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ABSTRACT

Author: Gillham, Alex, R. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: May 2018
Title: Eudaimonia and the Best Life: Epicurus’ Objective Goods Perfectionism
Committee Chair: Curd, Patricia
In this dissertation, I argue that there is a standard reading of Epicurus’ ethics (SRE). The thesis
of SRE is that Epicurus is both a hedonist and monist about the good, which entails that if
something is good, then it (a) is pleasure, (b) contributes to pleasure, or (c) constitutes pleasure.
If something is good in the sense of (a), it is intrinsically good. If something is good in the sense
of (b), it is instrumentally good, i.e., it is good insofar as it is a tool for securing pleasure. If
something is good in the sense of (c), it is constitutively good, i.e., it is an essential component of
pleasure. According to SRE, Epicurus argues that only pleasure is intrinsically good, but other
things can be good either instrumentally or constitutively. I argue in this dissertation that SRE is
incorrect.
Chapter 1 offers an overview of the key components of Epicurus’ ethics. It explains the
nature of pleasure and its kinds along with how they relate to one another; it does the same for
desire and its kinds. Chapter 1 also explores the relation between pleasure and desire, which
invites a reconstruction of Epicurus’ theory of action. This raises questions about which goods
are worth pursuing. Chapter 1 answers these questions and discusses what Epicurus takes goods
to be and what kinds of goods there are. Epicurus distinguishes between private goods and
external goods, which he adopts (I argue) from the Aristotelian distinction between internal and
external goods. Since Epicurus considers virtues to be goods, Chapter 2 explores the nature of
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virtue and its role in Epicurus’ notion of the best possible life. It offers a new reading of what
Epicurus has to say about what kind of thing virtue must be, what count as the particular virtues,
and why. I argue that Epicurus takes virtue to be an excellence with respect to one’s desires;
being virtuous is a matter of cultivating the right desires and then satisfying them appropriately.
Epicurus follows Aristotle very closely in identifying virtue as such, but I take care to show how
Epicurus modifies the Aristotelian notion of virtue. Chapter 2 also explores the relation between
virtue and pleasure. SRE takes this relation to be either instrumental or constitutive, i.e., it takes
virtue to be either an instrument for pleasure or constitutive of pleasure. In Chapter 2, I expose
the problems with both of these views, and I argue for a new understanding of the relation
between virtue and pleasure in Epicurus.
Putting together (a) my conclusions about goods and pleasure from Chapter 1 with (b) my
findings about the relation between virtue and pleasure from Chapter 2, I propose a new
alternative for reading Epicurus as an objective goods perfectionist. My thesis is that Epicurus
takes the final telos to be eudaimonia, something over and above pleasure. Eudaimonia is the
realization and pursuit of the best things in life: pleasure, knowledge, friendship, and virtue.
Epicurus insists we should sometimes pursue these goods for their own sake, although we should
often pursue them for the sake of other goods on the list; most often we should pursue them for
the sake of pleasure. My thesis requires a rejection of SRE because it argues that the goodness of
all goods is not derivative of the goodness of pleasure, which SRE considers the one and only
intrinsic good.
To attribute SRE to Epicurus is to insist that Epicurus endorses three more specific claims:
(1) that anything is worth choosing only for the sake of my own pleasure, (2) that if something is
good, then it is pleasure, promotes pleasure, or constitutes pleasure, and (3) that pleasure is the
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final telos. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 each argue against SRE (1-3) respectively. In Chapter 3, I argue
that Epicurus does not endorse SRE (1) insofar as he insists that friends should sometimes do
things for one another that are in no way for the sake of their own pleasure. Epicurus claims, for
example, that (a) friends should not always aim to get something for themselves out of friendship,
(b) friends should die for one another, and (c) we should feel pain when a friend dies. Similarly,
the gods engage in friendships but enjoy complete pleasure, which means they must choose
friendship for the sake of something other than their own pleasure since they already enjoy this
completely. To the extent that Epicurus exhorts us to become godlike with respect to our pursuit
of friendship, I argue that the same must be true of humans. None of these commitments, I argue,
is consistent with the claim that anything is worth choosing only for the sake of my own pleasure,
which means that Epicurus must reject SRE (1). In Chapter 4, I argue that Epicurus does not
endorse SRE (2) insofar he insists there are cases where knowing something is still good if it
does not promote or constitute pleause. This could not be true if Epicurus were to endorse SRE
(2), since its contrapositive entails that something is not good if it does not promote or constitute
pleasure. Here I also (a) provide a list of technical terms related to knowledge, e.g., truth,
justification, belief, and I (b) explore their place in the best possible life. I ultimately suggest that
Epicurus takes knowledge to be justified and true belief. In Chapter 5, I argue that Epicurus does
not endorse SRE (3) insofar as he insists there are goods that humans should cultivate, e.g.,
friendship, knowledge, and virtue, over and above even the most complete pleasure, which
means that pleasure cannot be the final telos, i.e., that for the sake of which we should do
everything else.

1

CHAPTER 1: PLEASURE, DESIRE, AND GOODS

1.1

Pleasure and Its Kinds: Kinetic, Katastematic, and Tranquility
Anyone who knows anything about Epicurus, whether through intense study or casual

conversation, would guess that Epicurus develops a system of ethics that places a premium on
pleasure, which he does. As Epicurus writes in the Letter to Menoeceus (Ep. Men.1),
And because of this we say that pleasure is the starting-point and the goal of living
blessedly. For we came to know this as our first and congenital good, and this is our
beginning for every choice and avoidance, and we arrive at this conclusion by judging
each good according to the standard of feeling.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν. ταύτην γὰρ
ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως
καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες.2
According to Epicurus, pleasure is the ἀρχή and τέλος of the blessed life; it is the measure by
which we choose some things and avoid others. Of course, when Epicurus says that pleasure is
the beginning and end of living blessedly, he does not mean that we should aim to rack up as
many pleasant sensations as we possibly can. It is well established that Epicurus distinguishes
among three kinds of pleasure: the kinetic, the katastematic, and tranquility. Each must be
perceived as pleasant to be pleasure. Kinetic pleasure is the pleasant sensation that I feel
whenever I am in the process of satisfying some particular desire and recognize this process as
pleasant. Katastematic pleasures are the feelings of satisfaction I consciously experience once I
gratify these desires. So suppose I find myself thirsty at t1. I experience kinetic pleasure at t2 as I

1

All abbreviations used in the body and footnotes of this dissertation to refer to or cite the primary
sources are taken from the 4th edition of the Oxford Classical Dictionary.
2
Ep. Men. 128. The translations in this dissertation are largely taken from Inwood and Gerson’s The
Epicurus Reader. I translate some passages somewhat differently, and I note where I do this. Any original
translations, or deviations from Inwood and Gerson’s translations, are italicized.
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drink water, and I experience katastematic pleasure after drinking at t3, once my thirst no longer
exists. Ataraxia, or tranquility, is what Epicurus calls complete katastematic pleasure.
Tranquility is present whenever I have neither pain in body nor worry in mind and realize that
this is so.3
Diogenes Laertius explains these notions of pleasure as Epicurus describes them in the
overview of Epicurus’ ethical positions in Book X of Diogenes’ Life of Epicurus (Diog. Laert):
He disagrees with the Cyrenaics concerning pleasure. For they do not accept katastematic
pleasure, but only kinetic pleasure, and he admits both types in both the body and soul, as
he says in On Choice and Avoidance and in On the Goal and in book one of On ways of
Life and in the Letter to his Friends in Mytilene. Similarly, Diogenes too in book
seventeen of his Selections and Metrodorus in the Timocrates take the same position:
both kinetic and katastematic pleasures are conceived as pleasure. And Epicurus, in his
On Choices, says this: “For freedom from disturbance and freedom from suffering are
katastematic pleasures and joy and delight are viewed as kinetic and active.
Διαφέρεται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναϊκοὺς περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς: οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καταστηματικὴν
οὐκ ἐγκρίνουσι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐν κινήσει: ὁ δὲ ἀμφοτέραν: ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὥς φησιν
ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τέλους καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ βίων καὶ ἐν
τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ
ἑπτακαιδεκάτῃ τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων καὶ Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ Τιμοκράτει λέγουσιν οὕτω:
νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς. ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ
Περὶ αἱρέσεων οὕτω λέγει: "ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν
ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.4
Kinetic pleasures are delights we experience as we go about satisfying our desires. Katastematic
pleasures are what we experience after having fulfilled particular desires. In this light,
katastematic pleasure looks like a sort of post hoc satisfaction that results from recognizing that
3

One might wonder whether pain in body and worry in mind are the same phenomena for Epicurus, or
whether they somehow differ. Unfortunately there is no conclusive answer in the extant texts. What we
can say is that both bodily pain and mental turmoil seem to be deviations from what would otherwise be
ideal atomic configuration and/or functioning. In other words, if it were not for the presence of bodily
pain and mental turmoil in some particular human being, that human being would enjoy complete
tranquility. In that light, both bodily pain and mental turmoil seem like the same kind of thing:
disturbances in our atomic makeup. Nevertheless, it is true that bodily pain and mental turmoil come apart
in where they occur. What Epicurus calls pain happens in the body, while what Epicurus calls turmoil
happens in the mind, i.e., the soul.
4
Diog. Laert. 10.136.
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we have achieved the fulfillment of some particular desire that we ought to fulfill.5 M can
experience katastematic pleasure in one respect but lack it in another, e.g., I can experience
katastematic pleasure from having eliminated my thirst even if I remain hungry. Complete
katastematic pleasure is what we experience once we have satisfied all of the desires that we
should have and have no desires that we ought not to have. Thus M achieves tranquility insofar
as M satisfies all desires that she ought to have.
In other words, I am prevented from enjoying complete katastematic pleasure by any
disturbance in body or in mind. A paradigmatic case of disturbance in body is hunger. A
paradigmatic case of disturbance in mind involves believing that the gods cause unhappiness for
mortals. Kinetic pleasures are present as I rid myself of these particular disturbances, so that
anytime I eliminate one of my bodily pains or mental troubles and it is not replaced by another, I
come closer to tranquility, which I fully possess only when I suffer from no disturbance
whatsoever in either body or mind. Let us return to the previous examples. Suppose that at t1 I
am both hungry and fear that the gods meddle in my affairs. I eat some bread and cheese, so that
I am no longer hungry at t2. I therefore experience some kinetic pleasure between t1 and t2 while
I eliminate my hunger, and I experience katastematic pleasure with respect to hunger at t2. I do
not yet enjoy complete katastematic pleasure, for I still fear that the gods cause unhappiness. At
t3, I read and come to understand Epicurus’ arguments for why completely blessed beings do not
meddle in the affairs of mortal beings, which precludes the gods from the sort of activity that is
causing unhappiness for human beings.6 As such, I enjoy an additional kinetic pleasure while

I say “that we ought to fulfill” because, as we will see shortly, achieving tranquility is not merely a
matter of satisfying the desires we happen to have, but of satisfying the desires we justifiably have, for
there are desires that we ought to have and ought not to have in the first place.
6
The argument is that the gods are completely blessed beings. Since having troubles and giving trouble to
other beings involve weakness, and completely blessed beings have no weaknesses, the gods have no
5
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ridding myself of this worry, and once I have eliminated this worry, I experience greater
katastematic pleasure than I did at t2. Once there are no other disturbances for me to rid in my
body or mind, I enjoy the greatest katastematic pleasure possible, and I achieve ataraxia.7
This means that tranquility can be episodic. I experience tranquility only when I
experience no pain or worry. Thus, insofar as I have no pain and worry at t1 but some at t2, I lose
my tranquility. At first glance, this appears to make tranquility too fleeting, since any time that
there is a disturbance in my mind or body, I lose it. If this is the case, then whenever I become
hungry, for example, I lose my tranquility. Although it is true that any disturbance detracts from
my tranquility, Epicurus argues that that tranquility is something more enduring than this might
suggest. For example, the paradigmatic case of tranquility is that of the Sage, who will be
properly disposed to handle any disturbances that arise. The Sage will know, for example, that
physical pains are short-lived and easy to endure, and it is unlikely that she will experience
worry, since worry arises, according to Epicurus, from false beliefs, which the Sage eliminates.
As such, although tranquility requires the complete absence of pain and worry, the best of us will
equip ourselves to deal with inevitable pains and worries swiftly, which means that our

troubles and do not give trouble to any other beings. Inasmuch as causing unhappiness for mortals would
involve giving trouble to other beings, the gods do not cause unhappiness for mortals. See Principal
Doctrine (RS) I.
7
There remain several questions about the relation between kinetic and katastematic pleasures that
require consideration. Do kinetic pleasures convert into katastematic pleasures once the desire being
satisfied is eliminated? Or does the kinetic pleasure end, and a separate pleasure, the katastematic
pleasure, arises? Let us return to the case of being thirsty. I enjoy kinetic pleasure while I drink, and I
experience katastematic pleasure once I have eliminated my thirst. Where does the kinetic pleasure that
accompanies my drinking end, and where does the katastematic pleasure of having sated my thirst begin?
From Diogenes’ description in 10.136, it seems to be the case that kinetic pleasure and katastematic
pleasures are numerically distinct and differ in kind; Diogenes calls them different “types” of pleasure. If
this is the case, then in any instance in which I experience enough kinetic pleasure to eliminate the
relevant disturbance, I will also experience a second and subsequent pleasure once I do so, a katastematic
one.

5
tranquility will be quite stable. It is for this reason that some have likened tranquility to a kind of
ability to deal with disturbances well, as Mitsis does in his The Pleasures of Invulnerability.

1.2

The Nature of Desire and Which Desires We Should Have
Since desires cause disturbances in our bodies and souls, and pleasure results whenever

we eliminate these disturbances, we should expect Epicurus to say quite a bit more about desire.
If we hope to piece together a cogent system of ethics from him, Epicurus needs to tell us what
desire is, to say what kinds of desire there are, and to tell us which desires we ought to have in
order to live the best possible life. Of desire, Epicurus writes:
One must reckon that of desires some are natural, some empty; and of the natural desires
some are necessary and some only natural; and of the necessary, some are necessary for
eudaimonia and some for freeing the body from troubles and some for life itself. The
steady evaluation of these enables one to refer every choice and avoidance to the health
of the body and the freedom of the soul from disturbance, since this is the goal of living
blessedly.8 For we do everything for the sake of being neither in pain nor in terror. As
soon as we achieve this state, every storm of the soul is undone, since the animal is not in
a position to go after some need nor to seek something else to complete the good of the
body and the soul. For we are in need of pleasure only when we are in pain because of the
absence of pleasure, and when we are not in pain, then we no longer lack pleasure.
Ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ κεναί. καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ
μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον: τῶν δ᾽ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν
ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν. τούτων γὰρ
ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν
καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος. τούτου γὰρ χάριν
πάντα πράττομεν, ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν: ὅταν δ᾽ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς
γένηται, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμών, οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῴου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον
τι καὶ ζητεῖν ἕτερον ᾧ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν συμπληρωθήσεται. τότε

8

Here Epicurus says that tranquility is the telos of living blessedly. Elsewhere (Ep. Men. 122) he says that
eudaimonia is a telos. Thus, there are questions about whether tranquility and eudaimonia are identical,
and whether we achieve them by living the blessed life. I answer these questions in Chapter 5, where I
argue that eudaimonia is an end more final and complete than tranquility, although we achieve both to
some degree by cultivating blessedness, which is to say that we accomplish both by making ourselves
godlike. Blessedness is an attribute of the gods, which means that we become blessed by cultivating
immortal goods, i.e., goods associated with the life of the gods. I discuss immortal goods more fully in
Chapter 2.
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γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρείαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν: ὅταν δὲ μὴ
ἀλγῶμεν, οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα.9
Here desires look like disruptions in what would otherwise be our normal constitution. Since
Epicurus is an atomist, this must mean that desires are deviations from our normal atomic
makeup.10 Whenever I have a desire, there is some storm in my body or soul, some disturbance
in what would be my ideal atomic structure if I did not have that desire. Consequently, Epicurus
seems to think that health in the case of human beings is characterized by the absence of
disturbance in how our bodies and souls would function ideally if there were no such
disturbance. Thus satisfying desires means eliminating disturbances such that our bodies and
souls return to their ideal states. This explains why when we dispel every storm in our souls, we
(at least unless or until some other storm arises) are no longer are able or need to seek something
to complete the good of the body or the soul [as Epicurus puts it]. Whenever I satisfy all of the
desires that I ought to have, I eliminate all possible disruptions in my constitution and I come to
achieve tranquility, which consists in a complete lack of disturbance in body and soul.
Since Epicurus seems to think that eliminating disturbances in our bodies and souls is a
matter of satisfying desires, it is tempting to think of him as a desire elimination theorist. In this
light, the aim is to eliminate the disturbance of desires, so we should eliminate our desires.
Epicurus does argue that we should eliminate some of our desires. Some desires are such that we
can never satisfy them, and thus they only serve to cause consistent frustration for us. This brings
to mind Gorgias 493b where Socrates analogizes the soul to a leaky jar. If our soul is a jar and
we are trying to maintain its fullness, some desires are like cracks in the jar itself, and so no
amount of water can fill the jar. Some desires are similar in this respect for Epicurus, e.g., the
9

Ep. Men. 127.
It is not clear what our normal atomic makeup is. This relates to questions about what it means for
humans to have a nature and for x to be natural for humans, which I discuss later in this section.
10
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desire for immortality, in which case we should eliminate those desires themselves.
Nevertheless, it would be misleading to consider Epicurus a desire elimination theorist because
there are certain desires that we should both have and satisfy, since they are necessary for our
survival or living the best possible life (or both).11
In the passage above, Epicurus draws two sets of distinctions between desires: there are
(1) natural versus non-natural desires, and (2) necessary versus non-necessary desires. Natural
desires are desires that a living thing has in light of the kind of the kind of thing that it is, e.g., it
is natural for humans to desire community with other humans because they have a nature suited
to interaction with other humans. Non-natural desires, also called empty, are desires that M
possesses because of the false belief that M needs to satisfy them in order to flourish; these are
harmful to the agent who possesses them. This is because they are groundless; there is no
justifiable basis for their possession. The desire for immortality is empty for me because it is
both a non-natural desire and a harmful desire for me to have. Since on Epicurus’ metaphysics I
am a temporary configuration of atoms, I am the sort of thing subject to dissolution and it is
therefore unnatural and impossible for me to be immortal. The unnaturalness of the desire
explains why it is harmful for me: because it takes as desirable something that is difficult or even
impossible to get, which means that the agent possessing it has un-satisfied expectations, which
in themselves are a source of disturbance in our souls. Unfortunately it is difficult to discern
what Epicurus means when he claims that x is natural for y, and so it is difficult to know what it
means for a desire to be natural for us. As Julia Annas points out in her Morality of Happiness,

11

I discuss the kinds of desires, along with which we should eliminate versus maintain and satisfy in the
next paragraph. I only aim to clarify here that desire elimination theories and desire satisfaction theories
come apart from one another. Epicurus thinks that a certain amount of both will be a part of the best
possible life.
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We do not possess in any of our extant passages a substantial Epicurean account of what
it is for a thing to have a nature. Nor does this seem due merely to the state of our
sources: Epicurus’ philosophy of science contains nothing like Aristotle’s careful
discussion of scientific concepts like those of nature and change…However we can glean
from the texts we do have various notions of nature which Epicurus employs. Thus he
uses it for what is objectively there, and for a thing and the way it is, as opposed to its
qualities and relations. He also uses ‘the nature of X’ or ‘the X nature’ in a way that
verges on periphrasis for ‘X’; thus a thing’s nature is what it is (what it really is, we
might say) as opposed to what merely happens to be true of it, or is true of it only by
virtue of its relation to something else. 12
If Annas is correct, when Epicurus claims that x is natural for y, what he means is that x is good
for y in virtue of the kind of thing that y is. This is consistent with the distinction between natural
and unnatural desires. This explains why an unknown scholion on RS XXIX tells us that,
Epicurus thinks that those which liberate us from pains are natural and necessary, for
example drinking in the case of thirst; natural and not necessary are those which merely
provide variations of pleasure but do not remove the feeling of pain, for example
expensive foods; neither natural nor necessary are, for example, crowns and the erection
of statues.
φυσικὰς καὶ ἀναγκαίας ἡγεῖται ὁ Ἐπίκουρος τὰς ἀλγηδόνος ἀπολυούσας, ὡς ποτὸν ἐπὶ
δίψους: φυσικὰς δὲ οὐκ ἀναγκαίας δὲ τὰς ποικιλλούσας μόνον τὴν ἡδονήν, μὴ
ὑπεξαιρουμένας δὲ τὸ ἄλγημα, ὡς πολυτελῆ σιτία: οὔτε δὲ φυσικὰς οὔτ᾽ ἀναγκαίας, ὡς
στεφάνους καὶ ἀνδριάντων ἀναθέσεις.13
The satisfaction of desires that liberates us from pain is natural because we are the kind of thing
that flees pain and pursues pleasure. The scholion also introduces the second distinction, between
necessary and non-necessary desires. Once again, Annas explains the distinction best: “The
desire is called necessary, then, because it is necessary for us to have its object: that is, its object
is something that we need rather than just what we want.”14 Necessary desires are for that which

12

Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford, 1993), 191. Annas notes that Epicurus offers no
thorough account of what it means for something to be natural, unlike Aristotle; nevertheless, she seems
to take Epicurus to think that to talk of something’s nature is to talk about what it objectively is. This is
what Aristotle means by nature. Hence Epicurus might be following Aristotle in thinking that to describe
something’s nature just is to describe what it essentially is (rather than what it accidentally is).
13
Diog. Laert. 149.
14
Annas, Morality of Happiness, 197.
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we require in order to survive and live the best possible life. Unnecessary desires are for the
opposite: that which we do not actually need in order to survive and live the best life.
We learned from Ep. Men. 127 that the evaluation of desires is important for the purpose
of living blessedly. Epicurus says more about which desires we should aim to satisfy in Vatican
Saying (Sent. Vat.) 71, where he writes, “One should bring this question to bear on all one’s
desires: what will happen to me if what is brought by desire is achieved, and what will happen if
it is not?”15 If what happens when the object of my desire is achieved does not take away from
the good of my body and my soul, i.e., if getting what I want will not cause some further pain or
worry for me, then it is permissible for me to pursue the desire for that given object. If it will
cause such disturbance, I ought not to satisfy the desire for that object. Further, the suggestion
seems to be that I should strive to undo the desire for that object so that I no longer desire it.

1.3

Epicurus’ Theory of Action
Consideration of which desires we should aim to have and satisfy invites us to consider

Epicurus’ theory of action. After claiming that pleasure is the first and congenital good in Ep.
Men., Epicurus goes on:
And it is just because [pleasure] is the first and congenital good that we do not choose
every pleasure; but sometimes we pass up many pleasures when we get a larger amount
of what is uncongenial from them. And we believe many pains to be better than pleasures
when a greater pleasure follows for a long while if we endure the pains. So every
pleasure is a good thing, since it has a nature congenial to us, but not every one is to be
chosen. Just as every pain too is a bad thing, but not every one is such as to always be
avoided. It is, however, appropriate to make all these decisions by comparative
measurement and an examination of the advantages and disadvantages.
καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν αἱρούμεθα,
ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβαίνομεν, ὅταν πλεῖον ἡμῖν τὸ δυσχερὲς ἐκ τούτων
Sent. Vat. 71. πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας προσακτέον τὸ ἐπερώτημα τοῦτο· τί μοι γενήσεται ἂν τελεσθῇ
τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπιζητούμενον; καὶ τί ἐὰν μὴ τελεσθῇ;
15
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ἕπηται· καὶ πολλὰς ἀλγηδόνας ἡδονῶν κρείττους νομίζομεν, ἐπειδὰν μείζων ἡμῖν ἡδονὴ
παρακολουθῇ πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομείνασι τὰς ἀλγηδόνας. πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονὴ διὰ τὸ φύσιν
ἔχειν οἰκείαν ἀγαθὸν, οὐ πᾶσα μέντοι αἱρετή· καθάπερ καὶ ἀλγηδὼν πᾶσα κακόν, οὐ
πᾶσα δὲ ἀεὶ φευκτὴ πεφυκυῖα. τῇ μέντοι συμμετρήσει καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων
βλέψει ταῦτα πάντα κρίνειν καθήκει.16
Scholars have often looked to this passage to justify the claim that Epicurus is a hedonist. Here
he claims that pleasure is the first and congenital good, that pain is bad, and that we should
consider the consequences for our pleasure that decisions might have by comparative
measurement of the advantages and disadvantages of those decisions. As Gisela Striker writes,
“…the two propositions that pleasure is good and that it is the only criterion of choice seem to
constitute Epicurus’ main argument for the main thesis of hedonism, ‘pleasure is the good’,
which can now perhaps be paraphrased more precisely as ‘pleasure is the only thing that is good
in itself’.”17 Many scholars agree with Striker on this point. They also take Epicurus to be a
hedonist, i.e., to argue for the conclusions that (1) pleasure is the only thing good in itself and
that (2) pleasure is the only criterion of choice and avoidance. However, there is disagreement
about what kind of hedonism Epicurus endorses: is he a psychological hedonist or an ethical
hedonist? If he is a psychological hedonist, he thinks that all actions that are undertaken aim, as a
matter of fact, for pleasure. If he is an ethical hedonist, he thinks that all actions that are to be
undertaken should aim for pleasure, although it is possible for us to aim for something other than
pleasure.
Some textual evidence seems to suggest that Epicurus is a psychological hedonist. He
claims, as we have seen, that the steady evaluation of desires leads us to refer every choice and
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(Cambridge: 1993), 8.
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avoidance to the health of the body and freedom of the soul from disturbance.18 He also appears
to claim, as we have seen, that we do everything for the sake of being neither in pain nor in
terror, and that pleasure is the starting-point for every choice and avoidance.19 These appear to be
empirical claims about what always motivates us: desire for pleasure. Neither of these claims
precludes us from making choices. Even if psychological hedonism is true, we can choose
between alternative courses of action, so long as each course of action aims for pleasure. This
does not require that I cannot choose between alternative actions a and b, unless neither produces
pleasure. Consequently, if psychological hedonism is true, I can choose between beer and wine
when I order dinner, but regardless of whether I choose beer or wine, the reason for both is the
same: I aim for pleasure. Similarly, I can only abstain from both beer and wine if I do so for the
sake of pleasure. Since Ep. Men. 128 and 129 seem to make the empirical claim that pleasure
always motivates us as a matter of fact, both offer prima facie reasons to consider Epicurus a
psychological hedonist, i.e., to think that all actions undertaken necessarily aim for pleasure.
John Cooper argues forcefully against Epicurus’ commitment to psychological hedonism,
and insists that Epicurus is instead an ethical hedonist. Cooper contends, for example, that the
“we” in the claims above refers to adherents of Epicureanism, not all humans. He also points out
that Cicero explains Epicurus’ theory of action using jussive subjunctives and the passive
periphrastic; certain actions ought to be chosen, and others are to be avoided, such that it must be
true that someone could fail to choose pleasure.20 Cooper also gestures toward RS XXV, which
claims that, “If you do not, on every occasion, refer each of your actions to the goal of nature,
but instead turn prematurely to some other [goal] in avoiding or pursuing [something], your
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actions will not be consistent with your principles.”21 Since the goal of nature here is the pursuit
of pleasure, RS XXV entails that it must be possible to go astray and not pursue pleasure, which
requires that psychological hedonism must be false. Cooper puts it in the following way.
And of course, in insisting on this, [Epicurus] is presupposing that it is psychologically
possible for a human being, even an educated and committed Epicurean, to act in pursuit
of other goals than pleasure as the ultimate object of their action – goals other than any
pleasure, goals other than pleasure according to any construal of the form or circumstance
of pleasure that is the right one to take as one’s ultimate guide in life.22
Cooper’s argument is, I think, successful. He is correct that if Epicurus is a hedonist, then he
must have been an ethical hedonist rather than a psychological hedonist. Furthermore, if this is
correct, then Epicurus must have thought that pleasure is the only thing that is good in itself, so
that in all of our actions, we should aim for pleasure, although we may sometimes fail to do so.
Cooper’s argument leaves open the possibility that, for Epicurus, it is possible to act in
pursuit of goals other than pleasure as the ultimate object of one’s action. Of course, Cooper
takes Epicurus to argue that one should not do this. According to Cooper, it follows from
Epicurus’ alleged commitment to ethical hedonism that one should always act in pursuit of
pleasure as the ultimate object of one’s actions, although this is something that we can fail to do.
This is where I disagree with Cooper about Epicurus. It is beyond dispute that Epicurus takes
some things other than pleasure to be good and therefore justifiable objects of one’s actions:
friendship, knowledge, justice, phronesis, honor, for example. Cooper of course realizes this –
that Epicurus takes goods other than pleasure to be worthy of pursuit. Nonetheless, his
interpretation entails that Epicurus takes these goods to be valuable, good, or choiceworthy only
because of their propensity to make our lives more pleasant, more tranquil, featuring less
RS XXV. εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως,
ἀλλὰ προκαταστρέψεις εἴτε φυγὴν εἴτε δίωξιν ποιούμενος εἰς ἄλλο τι, οὐκ ἔσονταί σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ
πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι.
22
Cooper, Reason and Emotion, 491.
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disturbance in either body or in mind. In other words, Cooper’s argument necessitates a reading
of Epicurus through which the value, goodness, or choiceworthiness of any object other than
pleasure must always be explained in terms of how that object contributes to our pleasure – our
kinetic pleasure, our katastematic pleasure, or our tranquility. Cooper’s reading takes pleasure to
be the ultimate aim of our actions for Epicurus, so that any other aim we can permissibly have
must be worth having only inasmuch as it tends to bring us closer to that ultimate aim in
pleasure. I deny that Epicurus is an ethical hedonist in this sense. While it is true that many of
our actions should aim for pleasure, Epicurus argues that not all of our actions should aim for
pleasure. There are goods that we should cultivate as part of the best possible life, the goodness
of which does not depend upon the goodness of pleasure. In this sense, Epicurus is a pluralist
about the good. I develop this interpretation in greater detail in the final section of this chapter.

1.4

The Standard Reading of Epicurus (SRE) and My Proposed Alternative
Cooper’s argument serves as a model for an ethically hedonistic interpretation of

Epicurus that many scholars in the secondary literature share. I will call this interpretation the
Standard Reading of Epicurus (SRE). The aim of this dissertation is to argue against SRE. The
Standard Reading of Epicurus consists of three claims: (1) that anything is worth choosing only
for the sake of my own pleasure, (2) that pleasure is the only intrinsic good, and (3) that the final
telos of human action is complete katastematic pleasure, i.e., tranquility. I argue that Epicurus
adopts none of these three claims. Moreover, he defends arguments that are inconsistent with all
three, which I use to show, by reductio ad absurdum, that he does indeed reject each of them.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 each argue against one claim of SRE. Chapter 3 argues against SRE (1)
insofar as Epicurus claims that friends should sometimes do things for one another that in no way
contribute to or constitute their own pleasure, which means, I argue, that the good of friendship
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sometimes require friends to take something other than their own pleasure as choiceworthy in
itself. Chapter 4 argues against SRE (2) because Epicurus rejects the contrapositive of the claim,
“If something is good, then it promotes or constitutes pleasure,” e.g., Epicurus thinks that there
are cases where knowing something, i.e., having a piece of knowledge, does not produce
pleasure or constitute pleasure and yet having this knowledge is good. Chapter 5 argues against
SRE (3) insofar as Epicurus thinks that there is some end more self-sufficient and complete than
tranquility, which means that it cannot be the final telos. Epicurus adopts the criteria that
Aristotle proposes in Eth. Nic. X for a final end: it must be (a) something at which we aim for its
own sake rather than for the sake of something else and (b) something that results in a life to
which nothing can be added to make that life better. Since Epicurus think that tranquility fails to
satisfy these two conditions, he therefore rejects SRE (3), i.e., that tranquility is the final telos.
These three claims are different, so Epicurus expresses different philosophical
commitments in rejecting each component of SRE. SRE (1) highlights a commitment to ethical
hedonism and ethical egoism, so that in rejecting it, Epicurus demonstrates an interest in
supporting the notion that something other than our own pleasure is choiceworthy in itself. SRE
(2) is an explanatory claim about what makes something that is good good; someone who
accepts SRE (2) believes that if something is good, then it produces pleasure, contributes to
pleasure, or constitutes pleasure, so that in rejecting it Epicurus argues that something can be
good independently of its relation to pleasure. SRE (3) is a claim about the final good, i.e., that
for the sake of which we should do everything else, so that in rejecting it Epicurus argues that
not all of our actions can be justified in terms of how they contribute to our pleasure. Put
otherwise, the claims come apart because SRE (1) is a claim about the truth of ethical hedonism
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and ethical egoism, SRE (2) is a claim about what makes any good a good, and SRE (3) claims
that tranquility is that for the sake of which we should cultivate all goods and do everything else.
Sent. Vat. 78 offers a convenient platform for beginning an argument against SRE. It says
that the noble man involves himself most with two things: friendship, which is an immortal
good, and wisdom, which is a mortal good.23 I argue against SRE that, for Epicurus, (1)
cultivating the good of friendship in the right way will sometimes require us to take something
other than our own pleasure as choiceworthy in itself, (2) cultivating the good of wisdom in the
right way will sometimes lead us to consider something good and worth pursuing even if it does
not contribute to or constitute our pleasure, and (3) that a discussion of immortal versus mortal
goods, along with what it might mean for mortals to be properly disposed to immortal goods,
invites us to see that something above and beyond complete katastematic pleasure should be the
final end of our actions. If this is the case, we must reject any ethically hedonistic interpretation
of Epicurus that takes goods to good and choiceworthy only with respect to their relation to the
pleasantness of our lives. More importantly, doing so requires us to reconsider how Epicurus
conceives of the relations among the various goods that will be a part of the best possible life.
I argue that far from being an absolute hedonist24, Epicurus is an objective goods
perfectionist. Parfit describes this kind of perfectionism as one under which we live a good life to
the extent that we accomplish or realize the best things available in life. He writes, “Consider
what I call the best things in life. These are the best kinds of creative activity and aesthetic
experience, the best relationships between different people, and the other things which do most
Sent. Vat. 78. ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ
ἀθάνατον.
24
To be an absolute hedonist, one must believe that pleasure is the only intrinsic good, not that it is one of
several intrinsic goods. The argument of this dissertation works, I think, against both ethically and
psychologically hedonistic interpretations of Epicurus.
23
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to make life worth living.”25 On such a view, the aim is to live the best life possible, and we do
this by pursuing a plurality of goods, some of which are good in themselves, some of which are
good for the sake of something else. Parfit’s list of goods is likely to differ from that of Epicurus.
It is doubtful, for example, that Epicurus counts aesthetic experience as one of the things that
makes our life go as well as possible. Nevertheless, Epicurus argues that eudaimonia is the telos,
which is the pursuit of the best things in life. Pleasure, in any of its three kinds, is one of these,
which means it will be worth pursuing for its own sake. However, there are other goods for
Epicurus the goodness of which is not always derivative of the goodness of pleasure: knowledge
and friendship, to give the two strongest examples.26 There is a plurality of goods that will be
part of the best possible life, and Epicurus rejects any ethically monistic explanation for the
goodness of whatever goods are on this list. Achieving tranquility is a necessary condition for
eudaimonia, for living the best possible life. Nonetheless, tranquility is not sufficient for this.
There are goods worth cultivating independently of their relation to pleasure. Some of these are
part of the final end and worth pursuing even once we achieve tranquility. Insofar as we pursue
them, we live the best possible life, which is more self-sufficient and complete than ataraxia.

1.5

Goods and Their Kinds
To claim that Epicurus is an objective goods perfectionist is to defend the view that

Epicurus takes there to be several goods worth pursuing for their own sake, although we might
sometimes pursue these goods for the sake of something else. For example, sometimes I might
pursue friendship for its own sake, and sometimes I might pursue friendship for the sake of

Derek Parfit, “Overpopulation and the Quality of Life,” in Applied Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford,
1986), 161.
26
I say “not always derivative” because there will be many cases where friendship and knowledge are
good because they contribute to our pleasure, but there will also be cases where friendship and knowledge
are good and worthy of pursuit if they do not contribute to or even take away from our pleasure.
25

17
pleasure.27 In order to understand which goods will be part of the best life, we must understand
what Epicurus counts as goods and what he takes goods to be. Epicurus considers the following
to be goods: pleasure28, self-sufficiency29, showing reverence for a wise man30, wisdom31,
friendship32, and phronesis33. What we must do is get clear on why Epicurus considers these to
be goods at all, i.e., we must understand how they are part of the best possible life.34
Pleasure is part of the best possible life because we are animals who pursue pleasure and
flee pain, although this is not all that we should do. To the extent that doing what is in our nature
promotes our well-being, and it is in our nature to seek pleasure and avoid pain, pleasure is part
of our well-being and is thus one of the best things in life. This is why Epicurus characterizes
pleasure as our first and congenital good; it is a good that we pursue along with members of our
species in light of our shared nature with them. Knowing why pleasure is a good helps us to see

27

This is what I argue in Chapter 3: that friendship is sometimes good for the sake of pleasure, and
sometimes for its own sake. I argue in Chapter 4 that the same is true for knowledge. In Chapter 5, I argue
this of some other goods: we pursue them sometimes for the sake of tranquility and sometimes for their
own sake, e.g., we sometimes cultivate μεγαλοψυχία, the virtue of sharing resources with those in need,
because it contributes to our tranquility, although we sometimes do this independently of our tranquility.
28
Since Epicurus claims that every pleasure is a good, he must mean that all three kinds of pleasure kinetic pleasure, katastematic pleasure, and tranquility, i.e., full katastematic pleasures, are goods worthy
of pursuit. I distinguish here between katastematic pleasure and tranquility and will continue to do so
because tranquility is complete katastematic pleasure (i.e., the total absence of pain and worry) while
there can be katastematic pleasure with respect to x, i.e., the reflective satisfaction that follows from the
kinetic, gustatory pleasure of consuming a tasty meal.
29
Ep. Men. 130. Καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν, οὐχ ἵνα πάντως τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα,
ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλά, τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρκώμεθα, πεπεισμένοι γνησίως ὅτι ἥδιστα πολυτελείας
ἀπολαύουσιν οἱ ἥκιστα ταύτης δεόμενοι…
30
Sent. Vat. 32. Ὁ τοῦ σοφοῦ σεβασμὸς ἀγαθὸν μέγα τῷ σεβομένῳ ἐστί.
31
Sent. Vat. 78. ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ
ἀθάνατον.
32
Ibid.
33
Ep. Men. 132. Τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν φρόνησις.
34
Unfortunately, I am unable to find any literature that offers a thorough consideration of Epicurean
goods, so much of this section will provide a fresh start into new areas of Epicurean ethics. To my
knowledge, no one has discussed the questions I undertake in this section, e.g., according to Epicurus,
what makes something a good, what things count as goods and why, what kinds of goods there are, etc.
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why at least some of the other goods on Epicurus’ list are also goods: because they promote or
constitute the pleasantness of our lives.
Self-sufficiency is a good because it prepares us to maintain pleasure under diverse
circumstances, and pleasure is one of the best things in life. Of self-sufficiency, Epicurus writes:
And we believe that self sufficiency is a great good, not in order that we might make do
with a few things under all circumstances, but so that if we do not have a lot we can make
do with a few, being genuinely convinced that those who least need extravagance enjoy it
most; and that everything natural is easy to obtain…
Καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν, οὐχ ἵνα πάντως τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα,
ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλά, τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρκώμεθα, πεπεισμένοι γνησίως ὅτι
ἥδιστα πολυτελείας ἀπολαύουσιν οἱ ἥκιστα ταύτης δεόμενοι…35
Self-sufficiency is a good because pleasure is a good, and being self-sufficient helps us to
experience pleasure and avoid pain to the greatest degree.36 This is because the self-sufficient
person has her desires in order, so that she only pursues what is natural and necessary for
survival and living the best possible life. Since, as Epicurus claims, these natural and necessary
things are easy to obtain, it is unlikely that the self-sufficient person will ever be dissatisfied and
will rarely experience pain. When extravagances come her way unexpectedly, she will enjoy
them to the highest degree because she is not accustomed to them. Therefore, self-sufficiency is
a good because it helps us get the most pleasure out of pleasant phenomena and makes it unlikely
that we experience pain from phenomena that are likely to be painful for those who lack it.
It is somewhat unclear why Epicurus claims that, “To show reverence for a wise man is
itself a great good for him who reveres [the wise man].”37 Unlike the good of self-sufficiency,
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Ep. Men. 130.
Thus self-sufficiency is an instrumental or constitutive good because it promotes or is an ingredient of
pleasure. It is not good in itself. Being an objective goods perfectionist does not require Epicurus to claim
that all goods are good per se, but only that there is a plurality of objective goods, i.e., more than one.
37
Sent. Vat. 32. ὁ τοῦ σοφοῦ σεβασμὸς ἀγαθὸν μέγα τῷ σεβομένῳ ἐστί.
36
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Epicurus provides no outright explanation of what it is that makes this kind of reverence a good
that one should cultivate. The most likely explanation is that my revering the wise man is good
for me because it can strengthen my resolve to emulate him. Just as the Stoics set up as their
model the Sage, who is an archetype for how someone rightly embodying their philosophical
commitments would live, Epicurus seems to be doing the same here. Epicurus often refers to the
wise person and what she will do, and these references do not seem to be to any particular
individual, but to be descriptions of the kinds of things that the ideal Epicurean would do. Sent.
Vat. 56-57, for example, claim that, “The wise person feels no more pain when tortured <than
when his friend is tortured, and will die on his behalf; for if he betrays> his friend, his entire life
will be confounded and utterly disturbed because of a lack of confidence.”38 What Epicurus
means is that the ideal Epicurean would die for a friend for the right reasons; he is creating a
model of Epicurean behavior, like that of the Stoic Sage. Such idealizing is common among
Epicureans. Lucretius praises Memmius, whom Lucretius takes to be the archetype of right
behavior, with the phrase, “deus ille fuit, deus” in his De Rerum Natura.39 Here the reverence for
Memmius is so strong that Lucretius calls him a god twice in the same line. Between Epicurus
himself and Lucretius, Epicureans consistently idealize those embodying their philosophical
principles. For this reason, reverence for a wise man seems to be a good because it signals and
strengthens commitment to the Epicurean life. It is a good worth cultivating because it helps
Epicureans put into daily practice the commitments of the school to which they belong.

Sent. Vat. 56-57. ἀλγεῖ μὲν ὁ σοφὸς οὐ μᾶλλον στρεβλούμενος <ἢ στρεβλουμένου τοῦ φίλου, καὶ ὑπὲρ
αὐτοῦ τεθνήξεται· εἰ γὰρ προήσεται> τὸν φίλον ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ πᾶς διʼ ἀπιστίαν συγχυθήσεται καὶ
ἀνακεχαιτισμένος ἔσται. The original text was unclear, but most interpreters seem to accept this
reconstruction, which puts Sent. Vat. 56 and 57 together by the 11-word lacuna contained in the brackets.
39
At Lucr. 5.8, for example.
38
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The final three goods on the list are wisdom, friendship, and phronesis. I will not enter
here into a thorough explanation of what makes these three things goods, since I discuss the
goodness of phronesis, friendship, and knowledge in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 respectively. However,
here is an example of how SRE and my interpretation differ with respect to their explanations of
the status of these three things as goods. SRE takes it that the final telos is pleasure, so that
anything else can be a good only inasmuch as it is an instrument for securing pleasure or is
constitutive of pleasure. I concede that in many cases, either will explain why wisdom,
friendship, and phronesis are good. For example, Epicurus claims that, “We do not need utility
from our friends so much as we need confidence concerning that utility.”40 When we consider
Sent. Vat. 34 in response to the question of why Epicurus considers friendship a good, the answer
seems to be that friendship makes us feel confident that we can get through hard times, which
undoes some of our worries about the future and helps us approach nearer to tranquility. In this
case, friendship is a good because of its instrumental value for our pleasure. In many cases,
wisdom will be a good for a similar reason. Since we can undo some of our strongest anxieties in
life through philosophy, philosophy, which produces knowledge and wisdom, is often an
instrument for securing tranquility. Epicurus famously insists, for example, that we can eliminate
our fear of death by reminding ourselves that it is nothing to worry about, since when we are
alive death cannot affect us, and once we die we cannot be affected by anything at all.41
Phronesis is often good for the same reasons, because pleasure is an end and phronesis helps us
achieve it. Since virtue is a part of the best possible life, and one cannot cultivate the virtues
without phronesis, phronesis is also good because it is part of the best possible life.
Sent. Vat. 34. οὐκ οὕτως χρείαν ἔχομεν τῆς χρείας <τῆς> παρὰ τῶν φίλων ὡς τῆς πίστεως τῆς περὶ τῆς
χρείας.
41
Ep. Men. 125. ὁ θάνατος οὐθὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδήπερ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ὦμεν, ὁ θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν,
ὅταν δὲ ὁ θάνατος παρῇ, τόθ’ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμέν. οὔτε οὖν πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντάς ἐστιν οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς
τετελευτηκότας, ἐπειδήπερ περὶ οὓς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, οἳ δ’ οὐκέτι εἰσίν.
40
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All of this is consistent with SRE. Nevertheless, I argue in this dissertation that while
wisdom, friendship, and virtue are often goods because they are instrumental in bringing about
pleasure or constitutive of pleasure, Epicurus also thinks that there are cases where wisdom,
friendship, and virtue will be good independently of their relation to pleasure. We should pursue
them as goods sometimes even if they do not promote or constitute our pleasure; we should
pursue them sometimes even if they have no bearing on our pleasure. SRE cannot accommodate
these cases since it insists that pleasure in one of its kinds explains the rightness of all of our
actions and which goods we should cultivate. For these reasons, I argue that Epicurus is an
objective goods perfectionist. Pleasure, self-sufficiency, reverence for a wise man, wisdom,
friendship, phronesis, pleasure, and tranquility are all goods worthy of our pursuit. It is true that
all of these goods will often be worth pursuing for the sake of something else on the list, e.g., we
often pursue wisdom, friendship, and phronesis for the sake of pleasure. However, since there
are cases where Epicurus insists that we pursue some of these goods not for the sake of
something else but for their own sakes, there is plurality of intrinsic goods, which are worth
pursuing at least sometimes for their own sakes. Eudaimonia is the telos. We achieve
eudaimonia by pursuing these goods in the right proportion. I explain why all goods within the
plurality of goods are goods in later chapters, where I argue against the claims comprising SRE.
Beyond understanding which things Epicurus counts as goods and why, it is important to
note that he also distinguishes different types of goods. First, there are what Epicurus calls
personal goods. Unfortunately Epicurus never gives any explicit indication of what makes a good
count as personal. However, we can gather that personal goods are dispositions that individuals
develop in order to live the best possible life. The notion of personal goods is mentioned only
once, in Sent. Vat. 45, which says that, “Natural philosophy does not create boastful men nor
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chatterboxes nor men who show off ‘culture’ which the many quarrel over, but rather strong and
self-sufficient men, who pride themselves on their own personal goods, not those of external
circumstances.” 42 In fact, there are no other uses of idion or any of its cognates to describe goods
in any of the extant writings. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable, I argue below, to suppose that
Epicurus takes personal goods to be similar to what Aristotle calls internal goods: goods of the
body and mind that one cultivates for or within oneself as part of the best possible life. By
contrast, external goods would then be goods that are a part of the external world or dependent
on others (rather than solely on oneself) that we have at our disposal for the purpose of living the
best possible life. I discuss the distinction between personal and external goods fully below.
For Aristotle, internal goods are goods of the soul, dispositions we cultivate, e.g., the
virtues. External goods are things in the world that we can take hold of and use in order to
flourish, e.g., money. There are two reasons to think that Epicurus adopts the Aristotelian
distinction between internal and external goods. 43 First, Sent. Vat. 45 suggests that natural
philosophy helps us to develop personal goods. This means that the knowledge and wisdom that
natural philosophy provides to us count as personal goods. Additionally, there is the suggestion
that natural philosophy helps us to cultivate self-sufficiency, which as we saw above involves
training in having the right desires so that we are able to avoid pain and experience pleasure in
the greatest number of possible circumstances. Self-sufficiency is important because it makes our
tranquility maintainable to the greatest degree, and tranquility is one of the best things in life.
Sent. Vat. 45. Οὐ κομποὺς οὐδὲ φωνῆς ἐργαστικοὺς οὐδὲ τὴν περιμάχητον παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς παιδείαν
ἐνδεικνυμένους φυσιολογία παρασκευάζει, ἀλλὰ σοβαροὺς καὶ αὐτάρκεις καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀγαθοῖς, οὐκ
ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων μέγα φρονοῦντες.
43
The two describe the distinction with different language. Epicurus uses “τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀγαθοῖς” to describe
personal goods while Aristotle uses goods “αὐτῷ”, and Epicurus uses “ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων” to
describe external circumstances while Aristotle uses “ἔξω” to get at the notion of external goods. Aris.
1360b24: ἔστι δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, ἔξω δὲ εὐγένεια καὶ φίλοι καὶ χρήματα καὶ
τιμή.
42
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Knowledge and self-sufficiency are not things in the external world that we can take and use for
our own purposes, but are rather goods we cultivate within ourselves. Thus, knowledge and selfsufficiency look like paradigmatic cases of personal goods, i.e., dispositions that individuals
cultivate in order to live the best possible life. A question therefore arises about what nonpersonal goods are. Sent. Vat. 45 contrasts personal goods with external circumstances, which
echoes Aristotle’s contrast between internal and external goods, so when Epicurus distinguishes
between personal goods and non-personal goods, he seems to be adopting Aristotle’s distinction
between internal and external goods. If Epicurus does this, personal goods are dispositions or
states, which means that pleasure, knowledge, reverence for the wise man, and self-sufficiency
would count as personal goods. Non-personal goods would therefore be bits of the external
world or goods that depend on others that we should cultivate as part of best possible life.
While Epicurus does seem to follow Aristotle in the division between internal and
external goods, it is likely that fewer things will count as external goods for Epicurus. Aristotle,
for example, argues that flourishing needs (among other things) wealth, political power, good
birth, satisfactory children, which are external goods.44 Since Epicurus argues that happiness is
up to us, and does not depend on external circumstances, it is unlikely that we will require many
44

Aris., 1099a31-b8. Nevertheless it is manifest that happiness also requires external goods in addition, as
we said; for it is impossible, or at least not easy, to play a noble part unless furnished with the necessary
equipment. For many noble actions require instruments for their performance, in the shape of friends or
wealth or political power; also there are certain external advantages, the lack of which sullies supreme
felicity, such as good birth, satisfactory children, and personal beauty: a man of very ugly appearance or
low birth, or childless and alone in the world, is not our idea of a happy man, and still less so perhaps is
one who has children or friends that are worthless, or who has had good ones but lost them by death. As
we said therefore, happiness does seem to require the addition of external prosperity, and this is why
some people identify it with good fortune, though some identify it with virtue.. φαίνεται δ᾽ ὅμως καὶ τῶν
ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν: ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον
ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ δι᾽ ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως:
ἐνίων δὲ τητώμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους: οὐ πάνυ γὰρ
εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενὴς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δ᾽ ἴσως ἧττον, εἴ τῳ
πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν. καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς
τοιαύτης εὐημερίας: ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.
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non-personal goods in order to live the best possible life. One non-personal good we will need is
friendship, which is non-personal in the sense that, insofar as it requires the presence of another,
it is not completely up to us to cultivate it. There will be an internal component of friendship; we
must cultivate a certain disposition in order to be a friend. Nevertheless, friendship is not wholly
up to us, and is therefore not strictly a personal good. As such, friendship is likely to be a nonpersonal good, which tracks nicely with the Aristotelian distinction between internal and external
goods. Both Epicurus and Aristotle think that friends will be a part of the best possible life,
although they are goods that are outside of us. Aristotle, for example, argues that friendship,
“…is an excellence or implies an excellence, and is most necessary with a view to living.”45
Similarly, as we saw, Epicurus argues that the noble man will be most involved with friendship.
Although Epicurus seems to follow Aristotle here, he updates the taxonomy of goods
beyond Aristotle’s contributions. Aristotle divides goods into the internal and external, but he
thinks that this is the only classification into which goods fall; he writes in Rhetorica that, “… a
man would be entirely independent, provided he possessed all internal and external goods; for
there are no others.”46 Epicurus offers yet another distinction between kinds of goods. According
to Epicurus, there are also mortal goods as opposed to immortal goods.47 Again, one can only
piece together what this distinction might be because Epicurus never states the conditions that
something must satisfy to be either. However, the distinction comes up twice in the extant
writings. It is first mentioned toward the end of the Ep. Men., where Epicurus tells the reader to,
Practice these and the related precepts day and night, by yourself and with a like-minded
friend, and you will never be disturbed either when awake or in sleep, and you will live
Aris. 11155a1. ἔστι γὰρ ἀρετή τις ἢ μετ᾽ ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ᾽ ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς τὸν βίον.
Aris. 1360b24. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν αὐταρκέστατός τις εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τά τ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά:
οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα.
47
Ep. Men. 135. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔοικε θνητῷ ζῴῳ ζῶν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς.
45
46
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as a god among men. For a man who lives among immortal goods is in no respect like a
mere mortal animal.
ταῦτα οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ μελέτα πρὸς σεαυτὸν ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς <καὶ> πρὸς
τὸν ὅμοιον σεαυτῷ, καὶ οὐδέποτε οὔθ’ ὕπαρ οὔτ’ ὄναρ διαταραχθήσῃ, ζήσῃ δὲ ὡς θεὸς
ἐν ἀνθρώποις. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔοικε θνητῷ ζῴῳ ζῶν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς.48
The second is in Sent. Vat. 78, where Epicurus exhorts us to cultivate wisdom and friendship,
one of which he calls a mortal good and one of which he calls an immortal good: “The noble
person is most involved with wisdom and friendship, of which one is a mortal good, the other
immortal.”49 Ep. Men. 135 asserts that there is a causal connection between living among
immortal goods and living as a god among men. The claim is that the cultivation of immortal
goods makes us godlike, i.e., striving for immortal goods brings us closer to living the kind of
life that the gods live. Cultivating immortal goods helps us to eliminate worries. Having no
worries is being like a god. Unfortunately, though, the claim remains opaque because Epicurus
never offers a list of immortal goods, nor does he say exactly what an immortal good is.
We know from Sent. Vat. 78 that friendship counts as an ἀθάνατον ἀγαθόν,50 but this
does not on its own clarify what immortal goods are. One possibility is that some goods are
immortal because they are not subject to dissolution like all atomic compounds in the cosmoi. If
this is the case, then mortal goods would be the opposite: atomic compounds are subject to
48

Ibid.
Sent. Vat. 78. ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ
ἀθάνατον.
50
One could question whether Sent. Vat. 78 makes wisdom or friendship the immortal good, since which
adjective is ascribed to which good remains ambiguous. The structure seems parallel to me; the first
adjective describes the first good and the second adjective describes the second good, so that wisdom is a
mortal good and friendship is an immortal good. Epicureans could in theory, intend for the second
adjective to apply to the first good and vice versa, but they would have no reason to confuse the reader in
this way. The Vatican Sayings, after all, were written to be short mantras that students of Epicureanism
could memorize in order to keep the tenets of the school clear and firm in mind. The saying also could
have been intended, in theory, to keep the order of the adjectival attributions vague, as if urging the reader
to think through it and figure it out for herself. Again, however, given that the whole reason the Vatican
Sayings were written was to clarify and reinforce the pillars of Epicureanism, this seems fairly unlikely.
Therefore, I think the structure is parallel; wisdom is the mortal good, friendship the immortal good.
49
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dissolution like everything else. On this view, immortal goods would be indestructible and
mortal goods would be perishable. There are several problems, however, with explaining the
distinction between immortal and mortal goods in this way. First, many of what Epicurus
considers goods do not at all look like compounds themselves. Suppose this first notion of
immortal versus immortal goods is accurate. Then all goods must be configurations of atoms.
Self-sufficiency, reverence for a wise man, friendship, wisdom, and phronesis, however, are not
configurations of atoms in themselves. They affect configurations of atoms. If they are πάθη,
which they seem to be, then this is precisely what they do: cause our atomic makeup to be a
certain way. In fact, this explains why they are goods: they change our own atomic structure in a
way that is beneficial for living the best life possible. Nevertheless, this is not to say that these
goods are atomic compounds themselves, and it is difficult to see how Epicurus could have had
such a notion in mind when he attributed immortality to some goods and mortality to others.
Second, Epicurus could not have meant for the distinction to mark off atomic
compounds that are indestructible from ones that are perishable because he strongly commits to
the claim that everything in the cosmoi is subject to dissolution, with one and only one
exception: the gods. In his Letter to Herodotus (Ep. Hdt.), for example, he writes:
…one must believe that the cosmoi, and every finite compound which is similar in form
to those which are frequently seen, have come into being from the unlimited, all of these
things having been separated off from particular conglomerations [of matter], both larger
and smaller; and that they are all dissolved again, some more quickly and some more
slowly…
Ἐπί τε τοῖς προειρημένοις τοὺς κόσμους δεῖ καὶ πᾶσαν σύγκρισιν πεπερασμένην τὸ
ὁμοειδὲς τοῖς θεωρουμένοις πυκνῶς ἔχουσαν νομίζειν γεγονέναι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου,
πάντων τούτων ἐκ συστροφῶν ἰδίων ἀποκεκριμένων καὶ μειζόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων· καὶ
πάλιν διαλύεσθαι πάντα, τὰ μὲν θᾶττον, τὰ δὲ βραδύτερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε,
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τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε τοῦτο πάσχοντα. δῆλον οὖν ὡς καὶ φθαρτούς φησι τοὺς κόσμους,
μεταβαλλόντων τῶν μερῶν. καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις τὴν γῆν τῷ ἀέρι ἐποχεῖσθαι...51
Epicurus claims here that originally there is the unlimited, and that all particulars are finite
compounds that come into being from it afterward. All of these will dissolve, although some take
longer than others to do so. Gods are the one exception; they are blessed and indestructible,
living eternally in the intermundia between the cosmos.52 As such, it would be inconsistent to
claim that Epicurus takes an immortal good to be one that is eternal and imperishable, since the
only things in the cosmoi that fit such a description in the extant writings are the gods. One could
respond by claiming (1) that these immortal goods might be part of the gods, so there is no
genuine inconsistency between the claims that (2) the gods are the only eternal things in the
cosmoi and (3) immortal goods are eternal. This would only raise more serious problems,
however, since the claim (4) at Ep. Men. 135 is that humans can also possess immortal goods.
The problem is that endorsing 1-4 together entails that humans could possess parts of the gods, a
claim which is not only difficult to work out in theory, but also lacks any support in the extant
writings. For these two reasons, it is misguided to cash out the distinction between immortal
goods and mortal goods by taking the former to be indestructible and the second to be perishable.
Alternatively, the distinction could amount to the following: immortal goods are those
that are part of the blessedness that gods enjoy, and mortal goods are those that are part of the
blessedness that mortals enjoy, although there might be cases in which humans can approximate
51

Ep. Hdt. 73.
It is unclear what the intermundia are, and how the gods can live eternally in them, especially since
Epicurus seems to think that everything in the cosmoi is subject to dissolution. Perhaps he means that
everything within the cosmoi is subject to dissolution, but the intermundia are not within but between the
cosmoi. This would explain why the gods live in them: in order to maintain their eternal status, gods must
live in something eternal. Of course, this would raise problems of its own. If this were the case, would the
intermundia themselves not count as something beyond the powers of dissolution in the cosmoi, when
only the gods are supposed to satisfy this criterion? I consider some of these problems in Chapter 5,
where I wrestle with the issue of whether there are gods and whether they are noetic projections or mind
independent entities. I argue the latter, although I think that this is inconsequential for my thesis.
52
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godlike flourishing by cultivating the goods associated with divine blessedness, i.e., immortal
goods. We know from Ep. Men. 135 that there is a general exhortation for mortals to pursue
immortal goods and become godlike, and we know from Sent. Vat. 78 that friendship is an
example of an immortal good. Since Epicurus places a premium on friendship in the good life for
mortals, we therefore know that friendship is an immortal good in which humans can share.
Whether the opposite is true remains unclear; I know of no texts in which Epicurus suggests that
the gods share in mortal goods. Regardless, this alternative seems like the more plausible
explanation for the distinction between immortal and mortal goods. The suggestion in Ep. Men.
135, after all, is that mortals can become godlike by pursuing the goods typically associated with
the gods, by emulating the gods with respect to the sort of goods related to their blessedness. The
suggestion is that the gods possess certain goods, and that mortals can approximate godlike
blessedness by sharing in them. Even if we set aside Ep. Men. 135 and Sent. Vat. 78 for a
moment, the distinction between mortal and immortal goods should still be considered with
respect to Epicurus’ metaphysical commitments in one of the two suggested ways. (1) Immortal
goods could be so because they are indestructible compounds and mortal goods could be so
because they are perishable. (2) Immortal goods could be immortal because they are the sort of
goods that immortal beings enjoy and mortal goods could be mortal because they are the sort of
goods mortals being enjoy. It is important to note that (1) is a claim about what these goods are,
while (2) is a claim about the kinds of beings with which they are usually associated. Admittedly,
there might be other accounts of the distinction between immortal and mortal goods.
Nevertheless, the accounts described here are, I think, the most plausible, and so we ought
choose between them. Given the problems that adopting (1) causes, since it requires that goods
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such as friendship in themselves are material compounds that are not subject to dissolution by
the metaphysical forces of the cosmoi, we should instead attribute reading (2) to Epicurus.

1.6

Conclusions
Epicurus distinguishes among three kinds of pleasure – the kinetic, the katastematic, and

tranquility. Kinetic pleasures are what we enjoy during the process of satisfying some desire,
e.g., the positive sensation I know and feel whenever I drink water while thirsty. Katastematic
pleasures are the episodes of satisfaction that result from having fulfilled some desire, e.g., the
experience of gratification I feel after I eliminate my thirst. Tranquility is complete katastematic
pleasure, a condition in which I experience no pain in my body or worry in my mind. On this
view, each kinetic pleasure is a step towards an episode of katastematic pleasure, and each
episode of katastematic pleasure is a step towards tranquility. Although all three kinds of
pleasures are goods worth pursuing in most cases, Epicurus recommends that we get our desires
in proper order, so that experiencing pleasure becomes easier and more in line with what it
means for us to live the best possible life. To that effect, he distinguishes between natural and
unnatural desires and also between necessary and non-necessary desires. We are to cultivate and
then pursue desires only if they satisfy two conditions. First, it must be natural for us to do so.
Second, it must be necessary for survival or well-being. Cultivating and pursuing only those
desires which meet these two criteria offer the surest path towards living the best possible life,
according to Epicurus. At our disposal there is a number of goods for this purpose, things we
pursue or properties we develop either for their own sake or because they help us to achieve or
realize the best things in life. Indeed, this is what makes Epicurus an objective goods
perfectionist: there is plurality of goods worth pursuing, some for the sake of pleasure, some for
their own sake, and some for the sake of other goods. Not all of these goods will be good
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because of their relation to pleasure, because they promote or constitute pleasure for us, although
in many cases this will explain why we pursue them. Tranquility is a necessary condition for
living the best possible life, and we will pursue many other goods in order to achieve it.
Nevertheless, the goodness of all goods on the list cannot be explained by the goodness of
pleasure. Thus they must be good for some other reason, and I argue here that they are good
because to pursue them, at least sometimes for the sake of themselves, is to be eudaimon.
Pursuing the plurality of the goods in the right proportion is living the best possible life. Some of
these goods are personal and some are external. Some are mortal and some are immortal. Among
these goods are self-sufficiency, reverence for a wise man, friendship, wisdom, and phronesis.
Finally, I close this chapter by bringing attention to some questions that Epicurus’ claims
about phronesis raise. We will see in the next chapter that virtue is intimately connected with the
best possible life. Pleasure is a good worth pursuing in order to live the best possible life, but it is
difficult to live pleasantly without living virtuously, and it is difficult to live virtuously without
living pleasantly. In the next chapter, I explore Epicurean virtue. Here I note that it is quite
difficult to decide whether Epicurus considers virtue a good. It is clear from this chapter that
phronesis is a good. In fact, the next chapter discusses some stronger claims about phronesis that
Epicurus makes: it is the greatest good, not only because it is a virtue in itself, but also because it
is the source of all other virtues. Thus we know that at least one virtue is a good, e.g., phronesis.
Let us now consider Epicurus’ account of what virtue is, which things count as virtues and why,
the relation between virtue and phronesis, and the connection between virtue and tranquility.
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CHAPTER 2: VIRTUE, PLEASURE, AND THE BEST POSSIBLE LIFE

2.1

Introduction

Epicurus writes at Ep. Men. 132,
Prudence53 is the principle of these things [i.e., searching out the reasons for every choice
and avoidance] and the greatest good. That is why prudence is a more valuable thing than
philosophy. For prudence is the source of all the other virtues, teaching that it is
impossible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honourably, and justly, and
impossible to live prudently, honourably, and justly without living pleasantly. For the
virtues are natural adjuncts of the pleasant life and the pleasant life is inseparable from
them.
τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν φρόνησις: διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφίας
τιμιώτερον ὑπάρχει φρόνησις, ἐξ ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ πᾶσαι πεφύκασιν ἀρεταί, διδάσκουσα ὡς
οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ
καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως: συμπεφύκασι γὰρ αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῷ ζῆν ἡδέως, καὶ τὸ ζῆν
ἡδέως τούτων ἐστὶν ἀχώριστον.54
Here Epicurus makes a number of rather strong claims about virtue and its relation to what most
scholars take to be the goal of the Epicurean philosophy: the life of pleasure. First, Epicurus
claims that prudence55 is the ἀρχὴ and μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν. This is puzzling in itself. Scholars often
take Epicurus to posit ataraxia as the final good, and it is somewhat unclear how to reconcile
these two claims. Perhaps Epicurus means to differentiate between the greatest good and the
final good, and the suggestion here is that on the path towards the final good, the greatest tool
that you can have at your disposal is the virtue of prudence.56 Perhaps to say that prudence is the
53

For ease of use, I will use prudence to translate phronesis into English.
Ep. Men. 132.
55
I discuss what it means for prudence to be the ἀρχὴ in Chapter 3.
56
This is consistent with the tough instrumentalist interpretation of the relation between virtue and
pleasure I discuss in Section 2.3. I aim here only to introduce some of the problems associated with how
Epicurus describes the role of prudence in the good life. Sometimes he calls it the greatest good, and
sometimes he describes it as an instrument for securing a more self-sufficient and complete good.
Ultimately I argue that the second reading is better, provided we have a proper account of what the most
54
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greatest good means that developing it is important for achieving the final good, which is
something else entirely.57
This solution raises other problems for Epicurus, since he attributes a primary importance
to other goods because they are part of the tranquil life, e.g., wisdom and friendship. For
example, RS XXVII claims that, “Of all the things which wisdom provides for the blessedness of
one’s whole life, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship.”58 It is unclear how Epicurus
can maintain that prudence is the greatest good – if what he means is that it is the greatest
instrument for securing tranquility – when he says that friendship is the greatest thing we have
for the sake of becoming blessed, i.e., tranquil. If he means to differentiate between the final end
and blessedness, then there is no tension between the claims. However, since he seems to suggest
elsewhere that blessedness just is a matter of living the tranquil life, this solution remains
unsatisfying.59 He says, as we have seen, that pleasure is the goal of living blessedly, i.e., that
living blessedly requires eliminating pains and worries. Epicurus could avoid this tension by not
counting friendship as a good, but we know from other places in the extant remains that he
refuses to do this. Sent. Vat. 78, for example, claims that, “The noble man is most involved with
wisdom and friendship, of which one is a mortal good, the other immortal.”60 This maxim also
seems to go against taking Ep. Men. 123 to mean that prudence is the greatest instrument for or

self-sufficient and complete end is: eudaimonia, not tranquility. Prudence is not good simply because it
promotes tranquility, but because it leads us to achieve eudaimonia, i.e., to cultivate the best things in life.
57
It is unclear whether Epicurus develops a unity of virtues theme in positing prudence as the source of
other virtues. On the one hand, claiming that prudence is the source of all other virtues does seem to
suggest that all virtue might reduce to prudence. On the other hand, it will turn out that cultivating
prudence will be necessary but not sufficient for developing the other virtues, as I discuss later.
58
RS XXVII. ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς
φιλίας κτῆσις. The claim here seems to be that the wise person knows what living the best life requires,
and the most important requirement is friendship. Thus wisdom can lead to the cultivation of friendship.
59
I argue in Chapter 5 that blessedness produces tranquility, which is not identical to eudaimonia.
60
Sent. Vat. 78. ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ
ἀθάνατον.
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constituent of tranquility, since Epicurus here claims that the noble person is most involved with
two other goods: wisdom and friendship. If Epicurus means to differentiate between nobility and
tranquility here, then there is no problem. It could also be the case that being most involved with
wisdom and friendship need not entail that either wisdom or friendship is the greatest good,
leaving room for prudence to play that role. Ultimately it remains difficult to discern just what
Epicurus means when he calls prudence the megiston agathon, but we can safely take it to mean
that prudence will be very important for securing tranquility, although there are other goods and
virtues that will be similarly important for that same purpose.
The second point about the passage that deserves attention is that Epicurus places a
secondary importance on philosophy in the best possible life, which is less valuable than
prudence. It is somewhat difficult to know what Epicurus means because he never explains what
takes philosophy to be. Although the extant writings mention philosophia or one of its cognates
several times, they are not very helpful when it comes to figuring out what Epicurus thinks
philosophy is. Sent. Vat. 41 tells us that we should philosophize and says that there is a correct
way to do so.61 Similarly, Sent. Vat. 54 says that we should not pretend to philosophize but really
do so, since what we want is not the appearance of health but health itself.62 This seems to
suggest that philosophy produces health or is a kind of health itself, presumably the health of the
soul, and that there is a right way to go about it. In Ep. Men. 122, Epicurus tells us
Let no one delay the study of philosophy while young nor weary of it when old. For no
one is either too young or too old for the health of the soul. He who says either that the
time for philosophy has not yet come or that it has passed is like someone who says that
One must philosophize and at the same time laugh and take care of one’s household and use the rest of
our personal goods, and never stop proclaiming the utterances of correct philosophy. γελᾶν ἅμα δεῖ καὶ
φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι καὶ μηδαμῇ λήγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀρθῆς
φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας.
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One must not pretend to philosophize, but philosophize in reality. For we do not need the semblance of
health, but true health. οὐ προσποιεῖσθαι δεῖ φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλʼ ὄντως φιλοσοφεῖν· οὐ γὰρ προσδεόμεθα
τοῦ δοκεῖν ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κατʼ ἀλήθειαν ὑγιαίνειν.
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the time for eudaimonia has not yet come or that it has passed. Therefore, both young and
old must philosophize, the latter so that although old he may stay young in good things
owing to gratitude for what has occurred, the former so that although young he too may
be like an old man owing to his lack of fear of what is to come. Therefore, one must
practice the things which produce eudaimonia, since if that is present we have everything
and if it is absent we do everything in order to have it.
Μήτε νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν, μήτε γέρων ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν: οὔτε
γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδείς ἐστιν οὔτε πάρωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον. ὁ δὲ λέγων ἢ μήπω
τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ παρεληλυθέναι τὴν ὥραν ὅμοιός ἐστι τῷ λέγοντι πρὸς
εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μήπω παρεῖναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι τὴν ὥραν. ὥστε φιλοσοφητέον καὶ
νέῳ καὶ γέροντι, τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν
γεγονότων, τῷ δ᾽ ὅπως νέος ἅμα καὶ παλαιὸς ᾖ διὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν τῶν μελλόντων. μελετᾶν
οὖν χρὴ τὰ ποιοῦντα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εἴ περ παρούσης μὲν αὐτῆς, πάντα ἔχομεν,
ἀπούσης δέ, πάντα πράττομεν εἰς τὸ ταύτην ἔχειν.63
Epicurus claims here that philosophy produces the health of the soul, which echoes Sent. Vat. 54.
He also says that philosophy is good for both young and old, although for different reasons. It is
good for the old because it makes them grateful for the goods they have experienced. It is good
for the young because it helps them to eliminate fears about the future. Thus, in both cases,
Epicurus explains the goodness of philosophy via its practical effects on the health of our souls.
As such, Epicurus argues in the passages above that philosophy is the practice of cultivating the
personal good of wisdom, which is a good because it promotes or constitutes our tranquility.
This is why Epicurus thinks that prudence is more valuable than philosophy. While
philosophy is good because it promotes the health of our soul and therefore brings us closer to
tranquility, prudence is the principle of all possible actions that aim for tranquility, which means
that prudence will play a more prominent role in producing freedom from disturbance than
philosophy. If this is the case, Epicurus appears to disagree with Plato and Aristotle about why
philosophy is good. Plato and Aristotle think that the pursuit of wisdom is good in itself, not only
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because of its practical effects.64 Nevertheless, such a notion of philosophy and its goodness is
consistent with SRE. If tranquility is the final end, the goodness of anything depends on whether
it promotes or constitutes tranquility.65 Thus if what we should ultimately aim for is the freedom
from pain and worry, and prudence allows us to make the right choices that bring about this
freedom, then prudence will turn out to be more valuable than philosophy, since philosophy will
be less helpful than prudence when it comes to making choices that bring us closer to tranquility.
Yet there are reasons to doubt that Epicurus thinks that prudence is more important than
philosophia. First, he seems to think that one could not have prudence without doing philosophy,
since prudence requires wisdom and philosophy produces wisdom.66 Both prudence and wisdom
are necessary for living the best possible life, so one might wonder whether Epicurus really
means to claim in Ep. Men. 132 that prudence is more valuable than philosophy, for philosophy
produces wisdom. Second, as there is room for debate about Epicurus’ view about the value of
wisdom, so too about which of the two is more valuable.67 Here again, Epicurus is unclear about
what wisdom is and how it differs from prudence. There are only two passages in the extant
remains that mention sophia. One is Sent. Vat. 78, which says that wisdom is a mortal good.68
The second is RS XXVII, in which Epicurus claims that wisdom provides many things for our
I say “If this is the case…” here because I argue in Chapter 4 that philosophy is not only good because
it promotes or constitutes our tranquility. Philosophy is also good because it helps us to obtain new
knowledge, and the goodness of all new knowledge cannot be explained via its effects on our tranquility.
65
Although, I admit that there is an open question about how the values of these other goods relate to the
final end that tranquility allegedly is. Some think that other goods can have value only as instruments for
the procurement of pleasure, e.g., David Sedley, while some think that other goods can have value as
constituents of pleasure, e.g., J. Annas. I explain each of these views, consider the evidence in favor of
them, and explore some of their problems in Section 2.3. I ultimately argue that both the instrumentalist
and constitutive views are mistaken, and I offer my own alternative for how to understand the role of
goods, e.g., virtue, friendship, and knowledge, in the best possible life.
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For ease of use, I will use wisdom to translate sophia into English
67
Chapter 4 addresses questions along these lines – can knowledge that (a) fails to contribute to or
constitute or pleasure or (b) detracts from our pleasure be good and thus worth pursuing?
68
The noble man is devoted most of all to wisdom and to friendship: one a mortal good, the other
immortal. ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ
ἀθάνατον.
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blessedness. The claim here is that wisdom, not prudence, provides many things that make us
blessed, friendship included; friendship is the greatest thing provided to us for the sake of our
blessedness, and wisdom provides it. How can prudence be more valuable than philosophy if
philosophy produces wisdom and wisdom provides the greatest thing? Perhaps wisdom requires
not only having certain knowledge, but that it is action-guiding, so that those with wisdom both
know the right things and how to incorporate them into our lives. Epicurus does think that one
must not only have certain philosophical beliefs in order to live the good life, but also that these
beliefs must be action-guiding, leading toward the best possible things in life. If this is the case,
there will be a strong relation between prudence and philosophy. To live the best possible life, it
is reasonable to think that one must have both prudence and wisdom, which is to say the wise
person will know the right things and incorporate them into their lives in an appropriate way.69
The third important point in this passage is that Epicurus takes prudence to be the
principle of all other virtues. He must mean that prudence is the source of all other virtues. This
is a striking claim, for it entails that one could not become virtuous without first developing
prudence. Here Epicurus follows Aristotle in thinking that seemingly virtuous conduct or
character is not truly virtuous without prudence. As Aristotle writes in Eth. Nic. At 1144b14,
…if a man of good natural disposition acquires prudence, then he excels in conduct, and
the disposition which previously only resembled virtue will now be virtue in the true
sense. Therefore, as in the part of us which forms opinions there are two types, cleverness
and phronesis, so too in the moral part there are two types, natural excellence and
excellence in the strictest sense, and of these the latter involves practical wisdom.
ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει: ἡ δ᾽ ἕξις ὁμοία οὖσα τότ᾽ ἔσται κυρίως
ἀρετή. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν εἴδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω
καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ᾽ ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ
γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως.70
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This is one of the theses of Chapter 4.
Aris. Eth. Nic.1144b14.
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Thus Epicurus and Aristotle agree that virtue requires prudence. However, Aristotle argues that
contemplation is a virtue in and of itself, and that it is the most complete and self-sufficient good.
“If happiness is activity in accordance with excellence, it is reasonable that it should be in
accordance with the highest excellence; and this will be that of the best thing in us…That this
activity is contemplative we have already said.”71 Happiness is the most complete and selfsufficient end, and Aristotle claims here that happiness is contemplative activity, i.e., activity in
accordance with the intellect because intellect is the highest excellence. Scholars refuse to say
the same of Epicurus for two reasons. First, Epicurus never claims in the extant writings that
contemplation is a virtue. Second, SRE (3) takes tranquility to be the only final good, so that
anything else can be good only insofar as it is an instrument towards tranquility or constitutive of
tranquility. If this is so, then Aristotle argues that contemplation is good in and of itself, while
Epicurus thinks that it is good only when it has positive effects on or for our tranquility.72
I argue in this chapter that virtue just is prudence in the sense that being virtuous means
cultivating and acting on the right desires for Epicurus. Before one can become virtuous in this
sense, one must know certain things, so in one sense knowledge must be cultivated before
prudence and the virtues. Before we can knowingly cultivate and act on the right desires, we

Ibid. 1177a11. εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὔλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην: αὕτη δ᾽ ἂν
εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν
ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ
τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. ὅτι δ᾽ ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται.
72
I also address this question in Chapter 4. Even if tranquility is the final end, so that anything else can be
good only inasmuch as it promotes or constitutes tranquility, the importance of wisdom for Epicurus has
been downplayed in the literature. For example, most who attribute SRE (2) to Epicurus do so because
they take prudence to have greater consequences for our tranquility than wisdom. See for instance
Chapter 13, “The Virtues and Philosophy”, of O’Keefe’s 2013 Epicureanism. My suggestion is that even
if virtue requires prudence, we should not take this to have any negative implications for the role of
wisdom in the best possible life. Prudence and each virtue require wisdom. One could not cultivate virtues
without knowing what they are, which is why one must do philosophy to live the best possible life.
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have to know about desires generally; then we must know what the telos is, and which desires we
must cultivate and satisfy in order to seek that telos. To that effect, Epicurus writes:
One must reckon that of desires some are natural, some groundless; and of the natural
desires some are necessary and some merely natural; and of the necessary, some are
necessary for eudaimonia and some for freeing the body from troubles and some for life
itself. The steady evaluation of these enables one to refer every choice and avoidance to
the health of the body and tranquility of the soul, since this is the goal of a living
blessedly.
ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ κεναί, καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ
μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον· τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν
ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν. τούτων γὰρ
ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν
καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος. 73
If we did not know these things about desires – their kinds, which are necessary, which are
natural, etc. –we could never know how to go about cultivating and satisfying them in a way that
helps us towards our end. We could not conduct the sort of evaluation of desires that Epicurus
describes without first knowing the taxonomy of desires and which ones to satisfy. In fact,
Epicurus argues that this is why we do natural science. “If our suspicions about heavenly
phenomena and about death did not trouble us at all and were never anything to us, and,
moreover, if not knowing the limits of pains and desires did not trouble us, then we would have
no need of natural science.”74 Thus it is misleading to take Ep. Men. 123 to speak to the
importance of prudence alone. Prudence requires knowledge about desires, while other virtues
require their own bits of antecedent knowledge. One could not become just, for example, without
first knowing what justice is. Without knowing this, we could not know which acts to perform in
order to become just ourselves. One might question whether ἀναλογιστέον in the passage above
carries the force of knowledge that I need it to carry to support my claim that some knowledge
73

Ep. Men. 127.
RS XI. εἰ μηθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν καὶ αἱ περὶ θανάτου, μήποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ᾖ τι,
ἔτι τε τὸ μὴ κατανοεῖν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ τῶν επιθυμιῶν, οὐκ ἄν προσεδεόμεθα
φυσιολογίας.
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must be prior to living the best life for Epicurus. Aristotle uses the same form of ἀναλογιστέον at
Rh. 1443b15 to describe what someone must “sum up.” He uses it to describe what must be
concluded from the arguments he already furnished. Epicurus seems to do the same thing in the
passage above. Ep. Men. only offers a sketch of the beliefs that one must have in order to live the
best life, while the more thorough arguments that provide evidence for these beliefs exist
elsewhere. If this is the case, then we need not worry about the use of ἀναλογιστέον in Ep. Men.
127. Epicurus uses it to describe something that Menoeceus must conclude, i.e., something to
believe justifiably in light of arguments for these conclusions Epicurus furnishes elsewhere.
Tranquility itself also requires us to have certain beliefs, ones that we can only cultivate
via philosophy. Epicureans commonly refer to the four-fold cure, the tetrapharmakos, the series
of four claims that someone must understand and endorse in order achieve tranquility. These
were so important that Epicurus included them as the first four RS.
I.

II.
III.

IV.

I.
II.
III.
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RS I-IV.

What is blessed and indestructible has no troubles itself, nor does it give trouble
to anyone else, so that it is not affected by feelings of anger or gratitude. For all
such things are a sign of weakness.
Death is nothing to us. For what has been dissolved has no sense-experience, and
what has no sense experience is nothing to us.
The removal of all feeling of pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures.
Wherever a pleasurable feeling is present, for as long as it is present, there is
neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of distress, nor both together.
The feeling of pain does not linger continuously in the flesh; rather, the sharpest is
present for the shortest time, while what merely exceeds the feeling of pleasure in
the flesh lasts only a few days. And diseases which last a long time involve
feelings of pleasure which exceed feelings of pain.75
τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει· ὥστε
οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.
ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δʼἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν
πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δʼἂν
τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθʼὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾖ, ουκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ
συναμφότερον.
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IV.

οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον
χρόνον πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῖνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς
ἡμέρας συμβαίνει· αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ
ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἤπερ τὸ ἀλγοῦν.

We must adopt belief (I) because achieving tranquility requires us to believe that whether our
lives go well is up to us, which cannot be true if the gods meddle in the affairs of mortals. Belief
(II) enables us to overcome the fear of death by showing that it is not bad for us, which therefore
helps us to eliminate our worries about death and come closer to tranquility. Belief (III) explains
that there is a limit to the magnitude of pleasures, which helps us to understand that all we need
to do in order to live the most pleasant life possible is eliminate our pains and worries. Belief
(IV) claims that what is difficult is easy to endure, which helps us to achieve tranquility because
it reminds us that even if we suffer, such suffering will be short-lived and pales in comparison to
the pleasure that we can expect from life if we live correctly. We come to understand and
endorse these beliefs through philosophia.76 Again, RS XI tells us that, “If our suspicions about
heavenly phenomena and death did not trouble us at all and were never anything to us, and,
moreover, if not knowing the limits and pains of and desires did not trouble us, then we would
have no need of natural science.”77 Having suspicions about heavenly phenomena and knowing
the limits of our pains and desires cause disturbances in us, which we can only eliminate through
coming to know certain things, and the claim here is that we do this through natural science.
Natural science, however, is one part of philosophy, so that when we do natural science, we also
do philosophy: Diogenes tells us that, “We must begin with [the first epistle, i.e., Ep. Hdt.] after
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In Chapter 4 I explore the sense in which knowing things can be good for Epicurus. There I argue that
knowledge is sometimes good independently of its propensity to promote or constitute tranquility.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that most cases of knowing something are good because they are
instruments for or constitutive of happiness; beliefs I-IV seem to be good in one of these two senses.
77
RS XI. εἰ μηθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν καὶ αἱ περὶ θανάτου, μήποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ᾖ τι,
ἔτι τε τὸ μὴ κατανοεῖν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ τῶν επιθυμιῶν, οὐκ ἄν προσεδεόμεθα
φυσιολογίας.
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some preliminary remarks upon Epicurus’ division of philosophy. It is divided into three parts:
canonic, physics, and ethics.”78 When we do natural science (and therefore philosophy), the
possession of the knowledge itself brings us closer to tranquility; it is not that the knowledge
happens to be action-guiding in a way that brings us closer to tranquility. Thus, some knowledge
that tranquility requires results from philosophy rather than prudence. If this is the case, then
Epicurus means that living the best possible life will require both philosophy and prudence.
Fourth and finally, the passage with which I opened this chapter (1) tells us what the
other virtues are, e.g., honor and justice, and it also (2) describes the relation between virtue and
pleasure. Epicurus tells us that one cannot live pleasantly without living virtuously and vice
versa.79 Some questions: Does the attainment of virtue or pleasure come first? Does pleasure
supervene on the virtuous life? Or does virtue supervene on pleasure? Alternatively, do the two
lives come about at the same time? Are virtue and pleasure identical? Does having one entail that
one has the other at the same time? Section 2.3 (1) describes some answers to these questions
from the secondary literature; (2) explores the inadequacies of these answers; and (3) develops a
new view on the relation between virtue and pleasure that can better answer all of these
questions.
Although there is considerable scholarship on the relation between the virtuous life and
pleasant life in Epicurus, a thorough account of Epicurus’ notion of virtue has not yet been given.
This is understandable. Since the consensus is that Epicurus is a hedonist who incorporates some
elements of virtue theory into his ethical theory, the aim in most literature has been to
demonstrate how virtue fits into the life of pleasure rather than to offer an independent analysis
of the nature of virtue in Epicurus’ philosophy. One problem is that Epicurus offers no
Diog. Laert. 10.29. ἀρκτέον δὴ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης, ὀλίγα προειπόντα περὶ τῆς διαιρέσεως τῆς κατ᾽ αὐτὸν
φιλοσοφίας. Διαιρεῖται τοίνυν εἰς τρία, τό τε κανονικὸν καὶ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν.
79
There is some debate about how to interpret this claim; see Section III.
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discussion about the kind of thing that virtue is or what things count as virtues (as Aristotle
does). We do know, however, that Epicurus takes some things to count as virtues, and we know
how these virtues relate to one another: they all have their origin in prudence, the principle of all
other virtues. So, although the extant texts contain no clear analysis of virtue from Epicurus
himself, we can develop Epicurus’ account of virtue indirectly, working from related texts.

2.2

What Counts as Virtue and Why
What the specific virtues are depend on which Epicurean we consider, for different

Epicureans list different virtues. Later Epicureans, e.g., Philodemus, talk about virtues that
appear nowhere in the extant writings of Epicurus. We know from Ep. Men. 132 that Epicurus
counts prudence, justice, and honor as virtues. He also might have counted friendship as a virtue;
this depends on whether we translate Sent. Vat. 23 to say that every friendship is a virtue or every
friendship is worth choosing.80 In the conclusion to Chapter 1, I claimed that there is an open
question about whether Epicurus takes virtue to be a good. If one takes Sent. Vat. 23 to say that
friendship is a virtue, then at least one virtue would be a good, since Epicurus claims that
friendship is an immortal good. Aside from Ep. Men. 132 and the first reading of Sent. Vat. 23,
Epicurus nowhere else in the extant writings mentions whether there are any other virtues.

Sent. Vat. 23. πᾶσα φιλία διʼ ἑαυτὴν ἀρετή· ἀρχὴν δὲ εἴληφεν ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας. Usener emended the
text to read αἱρετή rather than ἀρετή, which was widely accepted. Some reject the emendation, e.g., E.
Brown, Sedley, and D. Armstrong. Either translation causes trouble for SRE (1), which claims that only
one’s own pleasure is good in itself, i.e., worth choosing per se. Without the emendation, Epicurus still
claims elsewhere that friendship requires us to consider something other than our own pleasure good in
itself, which is inconsistent with SRE (1). With the emendation, friendship is worth choosing in and of
itself. This contradicts SRE (1) even more strongly. Since friendship is worth choosing in and of itself,
and friendship is a virtue, it follows that (at least one) virtue is also worth choosing in and of itself. I
discuss Sent. Vat. 23, the emendation to it, and the problems that both raise for SRE in Chapter 3.
80
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Torquatus, the spokesperson for Epicureanism in Cicero’s De Finibus (Fin.) gives a more
expansive list of virtues. He claims the cardinal virtues are justice, wisdom81, temperance and
courage:
Justice remains in order for all virtue be spoken of; but the same things are able to be said
about it. Wisdom, temperance and courage I have shown to be so closely linked with
pleasure that they are not able in any way to be separated or extracted from it.
Iustitia restat, ut de omni virtute sit dictum. sed similia fere dici possunt. ut enim
sapientiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem copulatas esse docui cum voluptate, ut ab ea
nullo modo nec divelli nec distrahi possint.82
Unfortunately, Ep. Men. 132, Sent. Vat. 23, Fin. 1.50, and Philodemus’ On Piety are the only
three texts in which Epicurus or a follower gives an explicit list of virtues. Some scholars discuss
other virtues as a feature of Epicureanism. O’Keefe, for example, discusses the importance of
theoretical wisdom in Epicurus after discussing the importance of prudence, i.e. phronesis, as if
theoretical wisdom were also a virtue for Epicurus.83 McConnell adds μεγαλοψυχία to the list of
virtues, which he translates as greatness of soul; it is an attitude towards external goods that leads
us to share extra resources with others.84 No mention of this particular virtue remains in
Epicurus’ extant writings. It only appears a few times in later writings, mostly in Philodemus,
although McConnell does show convincingly that Epicurus himself stresses the importance of
detachment from external goods and sharing our resources with friends, which suggests that
Epicurus might have had something like the virtue of greatness of soul in mind. DeWitt attributes
a rather long list of virtues to Epicurus: wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, friendship, love of
81

It is not clear whether Torquatus means prudence or theoretical wisdom here. He calls it the art of
living, which suggests he means it to be prudence. However, the original text uses sapientia, which
suggests theoretical wisdom; otherwise it would have been more fitting to use prudentia. Torquatus also
says a few sentences later that we need wisdom to eliminate errors and prejudices, not just guide our
actions towards pleasure, which also suggests that he might be considering theoretical wisdom a virtue.
82
Cic., Fin. 1.50. My translation.
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O’Keefe, Epicureanism, “The Virtues and Philosophy”, 133, “We also need theoretical wisdom: a
proper understanding of the principles of atomism and how they can explain the world around us.”
84
Sean McConnell, “The Epicurean Virtue of μεγαλοψυχία”, Classical Philosophy 112, no. 2 (2017).
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mankind, suavity, considerateness, hope, honesty, faith, and gratitude.85 The last seven of this
list are attributed to Epicurus by no other scholar, so it might seem that DeWitt is taking
considerable liberty with what Epicurus counted as a virtue. It is unclear what DeWitt takes
virtue in general to be, so we cannot know why he counts these seven as virtues. DeWitt favors
the instrumentalist interpretation of the relation between pleasure and virtue, which I explain and
argue against in the next section of this chapter. He writes, for example, that, “…virtue is chosen
for the sake of pleasure and not the contrary.”86 Since he thinks that virtue is good only as an
instrument for securing pleasure, perhaps what he means is that wisdom, temperance, courage,
justice, friendship, love of mankind, suavity, considerateness, hope, honesty, faith, and gratitude
are virtues because they make our lives pleasant. Dewitt seems to think that virtues are
excellences that help us to achieve our end, which Epicurus takes to be pleasure. If this is the
case, then anything that helps us to achieve our end in pleasure turns out to be a virtue.
This raises a fundamental question: what does Epicurus take virtue to be? Only after
answering this can one hope to put together an exhaustive list of what satisfies the necessary
conditions for counting as a particular virtue. Ep. Men. 132 says that prudence is the source of all
other virtues, i.e., those other than honor and justice, which certainly suggests that there must be
virtues other than the ones listed. The problem is that Epicurus himself never says much about
what virtue is in a way that could help us identify what might count as virtues. If a virtue is just
an excellence that helps us live the best possible life, then it would seem to be the case that any
disposition we could cultivate as a part of the best life ought to count as a virtue. If this were the
case, then to the extent that the seven things DeWitt lists indeed help us to live the best possible
life, then they would count as virtues – even if Epicurus himself never calls them virtues.
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However, if Epicurus has some more restrictive definition of virtue, the list will be
smaller, much like the one given to us in the extant writings. When Torquatus explains how the
cardinal virtues fit into the good life, he also provides a list of what seem like vices, although he
never outright calls them vices.87 Torquatus’ aim in the relevant sections of Fin. is to explain
what the four cardinal virtues are and how they play a part in the best life; one strategy that he
employs is to describe some of the opposites of the cardinal virtues, i.e., vices. If we can get
clear about what these opposites are, how they come about, and what explains their badness, we
could work from this to put together an account of the virtues, how they come about, and what
explains their goodness, i.e., their being virtues. Insofar as to be vicious is to have and exercise
bad states of character and to be virtuous is to have and exercise good states of character, there
will be a virtue that we should cultivate that is opposite to each vice that we should avoid. This is
not to say that one must be either virtuous or vicious; one could be neither. This is to say that for
each virtue that we should cultivate, there is some contrary vice that we should aim to avoid.
Torquatus claims that, “…just as rashness, license and cowardice always excruciate the
mind, ever awaken trouble and disturbance, so unrighteousness, when firmly rooted in the heart,
causes disturbance by the mere fact of its very presence.”88 Here rashness, cowardice, license,
and unrighteousness appear juxtaposed to three of the four cardinal virtues at work in Stoicism
(the major contemporary school competing with Epicureanism in the Hellenistic period):
courage, temperance, and justice. Rashness and cowardice both consist partially in an absence of
courage, i.e., an excess or deficiency of fear; someone who fears too little is rash, while someone
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who fears too much is cowardly.89 License opposes temperance, and unrighteousness opposes
justice. Interestingly, Torquatus does not mention prudence at this point, which we might expect
him to do in light of Epicurus’ claim that this is the principle of all other virtues.90 In any case,
rashness, cowardice, license, and unrighteousness appear here as hallmark cases of vice.
Furthermore, Torquatus even tells us why we should avoid them. What explains the badness of
these vices is that they produce restlessness in us, i.e., they cause disturbance and thus diminish
tranquility. If something is a vice because it causes pain in our bodies and disturbance in our
soul, and vice is the opposite, virtue is what helps us get by without experiencing bodily pain or
mental turmoil. Virtue thus leads us to choose what either (1) helps us to achieve tranquility
when do not have it or (2) helps us maintain tranquility once we have already achieved it. 91
Attributing such a notion of virtue to Epicurus gains further support upon consideration
of how Torquatus describes the relation between desire, vice, and virtue later in Fin.:
Yet nevertheless some men indulge without limit their avarice, ambition and love of
power, lust, gluttony and those other desires, which ill-gotten gains can never diminish
but rather must inflame the more; insomuch that they seem as if they should be restrained
rather than reformed. True reason calls those of sound natures, therefore, to justice,
fairness, and honesty.
et tamen in quibusdam neque pecuniae modus est neque honoris neque imperii nec
libidinum nec epularum nec reliquarum cupiditatum, quas nulla praeda umquam improbe
parta minuit, [sed] potius inflammat, ut coercendi magis quam dedocendi esse videantur.
Invitat igitur vera ratio bene sanos ad iustitiam, aequitatem, fidem…92
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Avarice, excessive ambition, love of power, and gluttony are added at this point to the list of
dispositions contrary to virtue. Most important for our aim is Torquatus’ description of how
these vices come about. The claim is that humans develop these dispositions towards vicious
actions because they do not manage their desires properly. Each of these vices involves failing to
restrain one’s desires appropriately or giving into them inappropriately. This explains why men
of sound natures are “invited” by “true reason93” to the virtues of justice, equity, and honesty.
This reveals what we must to do live the best life. One such thing is know the nature of desires.
Once we learn this, we develop self-control, and therefore our desires are in order. Thus,
…fortitude against the fear of death is provided by natural philosophy, as is resilience
against the terror of religion; peace of mind, for it removes all ignorance of the mysteries
of things; self-control, for it explains the nature of the desires and their different kinds...
…sic e physicis et fortitudo sumitur contra mortis timorem et constantia contra metum
religionis et sedatio animi omnium rerum occultarum ignoratione sublata et moderatio
natura cupiditatum generibusque earum explicatis…94
That Torquatus turns here to discuss how natural philosophy helps us to avoid vice is interesting
in itself. We saw in the opening passage of this chapter that Epicurus seems to subordinate
philosophy to prudence in terms of importance; he calls prudence the greatest good, and says that
it is more valuable than philosophy. Here Torquatus seems to say something different: there is a
level of wisdom that is a prerequisite for prudence. Then again, to the extent that Epicurus seems
to take wisdom to be a necessary condition for prudence, perhaps Torquatus is saying the same
thing differently. Whatever difference there might be between them, they both seem to claim we
are sound in nature when we (1) eliminate desires that preclude us from living the best possible
life and (2) pursue only those desires which help us to live the best possible life. Torquatus’
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claims here suggest that having and satisfying the wrong desires makes us vicious, while having
and satisfying the right desires does the opposite: it makes us virtuous, i.e., sound in nature.
With all this in mind, we are in a position now to say what Epicurus takes virtue to be. If
we can trust Torquatus’ claims in De Finibus, Epicurean virtue is a matter of cultivating and
eliminating certain desires. M has virtue when M knowingly arranges and satisfies M’s desires
properly, i.e., M is virtuous when a knowledge of desire in general and the nature of M’s telos
enables M to cultivate and gratify desires only for what helps M to live the best life possible.
This explains, I think, why Epicurus would claim that prudence is the source of all other
particular virtues. Prudence helps us (1) discover which desires we should have in order to live
the best life, (2) get ourselves into a state in which we only desire those things, and (3) know
how to satisfy those desires in a way that most effectively helps us to live the best life possible.
Epicurean virtue is a state of excellence with respect to desires and the proper courses of action
towards which they lead. Being virtuous means having the proper desires and satisfying them
properly, which is a very Aristotelian account of virtue. Aristotle thinks that virtue requires
desiring the right things, at the right times, in the right way, and pursuing those desires
appropriately. Epicurus follows Aristotle quite closely when it comes to the nature of virtue.

2.3

The Relation between Virtue and Pleasure
The relation between the virtuous life and the pleasant life has received considerable

attention. There are two dominant views. T. O’Keefe writes, “Epicurus holds that only one’s own
pleasure has intrinsic value. A consequence of this is that anything else that has value must have
value as either (i) a constituent of one’s own pleasure or (ii) as a means to one’s own pleasure.”95
The different alternatives reduce to whether virtue is a means to pleasure or a constituent of
95
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pleasure, and most scholars take one of these two views. Annas, for example, takes the first and
insists that virtue is good as an important component of one’s own pleasure. She admits that we
originally develop virtues strictly as means towards our pleasure, but insists that Epicurus takes
virtues to grow in importance so much that they end up being valuable not merely as instruments
for our pleasure, but as constituents of our very happiness. In that light, she attributes a view like
Mill’s to Epicurus, whereby something that initially has merely instrumental value can grow in
importance to be valuable intrinsically as a part of the end itself, inseparable from it. Mill seems
to think, for example, that while money and power have instrumental value for the sake of
achieving happiness, some come to value money and power as ends in themselves. There are
also those who take virtue to be good only in the other sense O’Keefe describes, solely as a
means to one’s pleasure. Sedley, for example, calls his own approach to the relation between
virtue and pleasure in Epicurus the ‘tough instrumentalist’ view of practical virtues.96 A.H.
Armstrong describes Sedley’s approach as one, “…according to which [the virtues’] value is
entirely dependent on the contribution they make to securing the most pleasant possible life.”97
There are difficulties with both the constitutivist and instrumentalist views. Here I point
to the shortcomings of each to prepare for a different account of the role of virtue in Epicurus’
account of the best life. The problems with the constitutivist and instrumentalist views are so
serious that one should reject both, and even the strongest cases for these views do not require us
to attribute them to Epicurus. More to the point, I argue here that we should refuse to do so.
In support of the constitutivist view, Annas points to Ep. Men. 132, where Epicurus says
the virtues are inseparable from the pleasant life. She translates the passage differently to
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emphasize her view that virtue is constitutive of the pleasant life; “In translating sumpephukasi
as ‘grown to be a part of’ I am obviously influenced by Mill’s solution to his analogous problem
in Utilitarianism Chapter 4.”98 Annas thinks that if virtue “grows to be a part of” pleasure, to the
point where the two are inseparable from one another, then virtue and pleasure must together
constitute the happiness we all seek. She also points to Diog. Laert. 10.138 as evidence for her
view: “…Epicurus says that only virtue is inseparable from pleasure, and that other things, such
as food, may be separated [from pleasure].”99 If Annas’ claim is that the inseparability of
pleasure and virtue supports the constitutivist view, then she could also point to RS V, which
claims that living pleasantly cannot be done without living prudently, honorably, and honorably,
and vice verse; that M could not live one life without living the other seems to suggest that the
two are inseparable.100 Annas thinks that to say virtue and pleasure are inseparable is to say that
virtue is constitutive of pleasure. A number of other passages in the extant writings make a
similar point. Cicero himself seems to attribute the claim that virtue is constitutive of pleasure to
Epicurus. In Fin. he writes, “What was said about the virtues is also the case for friendship: [the
Epicureans] deny that it can be separated from pleasure.”101 Cicero continues to write, “What has
been said about the virtues, that they are always essentially connected to pleasures, must be also
said about friendship. For splendidly Epicurus says nearly these same words…”102 It is striking
that while Cicero is often dismissive of Epicurus, he praises him here. Cicero thinks that virtue is
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always essentially connected to pleasure, and he attributes the same view to Epicurus. This
supports the constitutivist view because to say that virtue and pleasure are essentially connected
is to say that the two cannot be separated from one another. This is what Annas takes her
constitutivist view to mean: that virtue is an essential component, i.e., a constituent, of pleasure.
She concludes that, “…Epicurus makes moves in his theory that are most plausibly construed as
giving the virtues non-instrumental value; they are not mere means to our final end of (static)
pleasure.”103 The constitutivist view claims that goods other than pleasure, e.g., virtue, can be
good in a non-instrumental way, namely because goods can grow to be so important that they
become a constituent of, i.e., an essential part of, the one thing that is good in itself: pleasure.
Sedley’s view points to Diog. Laert. 138 for its evidence: “And we choose the virtues for
the sake of pleasure, and not on their own account; just as we seek the skill of the physician for
the sake of health…”104 Furthermore, a handful of other passages from the extant writings also
support the instrumentalist view for which Sedley argues forcefully. Athenaeus, in his
Deipnosophistae, says the following about Epicurus on the relation between pleasure and virtue:
And in his On the Goal, Epicurus says again - You ought therefore to respect honor and
the virtues, and all things of that sort, if it produces pleasure; but if it does not, then we
may as well bid it goodbye - evidently in these words Epicurus makes virtue subordinate
to pleasure, and performing it as it were the part of a handmaid to it. And in other places
he says—“I spit upon honor and those who worship it vainly, when it produces no
pleasure.”
Κἀν τῷ περὶ Τέλους δὲ πάλιν φησίν: ‘τιμητέον τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰ
τοιουτότροπα, ἐὰν ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζῃ: ἐὰν δὲ μὴ παρασκευάζῃ, χαίρειν ἐατέον,’
σαφῶς ὑπουργὸν ἐν τούτοις ποιῶν τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ θεραπαίνης τάξιν
ἐπέχουσαν. Κἀν ἄλλοις δέ φησιν: ‘προσπτύω τῷ καλῷ καὶ τοῖς κενῶς αὐτὸ θαυμάζουσιν,
ὅταν μηδεμίαν ἡδονὴν ποιῇ.’105
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Here are several claims that appear to support the instrumentalist reading: (1) honor and the
virtues are worthy of respect conditionally, i.e., if they produce pleasure; (2) honor is worthy of
contempt unless it produces pleasure. Athenaeus thinks that (1) makes virtue the handmaiden of
pleasure, subordinating the former to the latter.106 This appears to be evidence for the
instrumentalist view. Although Cicero describes the constitutivist view in Fin., he attributes the
instrumentalist view to Epicurus in Tusculanae Disputationes (Tusc.), where Cicero quotes
Epicurus as saying,
I have often inquired of those who have been called wise men what would be left over in
good things, if all the same pleasures had been removed from them, unless they meant to
give us nothing but words. I could never learn anything from them; and unless they
choose that all virtue and wisdom should vanish and come to nothing, they must say with
me that the only way to live lies through those pleasures which have been mentioned
above.
Saepe quaesivi' inquit 'ex is qui appellabantur sapientes, quid haberent quod in bonis
relinquerent, si illa detraxissent, nisi si vellent voces inanis fundere: nihil ab is potui
cognoscere. Qui si virtutes ebullire volent et sapientias, nihil aliud dicent nisi eam viam,
qua efficiantur eae voluptates quas supra dixi.107
It is difficult to see how one could attribute anything but the instrumentalist view of virtue to
Epicurus if he claims that virtue and wisdom vanish and come to nothing unless they produce the
pleasures that Epicurus mentioned earlier: those of the body and mind. Finally, Clement of
Alexandria writes in his Stromates, “Epicurus and the Cyrenaics say that what is primarily
congenial to us is pleasure; for virtue comes along for the sake of pleasure and produces
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pleasure.”108 Insofar as virtue is and comes along because of and for the sake of pleasure, this
passage offers prima facie reasons to attribute Sedley’s “tough” instrumentalist view to Epicurus.
Let us now turn to the problems with each view. First, Kristian Urstad argues against the
constitutivist view of the relation between virtue and pleasure in the following way. He points
out that if pleasure is the only telos and pleasure is a feeling for Epicurus, then something can
only be good insofar as it produces the feeling of pleasure. As Urstad puts it, “[If] the ultimate
goal of happiness is a feeling of pleasure it cannot also be a composite of states and activities that
are sources of this pleasure. The only value activities connected to happiness as construed in this
way, i.e., as a feeling of pleasure, can have is a causal or instrumental one.”109 It is somewhat
unclear what Urstad means here. He seems to think that the constitutivist view collapses into the
instrumentalist view. According to Urstad, Annas thinks that if a is good in itself, but a is
composed of constituents b and c, then b and c can be good in themselves. Urstad denies this. He
insists that to say b and c are constituents of a is to say that b and c cause a. Thus, even on the
constitutivist view, the constituents of pleasure are only good because they cause pleasure, which
means they are only good because of their relation to pleasure. If this is the case, then the
constituents of pleasure are not good in themselves, but only because of their relation to what is
good in itself: the feeling of pleasure. In other words, Annas’ constitutivist view requires that the
feeling of pleasure is good in itself, but that other states and activities can also be good in
themselves because they are parts of this feeling. Urstad doubts that states and activities can be
good in themselves if only the feeling of pleasure can be good in itself. Ultimately, I remain
undecided whether the problem Urstad points to with Annas’ view is insurmountable.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how Annas can explain the intrinsic goodness of a constituent
Clem. Al., Strom. Ἐπίκουρος μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖόν φασιν ἡδονὴν εἶναι· ἕνεκα
γὰρ ἡδονῆς παρελθοῦσα. φασίν, ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡδονὴν ἐνεποίησε.
109
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of pleasure without referring to how it causes pleasure. As such, it is reasonable to worry that
Annas’ view collapses into the instrumentalist view, although she takes it to be different.
The bigger problem with the constitutivist view is that it lacks textual support. As Urstad
points out, the only two passages that Annas uses to argue for it are Ep. Men. 132110 and Diog.
Laert. 10.138.111 Both passages appear to make the same point on Annas’ view: that virtue is
necessary and sufficient for living the pleasant life. Reading the passages in this way makes it
easier for Annas to launch her view that happiness has virtue as an integral part of it.112 Urstad
argues, however, that Ep. Men. 132 and Diog. Laert. 10.138 are probably empirical claims about
what the life of pleasure is likely to require. As Urstad claims, “There is nothing, that is, in the
concept of ataraxia, as a self-confined psychological state, which is linked by analytic necessity
to the concept of virtue, and again vice versa.”113 It is also somewhat unclear what Urstad means
here, but he seems to think that Epicurus does not mean to claim that virtue is a necessary
condition for living the life of pleasure, i.e., it is impossible to life the live of pleasure without
cultivating virtue. Rather what Epicurus means in these passages is that, given the way that the
world is and the kind of things that humans are, it is a very safe bet that M will not live the
pleasant life without being virtuous, and so M should cultivate the virtues. This is not to say that
it is not possible to live the pleasant life without virtue. I agree. As evidence for this view, Urstad
notes that just before claiming only virtue is inseparable from pleasure at Diog. Laert. 138,
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Epicurus claims that the virtues are to be chosen because of pleasure and not for their own sakes,
just as medicine is chosen because of health. Given the clear instrumentalism of this line, and
since it occurs just before the claim about inseparability to follow that Annas relies on, Urstad
insists, rightly I think, that Ep. Men. 132 and Diog. Laert. 10.138 can only make sense alongside
one another if we take them to mean that the life of pleasure and virtue will often overlap with
one another. This does not entail the constitutivist view’s claims about virtue and pleasure being
inseparable simpliciter. This is a problem with the constitutivist view that will become clearer in
Chapters 3, 4, and 5, where I argue that there are at least some cases in which we should pursue
various goods independently of their relation to our life’s pleasantness, i.e., there will be times
where I should pursue certain goods even though they are not constituents of my pleasure.
Annas uses only Ep. Men. 132 and Diog. Laert. 138 in support of her constitutivist view,
so Urstad only offers reasons in his cited article for why these passages alone should not cause
one to abandon the instrumentalist view. We saw, however, earlier in this chapter that there are
two other passages one might take to support the constitutivist view - RS V and Fin. 1.66-68; so
we should consider whether these count as evidence for adopting it. RS V says that one cannot
live pleasantly without living virtuously, and vice versa. However, we saw good reasons to take
RS V in the way Urstad suggests we take Ep. Men. 138: to claim that the life of pleasure and life
of virtue will often overlap, not that one cannot possibly live the life of pleasure without
cultivating virtue. RS V supports the constitutivist view only if we take it to claim that virtue and
pleasure cannot possibly be separated from one another, but it would be unwise to attribute this
kind of claim to Epicurus. Even the highest form of pleasure, i.e., tranquility, is just the absence
of pain and worry. Someone could (very luckily) be in this state without being virtuous.
Although this is perhaps very unlikely, the heir to a large estate could live a life without suffering
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any pain or worry despite a lack of virtue. A far more common case is the infant. Insofar as
Epicurus claims that our first and congenital good is pleasure, even the baby in the cradle
experiences pleasure. Nevertheless, the baby is neither virtuous nor vicious. Thus the baby offers
a case where pleasure and virtue come apart, and since Epicurus refers to such a case, he would
not have meant for RS V to mean that cultivating virtue is a necessary condition for living the life
of pleasure. Since adopting the constitutivist view requires a much stronger kind of inseparability
between virtue and pleasure, we should not take RS V as support for Annas’ constitutivism.
The final passage that one could take to support the constitutivist view is Fin. 1.68:
“What has been said about the virtues, that they are always essentially connected to pleasures,
must be also said about friendship. For splendidly Epicurus says nearly these same words…”114
On the most charitable reading of this passage, it claims that the two are essentially connected
because virtue is always a part of pleasure. If this were the case, virtue can only exist as a part of
the pleasant life. We should be skeptical, though, about taking Fin. 1.68 in this way. First, doing
so requires Epicurus to claim that virtue and pleasure cannot come apart, when he could have
meant something more colloquial, e.g., virtue and pleasure will overlap with one another
frequently in the good life. Since I agree with Urstad that Epicurus means to claim that virtue and
pleasure are likely to coincide with one another in the good life, not that it is impossible to have
one without the other, I favor the more colloquial interpretation. Second and more importantly,
Cicero attributes the instrumentalist view to Epicurus in Tusc. 3.42.115 He says Epicurus takes
virtue to be nothing but a means to pleasure. Since Cicero attributes both views to Epicurus on
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the more disputed reading of Fin. 1.68, we should prefer the colloquial reading supporting the
instrumentalist view or set aside Fin. 1.68 altogether as evidence of which view Epicurus adopts.
I now turn to problems with the instrumentalist view. Cicero appears to attribute mutually
exclusive views to Epicurus, so we should consider other sources. If we do so, only two passages
remain to support Sedley’s interpretation. The first is from Athenaeus’ Deipnosophistae,
And in his On the Goal, Epicurus says again - You ought therefore to respect honor and
the virtues, and all things of that sort, if it produces pleasure; but if it does not, then we
may as well bid it goodbye - evidently in these words Epicurus makes virtue subordinate
to pleasure, and performing it as it were the part of a handmaid to it. And in another place
he says—“I spit upon honor, and those who worship it in a foolish manner, when it
produces no pleasure.”
Κἀν τῷ περὶ Τέλους δὲ πάλιν φησίν: ‘τιμητέον τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰ
τοιουτότροπα, ἐὰν ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζῃ: ἐὰν δὲ μὴ παρασκευάζῃ, χαίρειν ἐατέον,’
σαφῶς ὑπουργὸν ἐν τούτοις ποιῶν τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ θεραπαίνης τάξιν
ἐπέχουσαν. Κἀν ἄλλοις δέ φησιν: ‘προσπτύω τῷ καλῷ καὶ τοῖς κενῶς αὐτὸ θαυμάζουσιν,
ὅταν μηδεμίαν ἡδονὴν ποιῇ.’116
At first glance, Epicurus seems to say that you should only respect honor and the virtues if they
produce pleasure, which suggests that you should not respect honor and the virtues if they do not
produce pleasure. However, the verb παρασκευάζῃ is singular and thus must modify τὸ καλὸν.
As such, the claim is that honor is to be respected if it produces pleasure. For similar reasons, the
claim here also seems to be that we should bid goodbye to honor if it does not produce pleasure;
the object of χαίρειν is ἐατέον, which modifies τὸ καλὸν from the previous sentence. Thus, the
passage is about the relation between the honor and pleasure, not the relation between the virtues
and pleasure. One might take honor to include virtue, so that when we say we should respect
virtue if it produces pleasure and bid it goodbye when it does not, we also mean that we should
do the same for the virtues. However, this is not what the Greeks says. The virtues are referred to
in the plural here, but the first verb is singular, and while the second is in the infinitive, its object
116
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is in the singular. Plus, it makes more sense that Epicurus refers here to the relation between the
honor and pleasure rather than virtue and pleasure. Honor is more external than the other virtues
insofar as being honored is contingent upon others finding something honorable. To the extent
that Epicurus, like the Stoics, preaches general indifference toward externals, it would make
sense for Epicurus to posit stricter necessary conditions for our respect of honor than our respect
for goods that seem more private per his distinction, e.g., the virtues.117 Since the latter are more
up to us than the former, they more properly serve as objects for our respect. The point here is
that the passage does not claim explicitly that the virtues are mere instruments for obtaining
pleasure, so we perhaps ought not take these bits of the Deipnosophistae to support Sedley’s
instrumentalist view.
Even if we take the passage to claim that we should respect virtue only if it produces
pleasure, this does not require us to adopt the instrumentalist view. On this less literal reading,
Epicurus makes a claim about when we should respect the virtues, not when we should cultivate
them. We might respect the virtue of others only when it produces pleasure for us, for example,
but this does not entail that we should only cultivate virtues when it produces pleasure, and this
is what the instrumentalist reading requires. I demonstrate later that Epicurus rejects this. There
are cases where we should cultivate the virtues even though they do not produce pleasure. As
such, neither reading of Ath. 12.67 should be used to support Sedley’s instrumentalist reading;
one makes no clear claims about the role of virtue, and the other attributes a contradiction to
Epicurus.
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If this is so, there is another sense in which Epicurus follows Aristotle. For it is Aristotle who argues
that the best life cannot be the life of honor, since honor is not complete in itself insofar as it requires at
least two things: the person being honored and the person doing the honoring. In other words, Epicurus
seems to adopt the Aristotelian claim that we should be wary of honor because whether we are honored is
somewhat out our control, and thus cannot be a complete end.
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The final text that might support such instrumentalism is Diog. Laert. 138, which claims
that we choose virtue for the sake of pleasure, and not on its own account.118 The passage indeed
seems prima facie evidence for the instrumentalist view. Nevertheless, after a consideration of
the relevant passages, there remains only this one passage in favor of the instrumentalist view.
To the extent that building an interpretation on a single passage seems misguided, if there is
more evidence available for another view, we should be wary of a strong instrumentalist reading
of Epicurus.119 Although this section has surveyed all of the passages in the extant writings that
refer to virtue explicitly, there are other texts that contradict Sedley’s interpretation. We know,
for example, that Epicurus considers friendship to be both a virtue and a good.120 Since
friendship is a virtue, if Epicurus recommends that we pursue it in any way or for any reason that
contradicts the instrumentalist view (which he does), then the instrumentalist view is false. As I
shall show, Epicurus demands that the pursuit of friendship in the best life sometimes require us
to do things that are in no way for the sake of our own pleasure.121 He could not make such a
demand if the instrumentalist view were correct. Similarly for the good of knowledge. Since we
sometimes pursue knowledge independently of its effects on pleasure of any kind, the
instrumentalist view is false, for it claims that something is good only if it promotes pleasure.122

Διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐ δι᾽ αὑτάς, ὥσπερ τὴν ἰατρικὴν διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν. And we
choose the virtues for the sake of pleasure, and not on their own account; just as we seek the skill of the
physician for the sake of health.
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There is more evidence for another view, namely that virtue is one of the best things that we can
cultivate. This is what I argue in Chapter 5.
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Epicurus claims friendship is a virtue in Sent. Vat. 23: πᾶσα φιλία διʼ ἑαυτὴν ἀρετή· ἀρχὴν δὲ εἴληφεν
ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας. He says that friendship is a good in Sent. Vat. 78: ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν
μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον.
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I show in Chapter 3 that the good of friendship should require us to feel our friend’s pain as intensely
as our own, die for our friends, and mourn the death of my friends. I argue that we should not do these
things, according to Epicurus, because they produce or constitute pleasure, i.e., because they are
instruments for or constituents of pleasure. If this is so, instrumentalist and constitutivist views are false.
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I show in Chapter 4 that knowing p is good even if it does not promote or constitute the pleasantness of
our lives. Epicurus claims that knowledge always benefits us, although these benefits cannot always be
explained in terms of our pleasure. If this is so, then the instrumentalist and constitutivist views are false.
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Although I develop these arguments in later chapters, I will discuss them briefly here.
Suppose that pleasure is the only good for Epicurus, which the instrumentalist view requires.
This means that all of our actions should aim for pleasure in one of its three kinds – kinetic,
katastematic, or tranquility. Tranquility is the highest of these three kinds of pleasure, i.e., we
consider tranquility the best of these three kinds of pleasure and aim for it as such. What exactly
it means for tranquility to be the highest kind of pleasure is unclear. Alwood takes this to mean
that tranquility is qualitatively superior to kinetic pleasure.123 Woolf does not. He takes Epicurus
to be a quantitative hedonist, which must mean that tranquility is the highest pleasure because it
gives us a greater amount of pleasure than kinetic pleasures do.124 Whether katastematic pleasure
differs in kind from kinetic pleasure does not affect the argument of this chapter. All that I aim to
show here is that neither the constitutivist nor the instrumentalist view can account for the
relation between virtue and the best possible life in every case. The deepest problem with the
instrumentalist view, for example, is that it cannot explain the relation between virtue and
pleasure for someone who has already managed to achieve the highest pleasure: tranquility.
Suppose that someone secures tranquility, i.e., someone eliminates all bodily pain and
mental turmoil and is conscious of this fact. Epicurus thinks that the person who accomplishes
this ought to continue living. He claims, for example, that, “…the wise man neither rejects life
nor fears death.”125 To say the wise man does not reject life is to say that he prefers to continue
living, all things being equal. We should expect Epicurus to think that someone who has
achieved tranquility is living a good life, and it is good for someone living a good life to keep on

Andrew Alwood (forthcoming), “Epicurean Hedonism as Qualitative Hedonism,” Journal of Value
Inquiry. I thank Alwood for sending me a copy of this paper prior to its publication. It helped me to think
through some important difficulties with Epicurus’ (alleged) hedonism.
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Raphael Woolf, “Pleasure and Desire” in James Warren (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to
Epicureanism (Cambridge, 2009), p. 271.
125
Ep. Men. 126. ὁ δὲ σοφὸς οὔτε παραιτεῖται τὸ ζῆν> οὔτε φοβεῖται τὸ μὴ ζῆν·
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living ceteris paribus. So the already tranquil person will continue living. What will that person
do? Presumably, this person will continue to aim to live the best possible life. As such, she will
continue to be virtuous. She will continue to use her private and external goods appropriately,
and she will continue to perform virtuous actions. If this is so, then she will continue to exercise
the virtues. The problem with the instrumentalist view is that it cannot explain the role that virtue
plays for such a person. If the instrumentalist view is correct, then all virtue must be an
instrument for pleasure, i.e., virtue is only for the sake of pleasure. Virtue cannot play this role,
however, for the already tranquil person. Her pleasure is complete if she achieves stable
tranquility. After all, to experience tranquility just is to have eliminated all of one’s bodily pain
and mental turmoil for the time being and realize that this is the case. For someone who has done
this, virtue cannot possibly play an instrumental role; there is simply is no more pleasure to be
had, let alone any that would require instruments in order for someone to bring it about. To the
extent, therefore, that those of us who manage to achieve tranquility should aim to keep on living
the best possible life, which in turn requires us to continue being virtuous, virtue cannot play a
purely instrumental role for the sake of our pleasure. One might attempt to save the
instrumentalist view by claiming that already tranquil individuals will continue to cultivate and
exercise certain goods, e.g., virtue, because they help them to maintain their tranquility. I explain
why this solution will not work in Chapter 5. To save the instrumentalist reading by claiming
that if something is good, then it help us to maintain our tranquility, is to get wrong what is good
about tranquility: that it frees us up for other worthwhile pursuits and activities.
To be fair, this is not a problem that only the instrumentalist view faces. The
constitutivist view faces the same problem. Suppose the constitutivist view is correct. If it is,
then virtue is only good if it constitutes pleasure. Let us think again about the already tranquil
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person. She will want to continue living the best possible life, which will require her to continue
being virtuous. If the constitutivist view is correct, virtue can only be good because it constitutes
the pleasantness of her life. For the tranquil person, however, the pleasant life is already fully
constituted; it cannot be constituted further, for it is already complete. If the constitutivist view is
correct, all cases in which virtue are good are ones where virtue contributes to the structure of the
ataraxic life. The case of the tranquil person cannot be explained in this way. Here the pleasant
life is fully built already inasmuch as it features tranquility; it lacks no structure which can be
further provided by additional constituents. Since tranquility consists in the absence of pain and
worry, it has full structure once someone eliminates all of her pains and worries, and one cannot
build onto the structure of tranquility. Once again, one might try to save the constitutivst view by
claiming that virtue continues to be good for tranquil persons because it helps them to maintain
the constitution of their tranquility. This will not work, though. Tranquility that comes about by
taking the proper steps is stable and thus unlikely to require maintenance. Qua tranquil, we (1)
eliminate all beliefs that are likely to cause disturbance in our souls and (2) we come to know
that whatever pain might inevitably cause disturbance in our bodies is easy to deal with. Our
tranquility only requires maintenance if there are reasons to anticipate that worries might surface
or pains might arise for us that we are ill-prepared to deal with. Neither will be the case for
individuals who achieve tranquility in the right way, since they will eliminate all sources of
anxiety and will be able to deal effectively with whatever pains might arise for them.
Moreover, the constitutivist view cannot account for cases where individuals who are
tranquil develop new virtues. Recall that Philodemus takes greatness of soul to be a virtue, one
whereby someone with extra resources disposes of them properly to those who need them. Now
let us think about the conditions in which many Epicureans manage to achieve tranquility.
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Epicurus was a very frugal man, and the evidence suggests that he never made much money.
Seneca even tells us that, “[Epicurus] boasts that he could be fed for less than an obol, but that
Metrodorus, because he had not yet made so much [moral] progress, required an entire obol.”126
The very reason that Epicureans rarely have much so-called financial success is because they are
themselves indifferent to externals; since what is necessary for living the best life is easy to
obtain, there is no need to struggle in the pursuit of wealth. The point here is that proper disposal
of extra resources is a virtue, but many Epicureans manage to secure tranquility without ever
accumulating any extra resources to dispose of. So, many Epicureans apparently achieve
tranquility without cultivating one of the virtues. Suppose there is such an Epicurean, who
becomes tranquil at t1 without cultivating the virtue of μεγαλοψυχία. This same Epicurean
inherits a large estate soon thereafter at t2, and thus has a surplus of resources of which to
dispose. If Epicurus endorses the constitutivist view, there would be no reason for this Epicurean
to dispose of the resources properly to those who need them in order to develop the virtue of
greatness of soul. This Epicurean’s pleasant life is already fully constituted qua tranquil, so this
new virtue that was never a part of the constitution of her pleasant life could not be good or
worth pursuing. Epicurus would surely disapprove of this Epicurean precisely because he takes
any particular virtue to be good for her - even if it is not already a constituent of her pleasure.
One might respond to this by distinguishing between actual and potential constituents of
tranquility and insist that while μεγαλοψυχία is not an actual constituent of the tranquility of the
person who inherits the large estate, it is a potential constituent. This would only cause greater
problems. If there are potential constituents of tranquility for the person who has already
achieved it, then tranquility will fail to be complete as a final telos unless one cultivates all
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Sen. Ep. 18.9. Hoc certe in his epistulis ait, quas scripsit Charino magistratu ad Polyaenum. Et quidem
gloriatur non toto asse se pasci, Metrodorum, qui nondum tantum profecerit, toto.
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possible goods and every possible virtue, which is something that proponents of both the
instrumentalist and consitutivist views deny. The very reason that the two views conclude that
something is good only if it cause or constitutes tranquility is because they both take Epicurus to
claim (1) that tranquility is the final telos, which means (2) that tranquility must be complete, and
(3) that tranquility is easy to achieve. The instrumentalist and constitutivist interpretations both
claim that achieving tranquility is sufficient for living the best possible life. However, this cannot
be true if I can always constitute my tranquility further. Cultivating new virtues remains possible
for someone who has already achieved tranquility, but the constitutivist interpretation has no
satisfying explanation for how this would work. Either achieving tranquility requires the
cultivation of all possible constituents of tranquility, which seems to make achieving tranquility
impossible, or we should cultivate some goods that do not constitute our tranquility further.
The shortcomings of the instrumentalist and constitutivist view have implications for the
broader thesis of this dissertation. The instrumentalist and constitutivist views are inadequate
because they cannot explain the role of each virtue in the best possible life in every case: they
cannot explain why the tranquil person should continue to be virtuous and even develop new
virtues. Both versions of this problem point to the incompleteness of tranquility as an end. If the
final end is to be complete, it must explain all of our actions. Cicero tells us that Epicurus adopts
such a criterion for the final telos in Fin. 1.29.127 Yet tranquility alone cannot explain why we
should continue to cultivate certain goods, exercise the virtues we have already developed, and
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Cic., Fin. 1.29. We are investigating the final and ultimate good, which as all philosophers agree must
be of such a kind that it is the end to which everything is the means, but it is not itself the means to
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cultivate new virtues once we achieve stable freedom from pain in body and worry in mind.128 In
order to show this, I offer a picture of what the life of someone who has achieved tranquility
should look like, i.e., I piece together Epicurus’ descriptions of how those who secure tranquility
should live after doing so. Among other things, they should continue to be involved with certain
goods and exercise the virtues, and perhaps even develop new ones. Since being involved with
these goods and exercising virtues cannot be explained in all cases by tranquility as an end,
namely insofar as these individuals already have tranquility, there must be some end more final
and complete than tranquility itself. It is for this very reason that I argue in this dissertation that
Epicurus is an objective goods perfectionist. Eudaimonia is the activity of realizing and
prusuing the best things in life. One of these best things is pleasure in all three of its kinds –
kinetic, katastematic, and tranquility. In many cases, we might even pursue certain goods or
cultivate particular virtues for the sake of other goods on the list, as we often pursue them for the
sake of pleasure. Since tranquility is necessary for living the best possible life, we should pursue
many goods for the sake of it. Nevertheless, since we should sometimes pursue goods or virtue
independently of their effects on pleasure, pleasure alone is insufficient for living the best
possible life, which means that there will be other goods that must be good and worth pursuing in
and of themselves. This is the very thesis for which the objective goods perfectionist argues.
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I realize I have only given here a negative picture of the role of virtue in the good life, i.e., I argue that
neither the instrumentalist nor constitutivist view can be correct but I fail to give a positive account of the
role that virtue does play in the good life. I do this in Chapter 5, where I argue that (1) tranquility cannot
be the final end because (2) we should continue to pursue certain goods virtuously once our pleasure is
complete, which means that (3) virtue must be an activity rather than a state that is worth engaging in for
its own sake, i.e., virtue is an objective good.
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CHAPTER 3: FRIENDSHIP, PLEASURE, AND THE BEST POSSIBLE
LIFE

3.1

Introduction
In his “Politics and Society” in the The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, Eric

Brown claims that, “…there is no evidence that Epicurus finds friendship or friends to be
valuable for their own sake, no evidence that Epicurus contradicts his fundamental dictum that
everything worth choosing is worth choosing for the sake of one’s own pleasure.”129 What
Brown calls the fundamental dictum and what I call SRE (1) in this dissertation make the same
claim: that nothing is worth choosing unless it is for the sake of one’s own pleasure. Brown
argues that Epicurus’ claims about friendship testify to his commitment to SRE (1). On Brown’s
reading, the cultivation of friendship remains important for Epicurus, but there is no
circumstance in which any of us should act with respect to a friend in a way that is not ultimately
for the sake of our own pleasure. In this chapter, I argue that this reading of Epicurus is mistaken
for four reasons. While Brown might be correct that the passages he considers constitute no
evidence that friends should sometimes act for something other than their own pleasure, I discuss
other texts that do constitute such evidence. From this I conclude that SRE (1) is false.
Brown concedes that friendship is worth pursuing; so if SRE (1) is true, it follows that
friendship must always be worth pursuing for the sake of our own pleasure and never for the
sake of anything else. If this were the case, then there would be two ways that friendship would
be worth pursuing: either as an instrument toward our pleasure or as a constituent of our

Eric Brown, “Politics and Society.” In The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, edited by James
Warren. (Cambridge University Press: 2009), 189.
129
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pleasure.130 Brown argues for the instrumentalist view, which D. Sedley champions131; Brown
attributes the constitutivist view to J. Rist, P. Mitsis, and J. Annas.132 I argue that Epicurus thinks
friendship is worth pursuing even when it is neither an instrument toward nor a constituent of our
own pleasure.
There are four arguments for this claim in the extant writings. First, the gods pursue
friendships even though doing so is neither instrumental for nor constitutive of their own
pleasure, and Epicurus insists that we should emulate the gods in this very respect. 133 Second,
Epicurus claims that a friend should not always aim to get something for herself out of her
friendships, which suggests that friendship is worth pursuing at least in some cases for the sake
of something other than our pleasure. The third and fourth arguments discount Epicurus’
commitment to SRE (1) for similar reasons; Epicurus argues that there are cases in which it is
good to die for a friend or feel pain over the death of a friend, but not because doing so is
instrumental for or constitutive of our own pleasure. Since SRE (1) claims that everything must
be worth choosing for one of these two reasons, and because Epicurus thinks friendship is (at
least sometimes) worth choosing for some other reason, then Epicurus must reject SRE (1).
This chapter has three parts. The introduction introduces the claim that Brown attributes
to Epicurus, points towards some of its consequences, and offers some clues about how I will
argue that Epicurus rejects these claims. Next, Section 3.2 considers the evidence that Brown
employs and argues that it is inadequate for the purpose of attributing SRE (1) to Epicurus.
Finally, Section 3.3 discusses several passages that testify to Epicurus’ rejection of SRE (1).
130
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3.2

The Argument for SRE (1)
Brown offers four texts as evidence for SRE (1). The first is Ep. Men. 128-29.
The steady evaluation [of desires] enables one to refer every choice and avoidance to the
health of the body and the freedom of the soul from disturbance, since this is the goal of
living blessedly. For we do everything for the sake of being neither in pain nor in terror.
As soon as we achieve this state, every storm of the soul is dispelled, since the animal is
not in a position to go after some need nor to seek something else to complete the good of
the body and the soul. For we are in need of pleasure only when we are in pain because of
the absence of pleasure, and when we are not in pain, then we no longer lack pleasure.
And this is why we say that pleasure is the beginning and goal of living blessedly. For we
recognized this as our first and congenital good, and this is our beginning for every
choice and avoidance and we arrive at this conclusion by judging every good according
to the standard of feeling. And it is just because this is the first and congenital good that
we do not choose every pleasure; but sometimes we pass up many pleasures when we get
a larger amount of what is uncongenial from them. And we believe many pains to be
better than pleasures when a greater pleasure follows for a long while if we endure the
pains. So every pleasure is a good thing, since it has a nature congenial [to us], but not
every one is such as to be always avoided.
τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ
σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος.
τούτου γὰρ χάριν πάντα πράττομεν, ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν: ὅταν δ᾽ ἅπαξ
τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμών, οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῴου βαδίζειν
ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι καὶ ζητεῖν ἕτερον ᾧ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν
συμπληρωθήσεται. τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρείαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ἡδονὴν
ἀλγῶμεν: ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν, οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν
ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν. ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ
συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἐπὶ
ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες. καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν
τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν αἱρούμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰς
ἡδονὰς ὑπερβαίνομεν, ὅταν πλεῖον ἡμῖν τὸ δυσχερὲς ἐκ τούτων ἕπηται· καὶ πολλὰς
ἀλγηδόνας ἡδονῶν κρείττους νομίζομεν, ἐπειδὰν μείζων ἡμῖν ἡδονὴ παρακολουθῇ πολὺν
χρόνον ὑπομείνασι τὰς ἀλγηδόνας. πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονὴ διὰ τὸ φύσιν ἔχειν οἰκείαν ἀγαθὸν,
οὐ πᾶσα μέντοι αἱρετή· καθάπερ καὶ ἀλγηδὼν πᾶσα κακόν, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀεὶ φευκτὴ
πεφυκυῖα.134

Brown does not specify which of the claims from this long passage testify to Epicurus’
endorsement of the claim that everything is worth choosing only for the sake of our own
pleasure. Some are more obvious candidates than others. Epicurus does claim here that, “…we
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do everything for the sake of being neither in pain nor in terror.”135 This looks like prima facie
support for Brown’s thesis, but there are two reasons to reject it as evidence for SRE (1) in
Epicurus. First, Epicurus leaves it unclear who it is that we are trying to free from pain and
worry. He says that we do everything for the sake of being neither in pain nor in terror. Whose
freedom from pain and worry are all of our actions aiming for? That of some group, or my own?
Brown’s thesis requires that everything is worth choosing by A only for the sake of A’s own
pleasure. Thus, Brown’s attribution succeeds only if there is good evidence to take Epicurus to
be an ethical egoist and ethical hedonist in the sense that all of my actions should aim for the
sake of my own pleasure, which is unclear from the first lines of Ep. Men. 128-129 alone.
Support for such ethical egoism and ethical hedonism might surface in the other passages that
Brown considers; I return to this question as I discuss his other evidence. My point for the time
being is that it does not follow from the claim that we do everything for the sake of being neither
in pain nor terror that everything is worth choosing for the sake of my pleasure, and mine alone.
To support his claim, Brown must show Epicurus to endorse both ethical egoism and
ethical hedonism. SRE (1) is true only if Epicurus claims that (1) I only should seek the good for
myself ultimately (2) I should only do things for the sake of pleasure. Here again, the line quoted
above from Ep. Men. 128 offers prima facie support for these claims. Nevertheless, there are
reasons not to take Epicurus to be an ethical hedonist. One reason is that Epicurus seems to think
that there are cases where we should perform actions that are not simply for the sake of pleasure.
The tranquil person, for example, should continue to cultivate certain goods after achieving
tranquility. The pursuit of these goods cannot be for the sake of being neither in pain nor terror;
to be tranquil is not to be in pain or terror and to recognize this fact. A detailed rehearsal of this

135

Ep. Men.128. τούτου γὰρ πάντα πράττομεν, ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν.

70
argument will be given later in the chapter. I mention it here because there are reasons to suppose
that Epicurus does not take his claim that we do everything for the sake of ataraxia to entail that
each and every action is justifiable only for the sake of freeing oneself from pain and worry. If
this is so, then the tranquil person has no good reason to choose anything.136 Rather, the opening
claim of Ep. Men. 128-129, is about what we, i.e., the average Epicurean for whom the sketch of
the ethics in the Letter to Menoeceus is intended, should choose to do in most cases. There is
something other than freedom from disturbance at which the actions of the tranquil should aim.
Another claim from Ep. Men 128-129 appears to offer prima facie support for attributing
SRE (1) to Epicurus: “And this is why we say that pleasure is the beginning and goal of living
blessedly. For we recognized this as our first and congenital good, and this is the beginning for
every choice and avoidance, and we arrive at this conclusion by judging every good by the
standard of feeling.”137 The first problem discussed above also applies here. Epicurus does not
explicitly commit here to ethical egoism, i.e., the claim that I should seek the good for only my
own sake. He claims that pleasure is a good, and that it is the standard from which we begin
when we choose some things and avoid others. There is no clear assertion that everything I
should do is for the sake of my own pleasure as opposed to the pleasure of someone else.
Further, none of these claims is an explicit endorsement of ethical hedonism, i.e., the
claim that all of my actions should aim for pleasure. Epicurus claims that pleasure is our first and
congenital good, and what he means is that pleasure is the good that humans instinctually seek in
virtue of the kind of thing that they are. This does not preclude there being other intrinsic goods,
136

Here again, one might insist that the tranquil person should do such things because they help her to
maintain her pleasure. I gave some clues as to why such a strategy will not work in Chapter 2. I offer
some more reasons in this chapter. I discuss the problems with this solution most fully in Chapter 5.
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Ep. Men. 128. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν. ταύτην γὰρ
ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἐπὶ
ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες.
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the goodness of which we become aware of later in life. He also claims that when we choose
some things and avoid others, our starting point is pleasure.138 It is not clear at all what Epicurus
means by this. He might mean that when we think about which things to choose and avoid, our
initial move is to consider whether they will cause us pain or pleasure. If so, this need not
commit Epicurus to ethical hedonism, which Brown attributes to him, because, although our
initial impulse is to pursue pleasure and avoid pain, it is also possible that there are other
justifiable motivations, i.e., “points”, from which we should act. Brown thinks that Epicurus
means something stronger: to say pleasure is the starting point of every choice is to say that we
should do everything for the sake of pleasure. In the next section, I reject this; Epicurus argues
that we should sometimes pursue friendships when they are not for the sake of pleasure. Here,
what I argue is that Epicurus’ claim that the starting point of living blessedly and every choice is
pleasure does not entail that the only thing worth choosing by M is M’s own pleasure.
A second passage that Brown refers to is RS XXV, which says that, “If you do not, on
every occasion, refer each of your actions to the goal of nature, but instead turn prematurely to
some other [criterion] in avoiding or pursuing [things], your actions will not be consistent with
your reasoning.”139 Brown views RS XXV as claiming not only that everything is worth
choosing for the sake of pleasure, but for the agent’s own pleasure. It is difficult to see how these
two claims are supported by RS XXV. The claim there is simply that there is a goal of nature,
and that if we turn prematurely to some other criterion in choosing and pursuing things, our
actions will be inconsistent with our reasoning. This notion of turning prematurely to some other
criterion is interesting, although it is unclear what it would mean for us to do so according to
138
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RS XXV. εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως,
ἀλλὰ προκαταστρέψεις εἴτε φυγὴν εἴτε δίωξιν ποιούμενος εἰς ἄλλο τι, οὐκ ἔσονταί σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ
πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι.
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Epicurus. If what Epicurus means here is that we can and should choose some criterion other
than the goal of nature, but only after considering criterion of the goal of nature, then this seems
to suggest that there are several ends for the sake of which we should do things. If this is the
case, then Epicurus is not an ethical hedonist in the sense that all of our actions aim for one end
in pleasure, which SRE (1) requires. However, the force of “prematurely” remains unclear, so
Epicurus might not mean here that we should turn to some other criterion, but only after
measuring our actions by the goal of nature. More problematic for Brown’s argument, Epicurus
does not say here that the goal of nature is in fact pleasure and pleasure only, the one thing to
which we should refer all of our actions. Even were this goal of nature pleasure, the text fails to
indicate whose pleasure it is to which we should refer actions. The passage thus endorses neither
ethical hedonism nor ethical egoism. Even more difficult is that it remains unclear what it means
to refer our actions to the goal of nature. Brown thinks that to refer our actions to the goal of
nature is to act in every case for the sake of it, but Epicurus does not say this staightforwardly.
Rather his claim is that there is some kind of dissonance between our actions and our reasons
when we do not begin by referring our actions to the goal of nature. It is not that we are not
justified in performing actions that do not refer to the goal of nature: pleasure. Consequently,
Brown’s use of RS XXV requires us to attribute to Epicurus two inferences that are not supported
by the text itself: (1) that the goal of nature is pleasure and (2) that to refer all of our actions to
the goal of nature means that we should always act only for the sake of our own pleasure.140
The third passage that Brown uses as support is Diog. Laert. 10.34, which asserts that,
“[The Epicureans] say there are two feelings, pleasure and pain, which occur in every animal;
and the one is congenial to us, the other uncongenial. By means of them we judge what to choose
140

Epicurus might end arguing for these inferences elsewhere, which I reject, but Brown does not seem to
provide any evidence for them. He seems to think that the passage itself commits Epicurus to SRE (1).
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and what to avoid.”141 There are problems with using this passage as support for SRE (1). One is
familiar: to say that we judge what to choose and avoid by means of pleasure and pain is not to
say that we should do everything only for the sake of our own pleasure. Brown’s argument
requires Epicurus to endorse this stronger claim. Another difficulty is that the passage describes
the position of later Epicureans, i.e., followers of Epicurus, rather than Epicurus himself. We can
be sure of this because there are parts in the text both preceding and following Diog. Laert. 10.34
that describe the views of Epicurus himself rather than his followers. Diogenes appears to
differentiate here between what “he” says, i.e., Epicurus himself, and what “they” say, i.e., other
Epicureans. As a result, we might suspect that Diog. Laert. 10.34 describes how later Epicureans
work out or modify Epicurus’ position, and if this is the case, then it is not support for Epicurus’
adoption of SRE (1). Diogenes does this with some regularity. He often describes a position that
Epicurus defends, and then explains how his followers flesh out this position. The result is that
their positions differ somewhat. For example, Diog. Laert. 10.31 tells us that,
[The Epicureans] reject dialectic as being irrelevant. For it is sufficient for natural
philosophers to proceed according to the utterances made by the facts. So in The Canon
Epicurus is found saying that sense-perceptions, basic grasps, and feelings are the criteria
of truth, and the Epicureans add the application of the intellect to presentations.
Τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς παρέλκουσαν ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν: ἀρκεῖν γὰρ τοὺς φυσικοὺς χωρεῖν
κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων φθόγγους. ἐν τοίνυν τῷ Κανόνι λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος
κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη, οἱ δ᾽ Ἐπικούρειοι
καὶ τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας.142
Epicurus posits three criteria for truth and his followers add one. Only by attributing claims to
Epicurus himself rather than his followers can Diogenes distinguish between the views of each.
As such, there are reasons to suppose that Diogenes is familiar with the differences between the

Diog. Laert. 10.34. Πάθη δὲ λέγουσιν εἶναι δύο, ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀλγηδόνα, ἱστάμενα περὶ πᾶν ζῷον, καὶ
τὴν μὲν οἰκεῖον, τὴν δὲ ἀλλότριον: δι᾽ ὧν κρίνεσθαι τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγάς.
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views of Epicurus and his followers, and since Diog. Laert. 10.34 describes the latter, we might
be justifiably suspicious of whether the passage reveals anything about Epicurus’ own views.
The final passage that Brown uses as evidence is Fin.1.23, the relevant portions of which
claim that, “He lays the very greatest stress upon that which, as he declares, Nature herself
decrees and sanctions, that is the feelings of pleasure and pain. These he maintains lie at the root
of every act of choice and of avoidance.”143 There are two claims here: (1) that nature decrees
pleasure and sanctions pain and (2) that we refer everything that we should choose and avoid to
feelings of pleasure and pain. Just as RS XXV suggests that nature has a goal, the claim here
seems to be that nature approves of some things and disapproves of others, i.e., nature decrees
pleasure and sanctions pain. Since the universe consists of atoms randomly crashing into each
other, it is wrong to take this claim to mean that nature itself prefers things. What Epicurus
means is that it is natural for us to pursue pleasure and avoid pain, i.e., we like pleasure and
dislike pain. In other words, to say that nature decrees pleasure and sanctions pain is to say that
many things in nature like pleasure and dislike pain in virtue of the kind of thing that they are. 144
Not all things in nature pursue pleasure and avoid pain, e.g., rocks, so it remains difficult to see
why Epicurus would believe, at least as Cicero claims that he does, that nature herself does this.
Epicurus distinguishes between nature and things in nature; nature is not an agent, but beings
result from the mechanistic operations of the natural world that exhibit preferences for some
things. Whatever the case, the second claim of the relevant passage clarifies which things in
nature the passage seems to be about: things that choose to avoid some things and pursue others.

143

Cic. Fin. 1.23. Confirmat autem illud vel maxime, quod ipsa natura, ut ait ille, sciscat et probet, id est
voluptatem et dolorem. ad haec et quae sequamur et quae fugiamus refert omnia.
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This is consistent with what I argue Chapter 1, Section 1.2: when Epicurus says that x is natural for y,
he means that x is good for y in virtue of what y is. If this is correct, what Epicurus means when he says
that nature decrees pleasure is that living things in nature prefer pleasure because it is good for them.
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Thus the claim is that for all things that choose some things and refuse others, they tend to refer
their choices to feelings of pain and pleasure because they like pleasure and dislike pain.145
If this is the claim, it is not easy to see how it is supposed to support Brown’s thesis. If
Brown is correct, Epicurus must argue for ethical egoism and ethical hedonism. However, Fin.
1.23 does not say that everything is worth choosing only for the sake of my own pleasure. It says
that our choices and avoidances are referred to feelings of pain and pleasure, i.e., that we decide
whether to do something by considering whether it would be pleasant or painful. Thus Fin.1.23
in no clear way makes Brown’s thesis successful. Brown’s reading seems to suggest that if it is
natural for us to do something, we should always do it and only for our own sake. It seems to
require that there is some tight connection between the claims that it is natural for us to pursue
pleasure and that we should always pursue our own pleasure. Since Fin. 1.23 says that it is
natural for us to pursue pleasure, this would mean that we should always pursue our own
pleasure. The problem is that there is no such connection between the fact that it is natural for us
to pursue pleasure and the claim that we should always pursue our own pleasure. It is natural for
us to desire sexual intercourse, for example. Nevertheless, Epicureanism condemns sexual
intercourse as something that is not beneficial for us. According to Diog. Laert. 10.118, the
Epicureans claim that, “Sexual intercourse…never helped anyone, and one must be satisfied if it
has not harmed.”146 Epicurus himself offers no reasons for why sexual intercourse never helps
and is likely to cause us harm. Lucretius does in Book 4 of De Rerum Natura, where he argues
indulging sexual desires only serves to make them stronger. It is likely that Epicurus defended a
similar position. The point here is that both seem to think that it is natural for me to desire sexual
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It is not clear from his article whether Brown would agree with this, i.e., whether he would take
Epicurus to mean that nature itself prefers some things or that some things in nature prefer pleasure.
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Diog. Laert. 10.118. συνουσίαν δέ φασιν ὀνῆσαι μὲν οὐδέποτε, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ καὶ ἔβλαψε.
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intercourse, but they nevertheless deny that I should gratify such desires. In light of this, there is
no reason to suppose that I should always do something because it happens to be natural for me.
The evidence Brown considers does not support SRE (1). Neither Ep. Men. 128-129, RS
XXV, Diog. Laert. 10.34, nor Fin. 1.23, whether taken individually or together, entail a
commitment to ethical egoism or ethical hedonism, both of which SRE (1) requires to be true.

3.3

The Argument against SRE (1)
Brown suggests that there is only one surviving passage someone might reasonably take

to contradict Epicurus’ commitment to SRE (1): Sent. Vat. 23, which only does so on the
condition that one accepts an emendation to the original text. The original Greek reads: πᾶσα
φιλία διʼ ἑαυτὴν ἀρετή· ἀρχὴν δὲ εἴληφεν ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας, which says that each friendship is
on account of itself a virtue, although it takes its origin from the benefits it confers upon us. The
emendation originally appears in Wotke and Usener. It replaces the original ἀρετή with αἱρετή. If
we accept the emendation for the text, the passage claims that, “Every friendship is worth
choosing for its own sake, though it takes it origin from the benefits it [confers on us].” What
motivates the emendation is ultimately unclear. Wotke and Usener perhaps take Epicurus to
think that friendship is worth choosing per se, which can only be conveyed by the emendation.
What is more likely is that the force of δὲ is lost in the fragment without the emendation. The δὲ
introduces some tension between the first and second sentence. However, there is no clear
tension between something being a virtue and it conferring benefits on us. I take it that there is at
least more tension between saying (1) friendship is worth choosing for its own sake and (1)
friendship is worth choosing it because it confers benefits on us. In fact, Annas seems to favor
this reading because it supports the constitutivist view. Although we initially choose friendship
because it is beneficial to us, it grows in importance such that it becomes choiceworthy in itself
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as a constituent of our end. If we accept the emendation, Sent. Vat. 23 quite clearly undercuts
SRE (1); the emendation makes friendship choiceworthy in itself, whereas SRE (1) says that
only one’s own pleasure is choiceworthy for its own sake. If we reject the emendation, which
Brown advocates, he suggests that we thereby lose the one passage in which Epicurus posits
something as worth choosing that is not for sake of one’s own pleasure, and so any evidence that
Epicurus rejects SRE also (1) vanishes. Ultimately, it matters little for my argument whether we
accept or reject the emendation. Even if we set aside Sent. Vat. 23 entirely, there are other
passages where Epicurus argues that there is something worth doing that is not for the sake of
our own pleasure. These all make claims about friendship and what friends owe one another.147
Brown’s argument takes Epicurus to claim that everything is worth choosing by M only
for the sake of M’s pleasure. If this is true, if there is something worth choosing other than my
own pleasure, it can only be worth choosing for the sake of my own pleasure. Epicurus thinks
that friendship is worth choosing, so there must be some relation between my own pleasure and
the fact that friendship is worth choosing. The choiceworthiness of friendship must depend upon
or be somehow derivative of the choiceworthiness of my own pleasure. We saw in Chapters 1
and 2 that there are two accounts of the relation between the choiceworthiness of pleasure and
other goods. If SRE is correct, only pleasure is worth choosing in itself, which means that other
good things must be worth choosing in some non-intrinsic way: either instrumentally or
constitutively. So if Epicurus endorses SRE (1), he thinks that friends should only choose things
that are (a) instruments toward their own pleasure or (b) constituents of their own pleasure.
Brown’s 2002 “Epicurus on the Value of Friendship” makes an argument similar to the one from the
Companion to Epicureanism. In the 2002 article, he writes on page 74, “In sum, only one text would ask
us to countenance the possibility that Epicurus has a self-contradictory account of friendship or that
Epicurus consistently holds that friendship is διʼ ἑαυτὴν αἱρετή despite his commitment to the claim that
only pleasure is διʼ ἑαυτὴν ἀρετή.” My argument is that since there is a number of passages on friendship
that contradict SRE (1), Epicurus cannot consistently and does not commit himself to it.
147
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However, we should sometimes pursue friendship in ways or do things for our friends
that are neither instrumental for nor constitutive of our own pleasure. There are four reasons for
this. First, the gods pursue friendships even though doing so is neither instrumental toward nor
constitutive of their own pleasure, and we should strive to be godlike in this sense.148 Second,
Epicurus claims that a friendship where I always aim to get something for myself is not an ideal
friendship, which suggests that some friendships are not worth choosing only for the sake of my
own pleasure.149 Third and fourth, Epicurus claims that I should be willing to die for my
friends150 and feel pain over their deaths151. These two claims discount Epicurus’ commitment to
SRE (1) for similar reasons; Epicurus seems to argue for cases in which it is good to die for a
friend or feel pain over her death, but not because doing so is instrumental toward or constitutive
of our own pleasure. I discuss each of these passages and how they contradict SRE (1) below.
148

Sent. Vat. 78. The noble man is most involved with wisdom and friendship, of which one is a mortal
good, the other immortal. ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι θνητὸν
ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον. As I argued in Chapter 2 and will argue again, I take this passage to mean that
we should cultivate immortal goods, e.g., friendship. We enjoy godlike blessedness when we do so.
149
Sent. Vat. 39. The steadfast friend is neither he who always searches for utility, nor he who never
links [friendship to utility]. For the former makes gratitude a matter for commercial transaction, while the
latter kills off good hope for the future. οὔθʼ ὁ τὴν χρείαν ἐπιζητῶν διὰ παντὸς φίλος, οὔθʼ ὁ μηδέποτε
συνάπτων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ καπηλεύει τῇ χάριτι τὴν ἀμοιβήν, ὁ δὲ ἀποκόπτει τὴν περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος
εὐελπιστίαν.
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Sent. Vat. 56-57. The wise man feels no more pain when he is tortured <than when his friend is
tortured, and will die on his behalf; for if he betrays> his friend, his entire life will be confounded and
utterly upset because of a lack of confidence. ἀλγεῖ μὲν ὁ σοφὸς οὐ μᾶλλον στρεβλούμενος <ἢ
στρεβλουμένου τοῦ φίλου, καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τεθνήξεται· εἰ γὰρ προήσεται> τὸν φίλον ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ πᾶς διʼ
ἀπιστίαν συγχυθήσεται καὶ ἀνακεχαιτισμένος ἔσται.
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Plut. Mor. 1101a. They argue with those who eliminate pains and tears and lamentations for the deaths
of friends, and they say that the kind of freedom from pain which amounts to insensitivity is the result of
another and greater bad thing, savagery or an unadulterated lust for fame and madness, and that this is the
reason why it is better to suffer something and experience pain, and by Zeus even to weep copiously,
swoon and [experience] all the sentiment which they indulge in and [even] write about, and so come to
seem tender and given to friendship. For Epicurus said this in many other places and he also [said it]
about the death of Hegesianax when he wrote to his father Dositheus and to Pyrson, the brother of the
deceased. For recently I chanced to go through his letters. εἰ δὲ δεῖ προσθεῖναί τι τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἐκεῖνό
μοι δοκῶ λήψεσθαι παρ᾽ αὐτῶν πρῶτον, ὅτι τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι λύπας καὶ δάκρυα καὶ στεναγμοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς
τῶν φίλων τελευταῖς μάχονται καὶ λέγουσι ‘τὴν εἰς τὸ ἀπαθὲς καθεστῶσαν ἀλυπίαν ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου κακοῦ
μείζονος ὑπάρχειν, ὠμότητος ἢ δοξοκοπίας ἀκράτου καὶ λύσσης: διὸ πάσχειν τι βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ
λυπεῖσθαι καὶ νὴ Δία λιπαίνειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τήκεσθαι,’ καὶ ὅσα δὴ παθαινόμενοι ‘καὶ γράφοντες
ὑγροί τινες εἶναι καὶ φιλικοὶ δοκοῦσι.
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Epicurus certainly argues that friendship is often worth pursuing by me for the sake of
my own pleasure. Nor does Epicurus take all cases in which we justifiably pursue friendship to
be ones that are not for the sake of our own pleasure. This would amount to a gross
misunderstanding of Epicurus’ claims about the relation between pleasure and friendship. After
all, Epicurus clearly thinks that many friendships are good because they contribute to our
ataraxia. We need friends because we are weak and thus require help. According to Seneca,
Although a wise man is self-sufficient, he will still want to have a friend, if for no other
reason, in order to exercise his friendship, so that a great virtue might not go to waste; not
for the reason which Epicurus gave in this very letter, “so that he might have someone to
attend him when sick, and to help him when he is thrown into prison or is
impoverished…”
Sapiens, etiam si contentus est se, tamen habere amicum vult, si nihil aliud, ut exerceat
amicitiam, ne tam magna virtus iaceat, non ad hoc, quod dicebat Epicurus in hac ipsa
epistula, "ut habeat, qui sibi aegro adsideat, succurrat in vincula coniecto vel inopi…"152
If Seneca is correct, Epicurus thinks that friendship is good (at least in part) not because it
enables us to exercise virtue, but because our friends help us out during difficult times, i.e., they
provide help to us when we need it. Moreover, Epicurus says that, “We do not need utility from
our friends so much as we need confidence concerning that utility.”153 So, having friends is not
only good because friends help us through difficult times. Having friends is also good because it
makes us confident about the future, i.e., it reduces our anxieties about what is to come. Part of
what we stand to gain from friendship is the knowledge that if things go badly for us, someone
will be by our side to help us through misfortune. Several of Epicurus’ arguments about the
importance of friendship run parallel to this claim: having friends is good because it promotes or
constitutes pleasure. We saw Sent. Vat. 23, for example, where Epicurus suggests that friendship
has its origins in the benefits that it confers. Yet not all of his claims about what friends owe to
152

Sen. Ep. 9.8.
Sent. Vat. 34. οὐκ οὕτως χρείαν ἔχομεν τῆς χρείας <τῆς> παρὰ τῶν φίλων ὡς τῆς πίστεως τῆς περὶ τῆς
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one another share this reason. We should sometimes pursue friendships and do things because of
our friends, I argue, even if doing so does not bring about or constitute our own pleasure.
To be fair, Brown does not take Epicurus to claim that we will never sacrifice our
pleasure for the sake of our friendships or for the sake of our friends. Sent. Vat. 28, for example,
says that, “One must not approve of those who are excessively eager for friendship, nor those
who are reluctant. But one must be willing to run some risks for friendship.”154 Similarly, Sent.
Vat. 56-57 say that, “The wise man feels no more pain when he is tortured <than when his friend
is tortured, and will die on his behalf; for if he betrays> his friend, his entire life will be
confounded and utterly upset because of confidence.”155 Running risks for friendship, feeling our
friend’s pain as intensely as our own, and dying on behalf of friends are likely to require me to
sacrifice my own pleasure. Nevertheless, whenever these things are required, Brown seems to
think Epicurus advocates doing them only if it brings about or constitutes our pleasure for me in
the long run. Friends run risks for one another because the benefits of the whole friendship
outweigh one single risk going badly. Likewise, if I do not share my friend’s pain, my friend
feels a sense of betrayal, which destroys the confidence that is at the heart of our friendship,
without which neither of us feels secure. Since the whole point of friendship is to feel more
secure about the future, failing to share pains will destroy a friendship. Thus, Brown concedes
that there will be some cases where we subordinate our own pleasure for the sake of our friends;
but he maintains that subordinating our pleasure at t1 for the sake of our friends is only worth
doing if it somehow brings about pleasure or is constitutive of our pleasure at t2. Any case where

Sent. Vat. 28, οὔτε τοὺς προχείρους εἰς φιλίαν οὔτε τοὺς ὀκνηροὺς δοκιμαστέον· δεῖ δὲ καὶ
παρακινδυνεῦσαι χάριν, χάριν φίλιας.
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ἀλγεῖ μὲν ὁ σοφὸς οὐ μᾶλλον στρεβλούμενος <ἢ στρεβλουμένου τοῦ φίλου, καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ
τεθνήξεται· εἰ γὰρ προήσεται> τὸν φίλον ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ πᾶς διʼ ἀπιστίαν συγχυθήσεται καὶ
ἀνακεχαιτισμένος ἔσται.
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subordinating my pleasure for the sake of a friend is advisable, this is only so because I stand to
gain more in the long run by sacrificing my own pleasure for my friend here and now than I
would by not doing so. According to Brown, even the passages suggesting that friendship is
worth pursuing for the sake of something other than my own pleasure turn out to claim that
friendship is only worth choosing as an instrument for or constituent of my long-term pleasure.
Let us now turn to the arguments about friendship that challenge SRE (1). Epicurus takes
friendship to be worth pursuing by the gods. We know from Sent. Vat. 78 that friendship is an
immortal good, which I argued in Chapter 1 means that friendship is a good pursued by immortal
beings, i.e., the gods. The problem is that there is no sense in which the gods could pursue
friendship for the sake of their own pleasure, since their pleasure requires nothing in order to be
complete. Since they enjoy perfect pleasure in virtue of their being, they need neither instruments
nor constituents to enjoy ataraxia. In other words, friendship seems to be a good worth
cultivating for the gods, but friendship can be neither an instrumental good nor a constitutive
good for the gods, for they enjoy tranquility as a result of their divine nature. In RS I, Epicurus
tells us that, “What is blessed and indestructible has no troubles itself, nor does it give trouble to
anyone else, so that it is not affected by feelings of anger or gratitude. For all such things are a
sign of weakness.”156 The blessed gods have no weaknesses. Since the gods have no weaknesses,
they experience neither pain nor worry. Insofar as something has tranquility when it lacks all
pains and worries, the gods are tranquil, and this is so because of what the gods are.
Philodemus offers some evidence for this in his On the Gods, where he rejects the claim:
“that the gods do favors for each other, and by somehow giving a share in certain things of their

τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει· ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι
συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.
156
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own as if to beings that are in need of them, is not to be accepted. For each of them is
independently capable of providing himself with the most perfect pleasure.”157 Interestingly,
Philodemus describes the gods here as if they do not need friends because they can satisfy their
needs on their own, and so can provide themselves with the most perfect pleasure. This seems
different from Epicurus’ position, which is not that the gods have needs and are capable of
providing themselves with the most perfect pleasure, but that they enjoy this necessarily in virtue
of their nature. Even if Epicurus and Philodemus differ on why the gods enjoy perfect pleasure, it
matters little for my argument. Both agree that the gods do not pursue friendship for the sake of
their own pleasure, since they either enjoy the most perfect pleasure in virtue of their divine
nature, or they can provide themselves with the most perfect pleasure without the help of friends.
Friendship is not an instrument or constituent of divine pleasure, so SRE (1) is false at least when
it comes to the gods, who do not pursue friendship only for the sake of their own pleasure.
Whether SRE (1) is false for mortals is another question. D. Armstrong seems somewhat
sympathetic to this when he writes, “Besides restating the claim that friendship in the case of the
gods does not originate in any need, [Philodemus Fr. 85.7] assumes that the gods’ life is
normative for that of wise human beings. The wise can assimilate themselves to the gods in their
own friendships.”158 There is good evidence to support the claim that humans should imitate the
divine, i.e., we should build our lives to imitate the existence of the gods. Armstrong sees strong
evidence of this in Philodemus’s work. D. Konstan also sees it strongly in Epicurus’ own
writings, and has argued, successfully I think, that Epicurus consistently encourages humans to
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make themselves as godlike as possible.159 Epicurus exhorts mortals to become godlike
throughout the extant writings, e.g., in Ep. Men. 135, where he tells the reader to “Practice these
and the related precepts day and night, by yourself and with someone like you, and you will
never be disturbed either when awake or in sleep, and you will live as a god among men.”160
Mortals should become godlike by emulating the gods, so we should aim to model our lives after
the gods. Since being godlike means pursuing friendships not for the sake of one’s own pleasure,
it follows that this is a pursuit at which humans should aim. This means that SRE (1) fails to
apply for mortals who are trying to make themselves godlike and for the gods themselves.161
Other arguments support the conclusion that SRE (1) is false. Brown thinks SRE (1)
entails that whenever friend A sacrifices her pleasure for the sake of friend B, it is only because
A stands to gain greater pleasure at t2 by sacrificing her pleasure momentarily for the sake of B
at t1. When Epicurus claims that friends should sometimes do what is painful for one another,
e.g., run risks for one another, feel one another’s pain as strongly as their own, and share in one
another’s suffering, friends should do these things in a way that is consistent with both ethical
hedonism and ethical egoism. Friends must feel pain or forego pleasure for the sake of their own
pleasure, and Brown explains this by claiming that friends should make episodic sacrifices for
the sake of their own long-term pleasure. Consider again Sent. Vat. 56-57: “The wise man feels
no more pain when he is tortured <than when his friend is tortured, and will die on his behalf; for
if he betrays> his friend, his entire life will be confounded and utterly upset because of a lack of
159
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confidence.”162 On Brown’s reading, we should take this passage to say that at the heart of each
friendship is a feeling of confidence, and that a friend failing to do certain things for another
destroys that confidence. I expect my friend to feel as much pain as I do when someone tortures
me because it shows that she would go to great lengths for me, and because of this I am
confident that someone will help me through whatever tough times might lie ahead. The fact that
my friend feels my pain just as intensely as I do shows me that she is deeply committed to me,
and if she is deeply committed to me, I know that I can count on her whenever things go badly.
The problem with such an account of friendship is that Epicurus rejects such bartering for
benefits between friends, through which I forego my own pleasure only if it pays off in the long
run. On the contrary, Epicurus argues that real friends do not treat one another this way. For
example, Epicurus claims that, “The steadfast friend is neither he who always searches for
utility, nor he who never links [friendship to utility]. For the former makes gratitude a matter for
commercial transaction, while the latter kills off good hope for the future.”163 There are two
claims here. The second is that steadfast friends should not refuse to anticipate help from one
another, since this would diminish the hope that friends can have about their futures. The first is
that steadfast friends do not always seek utility, i.e., a friend should not always pursue what is
useful or beneficial for herself. Thus, friends can hope for help from one another, but this is not
always what motivates friends to do what friendship requires of them. If friends were always to
search for what is beneficial, the friendship would be little more than a commercial transaction,
but friendship is much more than this. What Epicurus argues here is that friends should not barter

Sent. Vat. 56-57. ἀλγεῖ μὲν ὁ σοφὸς οὐ μᾶλλον στρεβλούμενος <ἢ στρεβλουμένου τοῦ φίλου, καὶ ὑπὲρ
αὐτοῦ τεθνήξεται· εἰ γὰρ προήσεται> τὸν φίλον ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ πᾶς διʼ ἀπιστίαν συγχυθήσεται καὶ
ἀνακεχαιτισμένος ἔσται.
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for benefits as Brown alleges. Brown thinks that Epicurean friendship is no more than medium
through which I promote my own pleasure in the long run, because of which I make some
sacrifice now for the prospect of a greater return later. So there seems to be the following
inconsistency between Brown’s account of Epicurean friendship and Sent. Vat. 39.
1.1. Suppose SRE (1) is true, i.e., friends choose everything for the sake of their own
pleasure.
1.2. If friends make episodic sacrifices of their own pleasure, it is because doing so has
utility, i.e., friends do so to obtain pleasure in the long-term (Brown’s claim).
1.3. Friends make episodic sacrifices of their own pleasure for one another (Sent. Vat. 34,
56-57).
1.4. Friends make episodic sacrifices of their own pleasure only because doing so has
utility, i.e., because it helps them to obtain pleasure in the long-term (by 1.2 and 1.3).
1.5. Friends should not always aim for utility (Sent. Vat. 39).
1.6. Friends make episodic sacrifices of their own pleasure only because it has utility, and
friends should not always aim for utility (by 1.4 and 1.5).
Premises 1.3. and 1.4 say that friends sometimes sacrifice their own pleasure for one
another, but that whenever they do so, it is only for the sake of utility, i.e., it is because doing so
will help them to obtain greater pleasure later on. On the other hand, Sent. Vat 39 says that real
friends should not always aim for utility, so there seems to be some inconsistency between 1.4
and 1.5. In order to resolve this inconsistency, I suggest that we should eliminate 1.1.
It is worthwhile to note that Brown’s 2002 article has a very limited notion of friendship.
Brown thinks that when Epicurus discusses friendship, he has in mind is something lofty that
obtains only between two Sages. I think that Brown is wrong about that. It seems likely to me
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that when Epicurus talks about friendship, he describes to his audience at large how they might
become better friends. At the very least, he is telling his companions in the garden how to be
better friends, and surely not everyone in the garden is a Sage. This actually does not matter for
the argument here. Even if Brown correctly claims that friendship only obtains between Sages,
my arguments here go to show that the Sage will sometimes take as choiceworthy for its own
sake something other than her own pleasure, notably with respect to her friends. If that is true,
then SRE (1) is still false in the case of Sages, but perhaps not those engaged in lesser
friendships. This would help my argument, I think. If friendship is only between Sages, then
Brown’s argument would entail that the highest form of friendship does not abide by the
constraints of SRE (1). Since we should aim for the highest form of friendship, we should not
always pursue friendship for the sake of our own pleasure. If it is the case that friends should not
always act in order to get something out of a friendship, SRE (1) cannot be attributed to
Epicurus. Epicurus claims in Sent. Vat. 39 that friends should not always seek to gain something
for themselves. This is not to say that Epicurus does not think that friends will never get
something for themselves out of friendship (this would kill off hope for a good future, the sort of
hope that a friendship should cultivate). Nevertheless, the point remains that friends do not
always aim to get something out of friendship, which is inconsistent with the story that Brown
tells about why friends should sometimes make sacrifices of their own pleasure for one another.
Suppose my argument above is wrong. Perhaps claiming that the steadfast friend should
not always aim for utility does not contradict that everything is worth choosing for the sake of
our own pleasure in the way that Brown suggests. Even if this were the case, it would still be
difficult to see how all of Epicurus’ claims about what friends should do for one another can be
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harmonized with SRE (1). Epicurus claims that friends should sometimes die for one another.164
How can my willingness to die for a friend be worthwhile only for the sake of my own pleasure?
In Ep. Men. 124-125, Epicurus presents a no-subject argument about death: a person who dies
loses the capacity for perception and so can feel neither pleasure nor pain.
Get used to believing that death is nothing to us. For all good and bad consists in senseexperience, and death is the privation of sense-experience. Hence, a correct knowledge of
the fact that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life a matter for contentment,
not by adding a limitless time [to life] but by removing the longing for immortality. For
there is nothing fearful in life for one who has grasped that there is nothing fearful in the
absence of life.
συνέθιζε δὲ ἐν τῷ νομίζειν μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τὸν θάνατον ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ
κακὸν ἐν αἰσθήσει· στέρησις δέ ἐστιν αἰσθήσεως ὁ θάνατος. ὅθεν γνῶσις ὀρθὴ τοῦ μηθὲν
εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸν θάνατον ἀπολαυστὸν ποιεῖ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς θνητόν, οὐκ ἄπειρον
προστιθεῖσα χρόνον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῆς ἀθανασίας ἀφελομένη πόθον. οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ
ζῆν δεινόν τῷ κατειληφότι γνησίως τὸ μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ μὴ ζῆν δεινὸν.165
Dying for a friend requires me to cease to exist, to relinquish my capacity to experience
anything, including pleasure. Dying for a friend can therefore be neither instrumentally nor
constitutively worthwhile for the sake of my own pleasure or freedom from pain.
Here is a more formal version of the reductio given in the previous paragraph:
2.1. Suppose SRE (1) is true, i.e., everything is worth choosing only for the sake of my
own pleasure.
2.2. If 2.1, then anything other than my own pleasure is worth choosing only because it is
either instrumentally or constitutively good (entailment of SRE (1)).
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2.3. If something is instrumentally choiceworthy, it helps me to obtain my own pleasure
(definition of instrumental choiceworthiness).
2.4. If something is constitutively choiceworthy, it is an essential part of my own pleasure
(definition of constitutive choiceworthiness).
2.5. Friends should sometimes die for one another (Sent. Vat. 56-57 & Diog. Laert.
10.121b)
2.6. Dying for a friend involves choosing the dissolution of one’s body such that after
doing so one experiences no pleasure at all (No-Subject Argument).
2.7. Dying for a friend cannot be instrumentally good because it requires me to give up
everything and helps me to obtain nothing, for all good lies in sense-experience (NoSubject Argument).
2.8. Dying for a friend cannot be constitutively good because it requires me to eliminate
the conditions for my pleasure rather than constitute it (No-Subject Argument).
2.9. Everything is worth choosing only for the sake of my own pleasure, but we should
choose to die for a friend, which I cannot do for the sake of my own pleasure.
This argument shows that dying for friends can be neither instrumentally nor constitutively good
for the sake of our own pleasure. Since, as we know, SRE (1) entails that everything must be
worth choosing for the sake of our own pleasure, and there are only two ways of being worth
choosing for the sake of our own pleasure (instrumentally or constitutively) then we must reject
SRE (1).
Someone might object to premise 2.7 or 2.8 in the following way. Suppose that our lives
would be utterly painful if we chose not to die on behalf of a friend. If this were the case, we
would have reasons to choose dying for a friend that are rooted in our own pleasure. One might
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even think that this is the kind of reason that Epicurus has in mind when he says that friends
should sometimes die for one another, since Ep. Men. 56-57 ends with the claim, “…for if he
betrays his friend, his entire life will be confounded and utterly upset because of a lack of
confidence.”166 In such a case, dying for a friend can be instrumentally choiceworthy for the sake
of our own pleasure because it could help to prevent the suffering that we would encounter if we
chose not to die for a friend. Similarly, dying for a friend could be constitutively choiceworthy
for the sake of our own pleasure because we would lose some essential part of our pleasure if we
did not choose to die for a friend, a part without which we would not have a pleasant life at all.
There are two arguments against this objection. First, Epicurus’ claim here is that
betraying friends causes our lives to be utterly upset. He does not say that the wise man should
die on behalf of a friend if and only if not doing so would cause him to have an upset life.
Diogenes reinforces this reading of the passage at Diog. Laert. 121b, where he attributes to
Epicurus the claim that the wise man will die for a friend, even though he makes no mention here
of whether one will do so in order to avoid producing an upset life for oneself. Second, dying for
a friend can be neither an instrument nor constituent of my pleasure in the first place. If dying for
a friend is instrumentally choiceworthy for the sake of our pleasure, it must be worth doing
because it causes pleasure for us. The problem remains that far from causing anything for us,
death takes everything away from us, and it is difficult to see how Epicurus could want us to
choose something as an instrument for the sake of becoming nothing. For similar reasons, if
dying for a friend is constitutively choiceworthy for the sake of our own pleasure, it must be
worth doing because it forms an essential part of our pleasure, i.e., it somehow constitutes the
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pleasantness of our life. Dying on Epicurus’ account, however, annihilates our existence. It is not
clear how Epicurus could want us to choose something as a constituent of the pleasantness of our
lives when it undoes the very structure of our lives on which that pleasantness depends.
Nor will this objection fare any better if we claim that dying for a friend is an instrument
for or constitutive of the absence of pain, rather than the presence of pleasure. Let us remember
that pleasure and freedom from pain are only good when recognized as such. This is why the nosubject argument claims that all good and evil lies in sensory-perception. This also explains why
Epicurus claims that the sleeping and dead are not living the best possible life. As Torquatus tells
us, “The pleasure we pursue is not that alone which sets in motion our physical being itself in
some agreeable way and is perceived by the senses with a certain delight, but rather we hold that
the greatest pleasure is that which is perceived when all pain has been taken away.”167 Both
pleasure and the absence of pain can only be good if they are perceived as such. Dying for a
friend, therefore, could not be instrumentally or constitutively choiceworthy for the sake of my
freedom from pain because freedom from pain must be recognized as such, which the dead
cannot do. Those who have died cannot experience pleasure or the absence of pain, nor can they
recognize it as such, which means that choosing to be dead cannot be good as an instrument for
or constituent of our own pleasure, even if we think of pleasure as the absence of pain rather than
presence of pleasure. Consequently, dying for a friend cannot be worth choosing as an
instrument for the sake of or a constituent of our own pleasure, so again, SRE (1) must be false.
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A final argument having to do with how we should respond to the death of our friends
also contradicts SRE (1). Epicurus says that we should feel pain over the death of our friends.
Plutarch, in his A Pleasant Life, for example, tells us this of the Epicureans:
They argue with those who eliminate pains and tears and lamentations for the deaths of
friends, and they say that the kind of freedom from pain which amounts to insensitivity is
the result of another and greater bad thing, savagery or an unadulterated lust for fame and
madness, and that this is the reason why it is better to suffer something and experience
pain, and by Zeus even to weep copiously, swoon and [experience] all the sentiment
which they indulge in and [even] write about, and so come to seem tender and given to
friendship. For Epicurus said this in many other places and he also [said it] about the
death of Hegesianax when he wrote to his father Dositheus and to Pyrson, the brother of
the deceased. For recently I chanced to go through his letters.
εἰ δὲ δεῖ προσθεῖναί τι τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἐκεῖνό μοι δοκῶ λήψεσθαι παρ᾽ αὐτῶν πρῶτον,
ὅτι τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι λύπας καὶ δάκρυα καὶ στεναγμοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων τελευταῖς
μάχονται καὶ λέγουσι ‘τὴν εἰς τὸ ἀπαθὲς καθεστῶσαν ἀλυπίαν ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου κακοῦ
μείζονος ὑπάρχειν, ὠμότητος ἢ δοξοκοπίας ἀκράτου καὶ λύσσης: διὸ πάσχειν τι βέλτιον
εἶναι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ νὴ Δία λιπαίνειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τήκεσθαι,’ καὶ ὅσα δὴ
παθαινόμενοι ‘καὶ γράφοντες ὑγροί τινες εἶναι καὶ φιλικοὶ δοκοῦσι. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις
τε πολλοῖς Ἐπίκουρος εἴρηκε καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἡγησιάνακτος τελευτῆς πρὸς Σωσίθεον τὸν
πατέρα γράφων καὶ Πύρσωνα τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ τεθνηκότος: ἔναγχος γὰρ κατὰ τύχην τὰς
ἐπιστολὰς διῆλθον αὐτοῦ.168
The passage illustrates nicely how the Epicureans differ from the Stoics. Not only do Epicureans
believe that it is sometimes proper to have an emotional response to external events, but more
importantly, they willingly feel negative emotional responses and think that doing so is proper.
Nor should we think that this position is typical of later Epicureanism and not the founder of the
school himself, for Plutarch tells us that Epicurus made this claim “in many other places.” So
there is reason to attribute to Epicurus the claim that we should feel pain over the death of our
friends. If SRE (1) is true, this can only be worth choosing because it is an instrument toward
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obtaining our own pleasure or constitutive of our own pleasure. As was the case with dying for a
friend, the problem is that there does not seem to be any sense in which feeling pain over the
death of friends could be a means for obtaining or a constituent of our own pleasure. In order to
see why this is the case, consider the following reductio ad absurdum.
3.1. Suppose SRE (1) is true, i.e., everything is worth choosing only for the sake of my
own pleasure.
3.2. If 3.1, then anything other than my own pleasure is worth choosing only because it is
either instrumentally or constitutively choiceworthy (entailment of 3.1).
3.3. If something is instrumentally choiceworthy, it helps me to obtain my own pleasure
(definition of instrumental good).
3.4. If something is constitutively choiceworthy, it is an essential part of my own
pleasure (definition of constitutive good).
3.5. I should choose to feel pain over the death of a friend (Mor. 1101a).
3.6. Feeling pain over the death of a friend is not worth choosing because it is
instrumental in producing my own pleasure (my claim).
3.7. Feeling pain over the death of a friend is not worth choosing because it is constitutive
of my own pleasure (my claim).
3.8. Feeling pain over the death of a friend is neither instrumentally nor constitutively
choiceworthy (conjunction of 3.6 and 3.7).
3.9. Not everything is worth choosing for the sake of my own pleasure (by 3.5 and 3.8).
In order to avoid the contradiction between 3.1 and 3.9, we must have reasons to think
that 3.7 or 3.8 is false. At first, there seem to be such reasons. After all, Mor. 1101a seems to
suggest that grieving for the death of a friend is worth doing for two specific reasons. First, one
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might grieve the death of a friend in order to avoid greater pains associated with being
insensitive, which results from being savage, mad, or lusting after fame. Second, one might
grieve the death of a friend in order to seem tender and given to friendship. Presumably one
could take either the instrumentalist or constitutivist view of either reason. On the instrumentalist
view, we might choose to feel pain over the death of a friend because doing so helps us to avoid
insensitivity and seem given to friendship, both of which promote or contribute to our own
pleasure. On the constitutivist view, we might choose to feel pain over the death of a friend
because sensitivity and seeming given to friendship are essential ingredients of our pleasure.
Neither of these readings explains all the cases in which Epicurus claims that we should
feel pain over our friends who have died. Let us consider the instrumentalist reading. Applied to
the reasons provided in the passage, there must be some sense in which avoiding insensitivity
and seeming to be given to friendship promotes our own pleasure. If this is correct, then we
should choose to feel pain over the death of a friend only when we have one of these reasons: we
should aim to avoid insensitivity or to seem to be given to friendship because it promotes our
own pleasure. The problem is that the passage indicates that Epicurus grieved for the death of
others, e.g., Hegesianax; but there is good reason to suspect that neither of these reasons were
what motivated him to do so. Epicurus needed no such instruments, e.g., sensitivity or givenness
to friendship, to promote his own pleasure. Epicurus himself reports in his Letter to Idomeneus,
I write this to you while experiencing a blessed day, and at the same time the last day of
my life. Urinary blockages and dysenteric discomforts afflict me which could not be
surpassed for their intensity. But against all these things are ranged the joy in my soul
produced by recollection of the discussions we have had.
Τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα τελευταίαν ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταυτί.
στραγγουρία τε παρηκολουθήκει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ
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ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους. ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν
γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ.169
Epicurus achieves tranquility so fully that not even tremendous physical pain can disrupt it.170
Recall, though, that ataraxia has a limit. Since it consists in the absence of pain and worry, once
one has no pains or worries, one enjoys it to the highest degree possible. Once tranquil, our
pleasure requires no instruments. Pleasure only requires instruments if it can be promoted or
increased, which cannot be done to ataraxia. Thus, the Sage is a counterexample to the
instrumentalist reading of Mor. 1101a. The Sage will feel pain over the death of a friend, but not
because doing so is instrumental in bringing about his own pleasure. Qua tranquil, the Sage does
not use an instrument to promote his own pleasure; there is no further pleasure to promote.
Let us now consider the constitutivist reading. If it is correct, feeling pain over the death
of a friend must constitute our pleasure, i.e., grieving the death of a friend must be an essential
constituent of our own pleasure. If feeling pain over the death of a friend is constitutive of my
own pleasure, my own pleasure requires grieving for the death of my friends. To say that
mourning a friend who dies is an essential part of my pleasure is to say that such grieving is
something without which I could not experience the pleasure that I should ultimately aim for. It
is very unlikely, however, that this is what Epicurus means here. For there seem to be several
cases in which friends maintain their pleasure without grief over one another’s deaths. The
constitutivist reading suggests that being willing to die for friends is a necessary condition for
enjoying the kind of pleasure for which we should aim. This is a criterion far more restrictive,
169
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however, than the one for which Epicurus argues. Sent. Vat. 33, for example, says, “The cry of
the flesh: not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold. For if someone has these things and
is confident of having them in the future, he might contend even with Zeus for happiness.”171 All
that we need in order to be divinely happy (or close to it) are the resources to satisfy our desires
and confidence that we will be able to continue satisfying them. This sets the necessary
conditions for our pleasure considerably lower than feeling pain over the death of our friends,
which means that doing so cannot be constitutive of, or an essential ingredient of, our pleasure.
One might respond that what Epicurus means in Mor. 1101a is that sensitivity and a
disposition toward friendship are constituents of our pleasure, and so we should grieve because it
promotes our sensitivity and the appearance of our proclivity toward friendship. This is a strange
claim. First, it blends the instrumentalist and constitutivist views together. It seems to entail that
feeling pain over the death of a friend is instrumentally worth choosing because it promotes our
sensitivity and the appearance that we are given to friendship, which are constitutively worth
choosing for the sake of our own pleasure. Some things indeed are sometimes worth choosing
instrumentally, and at other times worth choosing constitutively. Interpreters who argue for
either the instrumentalist view or constitutivist view seem to think, however, that the two views
are mutually exclusive. Consequently, any reading that combines the two views is unlikely to be
appealing to most scholars working on Epicurus. The second and deeper problem with this
reading is that Sent. Vat. 33 contradicts it as strongly as it does the original reason for the
constitutivist view of Mor. 1101a. “The cry of the flesh: not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to
be cold. For if someone has these things and is confident of having them in the future, he might
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contend even with Zeus for happiness.”172 Happiness like that of Zeus only requires that we have
the resources to satisfy our desires and confidence that we will be able to do so in the future. If
this is the case, then neither feeling pain itself over the death of a friend, nor sensitivity, nor
seeming to have a disposition toward friendship can be necessary conditions for the pleasant life.

3.4

Conclusions
Brown argues that Epicurus endorses SRE (1). This chapter analyzed the passages that

Brown cites in order to attribute SRE (1) to Epicurus: Ep. Men. 128-129, RS XXV, Diog. Laert.
10.34, and Fin. 1.23. None of these passages, I argued, commits Epicurus in any explicit way to
ethical egoism or ethical hedonism. If Epicurus endorses SRE (1), he must claim that (a)
everything worth choosing by M is worth choosing for the sake of M, and (b) that the only thing
worth choosing in itself is pleasure. None of the passages that Brown cites expresses outright
commitment to either (a) or (b). Therefore, I conclude that Brown’s evidence is insufficient.
Section 3.3 argued for the negation of SRE (1). According to Brown, there is only one
passage that one might use for this purpose, Sent. Vat. 23. He argued that doing so requires an
emendation to the text that we should not accept, one that makes friendship choiceworthy in
itself rather than a virtue. Whether we accept the emendation is inconsequential for my
argument. Even if we set aside Sent. Vat. 23 entirely, there are several other passages that
contradict SRE (1). First, the gods pursue friendships and Epicurus insists that we should
emulate the gods in this respect. Second, Epicurus claims that a friend should not always aim to
get something out of friendship, which seems to suggest that friendship is worth pursuing at least
in some cases for the sake of something other than our own pleasure. Third, Epicurus claims that
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friends should sometimes die for one another. Fourth, Epicurus argues that we should feel pain
when our friend dies. If SRE (1) is true, all four of these claims must be explained with recourse
to their instrumental or constitutive choiceworthiness. The problem is that the instrumentalist and
constitutivist views fail to explain, in at least some cases, why we will choose to do these four
things. Thus SRE (1) fails. Epicurus seems to argue, on four independent grounds, that friendship
should sometimes require us to choose some things that are not for the sake of our own pleasure.
In this chapter, I offered no positive account of what makes emulating the gods’
friendships, refusing to aim always for utility, dying for friends, and feeling pain over our
friends’ deaths choiceworthy. I argued only that Brown’s evidence is insufficient for this thesis,
and that other evidence shows that the thesis must be false. Since other scholars attribute SRE (1)
to Epicurus for reasons similar to Brown’s, I take this to show that SRE (1) should not be
attributed to Epicurus in general. This is because Epicurus maintains views about what friends
should do for one another that fly in the face of the notion that everything is worth choosing only
for the sake of our own pleasure. There still remains an open question about what it is that makes
doing what friends should do for one another choiceworthy in all cases according to Epicurus.
Brown’s explanation is sufficient most of the time: Epicurus does seem to think that friendship is
worth choosing in most circumstances because it promotes or is an essential part of our pleasure.
What I have argued in this chapter is simply that friendship is not only worth having for one of
these two reasons, since there are cases where friends should do things for one another that are
not for the sake of their own pleasure. Thus the question remains: for the sake of what, in such
cases, should friends do these things for one another? There are two possibilities. If we do not
choose these things for the sake of our own pleasure, we should choose them either (a) for the
sake of the friendship or (b) for the sake of the friend. If we should emulate the friendships of the
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gods, (a) seems better. The gods do not do things that are for the sake of other gods. This would
require that one god could benefit another, which is impossible since the gods necessarily enjoy
perfect blessedness. What about Epicurus’ claim that we should not always aim for utility in
friendships? This leaves it possible that we should be friends in a way that is sometimes for the
sake of friendship or the sake of the friend. This is also true for the claim that we should die for a
friend. We might choose to die for the friend herself, or we might choose to die for the sake of
the friendship we had with her before choosing death. This could also be why we should feel
pain over the death of our friends; it might be worth doing for the sake of the friend who has
died, and it might be worth doing for the sake of the friendship that once existed between us.
I argue in Chapter 5 that Epicurus opts for (a): we do these things for the sake of
friendship because friendship is one of the best things in life. All of this supports the thesis of
this dissertation, which is that Epicurus develops an objective goods perfectionism. Friendship
requires that we do things that are not for the sake of our own pleasure. It is true that in most
cases, friendship will be good insofar as it promotes or constitutes our pleasure, because pleasure
is one of the best things in life. Nonetheless, this is not true in all cases. In light of this, the
goodness of friendship is not always derivative of the goodness of pleasure. This entails that
friendship sometimes requires us to aim for something other than our own pleasure as an end in
itself. This is precisely what it is to argue for objective goods perfectionism: there are several
goods, one of which is friendship, worth pursuing in themselves (at least sometimes). We
achieve our telos, i.e., eudaimonia, by cultivating these best things in life in the right proportion.
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CHAPTER 4: KNOWLEDGE, PLEASURE, AND THE BEST POSSIBLE
LIFE

4.1

Introduction
In Epicurus’ Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of Invulnerability, Philip Mitsis writes that,

“At Ad Menoeceum 128-129, Epicurus insists that pleasure is the ἀρχή and the τέλος, the
beginning and the end, of a blessed life, because our pursuit of pleasure governs and unifies all
of our rational choices and gives a structure to our lives as a whole.”173 Although it is true that
Epicurus claims in Ep. Men. 128-129 that pleasure is the ἀρχή and τέλος of a blessed life, there is
considerable misunderstanding about what he means by this. I explored one such
misunderstanding in Chapter 3 about friendship. Brown, for example, seems to think that
Epicurus’ claim that pleasure is the beginning and end of a blessed life entails that everything is
worth choosing only for the sake of our own pleasure (SRE (1)). In Chapter 3, I argued that
Epicurus rejects this and insists that friends should choose friendship in a way that does not
always promote or constitute their own pleasure. A presupposition of SRE (1) is that pleasure is
the only intrinsic good, so that all other goods are goods only in some non-intrinsic way. Brown
attributes this presupposition to Epicurus, who allegedly “…holds that one should value nothing
but pleasure for its own sake. Everything else is to be valued because it brings about pleasure.”174
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This view that only pleasure is an intrinsic good leads to a second misinterpretation of
Epicurus, which says that if knowledge is good, then it promotes or constitutes pleasure.175
According to SRE (2), something is good only if it satisfies one of the three following criteria:
either (a) it is pleasure itself, (b) it serves as a means towards the securing of pleasure or (c) it is
constitutive of pleasure. If something satisfies (a), it is intrinsically good. If something satisfies
(b) or (c), it is non-intrinsically good. If SRE (2) is true, then Epicurus must think that only
pleasure is intrinsically good, but other things can be good instrumentally or constitutively.
In this chapter, I have three aims. First, I explain why scholars have been tempted to
claim that Epicurus endorses SRE (2). I consider their evidence and show why it is insufficient
for attributing SRE (2) to Epicurus. Second, I describe two problems that Epicurus faces if he
endorses SRE (2). The first problem is that if only pleasure has non-intrinsic goodness and one
should do everything in order to obtain pleasure, then one might reasonably worry that Epicurus
has no way to preclude the adoption of unjustified beliefs that contribute to the pleasure of our
lives.176 Epicurus has strong arguments against the adoption of unjustified but pleasant belief.
The second problem: suppose that SRE (2) is true so that if something is good, then it is pleasure,
promotes pleasure, or constitutes pleasure. If this is the case, then if knowing p is good, knowing
p is, promotes, or constitutes pleasure. Thus the contrapositive of SRE (2) would also be true,
which says that something is not good if it fails to be, promote, or constitute pleasure. If this
175

SRE (1) says that anything is worth choosing only for the sake of our own pleasure. SRE (2) says that
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contrapositive holds, then knowing p is not good if it fails to be, promote, or constitute pleasure.
However, Epicurus rejects this contrapositive, which means he also rejects SRE (2) itself.
Epicurus argues that knowledge is good even if does not promote or constitute pleasure.

4.2

The Argument for SRE (2)
Both J. Cooper and G. Striker cite the cradle argument from Cicero’s De Finibus when

they claim that Epicurus takes pleasure to be the only intrinsic good. The relevant text says that,
As soon as each animal is born, it seeks pleasure and rejoices in it as the highest good,
and rejects pain as the greatest bad thing, driving it away from itself as effectively as it
can; and it does this while it is still not corrupted, while the judgment of nature herself is
unperverted and sound. Therefore, [Epicurus] says that there is no need to reason or
debate about why pleasure is to be pursued and pain avoided. He thinks that these things
are perceived, as we perceive that fire is hot, that snow is white, that honey is sweet.
Omne animal, simul atque natum sit, voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono,
dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et, quantum possit, a se repellere, idque facere
nondum depravatum ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. itaque negat opus esse
ratione neque disputatione, quam ob rem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. sentiri
haec putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, dulce mel.177
The fact that those who attribute SRE (2) to Epicurus cite this bit of Cicero as evidence is
somewhat worrying. First, there is good reason to be suspicious of Cicero’s reconstruction of
Epicurus, for Cicero is sometimes unfair to those with whom he disagrees, which he does with
Epicurus. Of course, this does not mean that Cicero is presenting Epicurus’ arguments unfairly
here, so this does not count as a sufficient reason for discounting Fin. 1.30. Nevertheless, it gives
us a reason to be suspicious of whether the position described here is Epicurus’ considered view.
Second, even if the cradle argument gives a proof for the claim the pleasure is the only
intrinsic good, Torquatus provides it, so it counts at best as indirect evidence of Epicurus’
position from one of his disciples. At worst, it counts merely as evidence for what one of
177
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Epicurus’ followers thought. Whether Torquatus’ beliefs are consistent with Epicurus’ system
remains an open question, and so I contend that if we have other texts that seem more securely
indicative of Epicurus’ positions, we should prefer to consult them. Admittedly, Epicurus
himself does offer an argument that has a conclusion similar to Torquatus’ in Fin. 1.30. He
claims, for example, at Ep. Men. 129 that we recognize pleasure as our first and congenital
good.178 His point is that when we observe infants, we notice that they instinctively tend towards
pleasure and away from pain. This is what it means for pleasure to be our first and congenital
good. This does not entail, however, that pleasure alone is intrinsically good, but only that we
instinctively pursue pleasure as our first innate good in virtue of what we are. Moreover,
Torquatus’ argument does not provide proof for the claim that pleasure is the only intrinsic good.
It demonstrates only that humans pursue pleasure from the very beginning of their lives as a
matter of empirical fact, and not that pleasure is the only intrinsic good for humans. The fact that
infants pursue pleasure does not mean they might not learn that other goods have intrinsic worth
later in life. The same is true for Epicurus’ claim that pleasure is our first and congenital good.
This does not claim that pleasure is the only good in itself, or that all other things are good only
if they promote or constitute it. Thus, Cooper and Striker’s use of Fin. 130, and of Ep. Men. 129
by association, is in itself insufficient for the purpose of attributing SRE (2) to Epicurus.
In his 2012 Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to
Plotinus, Cooper further explains how the cradle argument allegedly supports SRE (2).
Everyone today who knows Epicurus’s name knows that Epicurus had a high regard for
pleasure. In fact, he seems to have thought, experience teaches us that pleasure is the only
thing in human life that has value just in itself. It is the only thing that, by and in its own
nature, is a good thing. Thus he was a hedonist in his ethical theory. Cicero reports as the
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beginning of Epicurus’s ethical doctrine [Epicurus’] famous “cradle” argument. This
deduces that pleasure is the highest and only intrinsic good…179
Here Cooper contends that Epicurus takes pleasure alone to be intrinsically good. Cooper
clarifies that Epicurus could not have intended for his cradle argument to be accepted as a proof
for the conclusion that pleasure is the only highest and intrinsic good, but rather a reminder of
what we “already knew implicitly at the beginning [of our lives before culture downgraded the
value of pleasure]” – that pleasure is our only intrinsic good.180 This supports the reading of the
cradle arguments that I offered in the previous paragraph: they serve to remind us that we pursue
pleasure instinctively as infants, not to prove that pleasure is the only thing that is good in itself.
Regardless of the role that the cradle argument plays in Epicurus’ ethical program,
Cooper seems to take it as evidence for the fact that Epicurus endorses the claim that pleasure is
the only intrinsic good. He similarly writes in his 1999 “Pleasure and Desire in Epicurus,” that,
for Epicurus, “Pleasure and pain are in fact…the sole ultimate values for a human being (or any
other animal, for that matter); they are the only correct norms for evaluating options.”181 G.
Striker, agrees with Cooper on this point, who, in her 1993 “Epicurean Hedonism”, claims that
Epicurus endorses the “main thesis of hedonism”, which is that “pleasure is the only thing that is
good in itself.”182 In order to attribute SRE (2) to Epicurus, Striker also cites Fin., although she
cites the line that appears right before the cradle argument, which says the following:
So, we are asking what is the final and ultimate good, which according to the view of all
philosophers ought to be what everything should be referred to, but which should itself be
referred to nothing else. Epicurus places this in pleasure, which he claims is the highest
good and that pain is the greatest bad thing.
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quaerimus igitur, quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum
sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. hoc
Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult, summumque malum
dolorem…183
Unfortunately, Fin. 1.29 faces the same difficulties as Fin. 1.30. First, suspicion is justified
because Cicero sometimes treats Epicurus’ positions unfairly; in fact, I argue in Chapter 5 that
Cicero misrepresents Epicurus in this very passage. Fin. 1.29 says that Epicurus argues for
pleasure as the final good, that to which everything should be referred and itself referred to
nothing else. The problem is that Epicurus claims at Ep. Men. 122 that the final end, i.e., that for
the sake of which we do everything else, is eudaimonia. Eudaimonia and pleasure are not
necessarily identical. There will be cases where pursuing eudaimonia means not pursuing
pleasure and vice versa. I postpone this argument for Chapter 5, in which I argue that
eudaimonia rather than pleasure is the final telos. My aim here is to show that Cooper and
Striker’s use of Fin. to argue for SRE (2) is misguided for two reasons. First, the cradle argument
does not entail that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. Second, Epicurus’ own writings reject the
position that Cicero attributes to him in Fin. 1.29, namely that pleasure is the most complete end,
which means that we should hesitate to take Fin. to report Epicurus’ views accurately.
In any case, both Cooper and Striker take Epicurus to claim that pleasure is the only thing
to which everything should be referred and that pleasure should be referred to nothing else,
which they in turn count as evidence for Epicurus’ endorsement of the claim that only pleasure is
intrinsically good. If Cooper and Striker are correct, then Epicurus endorses what I call SRE (2),
which holds that if something is good, then it (a) is pleasure or (b) brings about pleasure or (c)
constitutes pleasure. If something is good in the sense of (a), then it is good intrinsically, i.e., in
itself. If something is good in the sense of (b), it is good instrumentally, i.e., good only insofar as
183
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it helps us to obtain something intrinsically good. If something is good in the sense of (c), then it
is constitutively good, i.e., it is good insofar as it is an integral or essential part of something that
is intrinsically good.184 SRE (2) takes Epicurus to think that only pleasure is good per se, but
something other than pleasure may be good instrumentally or constitutively. Insofar as Epicurus
takes pleasure to come in three kinds - the kinetic, the katastematic, and tranquility, i.e., perfect
katastematic pleasure - SRE (2) amounts to the claim that pleasure of one of these three is
intrinsically good, although other things can be non-intrinsically good as instruments or
constituents of pleasure of any of these three kinds. Furthermore, although all three kinds of
pleasure are intrinsically good, some are more complete and final than others; katastematic
pleasures are more final and complete than kinetic pleasures, and tranquility is more final than
kinetic pleasures and single episodes of katastematic pleasure. Consequently, although kinetic
pleasures, katastematic pleasures, and tranquility are intrinsically good, Epicurus recommends
that we should focus on obtaining tranquility because it is the highest form of pleasure, i.e., the
most final and complete kind. It is for this reason that Epicurus writes to Menoeceus:
So when we say that pleasure is the goal we do not mean the pleasures of the profligate or
the pleasures of consumption, as some believe, either from ignorance and disagreement
or from deliberate misinterpretation, but rather the lack of pain in the body and
disturbance in the soul. For it is not drinking bouts and continuous partying and enjoying
boys and women, or consuming fish and other dainties of an extravagant table, which
produce the pleasant life, but self-control which searches out the reasons for every choice
and avoidance and drives out the opinions which are the source of the greatest turmoil for
men’s souls.
ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν, οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν
ἀπολαύσει κειμένας λέγομεν, ὥς τινες ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦντες ἤ κακῶς
ἐκδεχόμενοι νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μήτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν.
οὐ γὰρ πότοι καὶ κῶμοι συνείροντες οὐδ’ ἀπολαύσεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ’ ἰχθύων
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα φέρει πολυτελὴς τράπεζα, τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾷ βίον, ἀλλὰ νήφων

184

For more on the distinction between what it means to be instrumentally vs. constitutively good, see
Section 2.3 of this dissertation.

106
λογισμὸς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξερευνῶν πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ τὰς δόξας ἐξελαύνων,
ἐξ ὧν πλεῖστος τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει θόρυβος.185
Although all three kinds of pleasure are intrinsically good, the kind that provides our proper goal
or telos is the highest kind, i.e., tranquility – the absence of bodily pain and mental turmoil.
When we put this all of these claims together, we see that scholars who attribute SRE (2) to
Epicurus (e.g., Cooper and Striker) would take Epicurus to endorse an argument such as this.186
1.1.

There is only one intrinsic good and it is pleasure (by SRE 2).

1.2.

Pleasure comes in three kinds – the kinetic, the katastematic and tranquility (by
Diog. Laert. 10.136).

1.3.

So kinetic pleasures, katastematic pleasures, and tranquility are all intrinsically
good (by 1.1 and 1.2).

1.4.

Because there is only one intrinsic good, if there are other goods, these must be
good in some non-intrinsic way.

1.5.

There are other goods (Chapter 2).

1.6.

Knowledge is one such good (Chapter 2).

1.7.

Knowledge is a good in some non-intrinsic way (by 1.4 and Chapter 2).

1.8.

Something can be good non-intrinsically if it is instrumentally good or
constitutively good (definition of non-intrinsic good).

1.9.

Something is instrumentally good if it is a means towards the end that is pleasure,
i.e., if it is an instrument for producing pleasure (definition of instrumental good).

185
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1.10.

Something is constitutively good if it constitutes the end that is pleasure, i.e., if it
is an integral part of the pleasant life (definition of constitutive good).187

1.11.

Although there is only one intrinsic good and it is pleasure there are other goods –
instrumental or constitutive goods (by 1.1 and 1.4-1.9).188

1.12.

4.3

Knowledge is either an instrumental or constitutive good (by 1.6 and 1.11).

Two Problems with SRE (2) and Epicurus’ Solutions
If Epicurus were to endorse SRE (2), he would be confronted with two problems. First, if

pleasure is the only intrinsic good, and one should do everything in order to bring about this one
intrinsic good for oneself, then we might worry that Epicurus would allow the adoption of
unjustified beliefs that are pleasant. Since believing something pleasant without justification
counts as one more thing I could do in order to bring about more of the intrinsic good for myself,
I should do so. Epicurus does claim that we should do everything to bring about tranquility for
ourselves. He writes that, “The steady evaluation of [desires] enables one to refer every choice
and avoidance to the health of the body and the freedom of the soul from disturbance, since this
is the goal of living blessedly. For we do everything for the sake of being neither in pain nor in
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does not promote or constitute tranquility, my argument rebuts SRE (2) whether one takes the
instrumentalist or constitutivist view of all goods other than pleasure.
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terror.”189 It follows from this that something is good to the extent that it accomplishes the task
of bringing us closer to tranquility; an action is therefore right in proportion to its propensity to
make one’s life more tranquil. Hence Epicurus denies that certain types of action are bad in
themselves, but only as a function of the consequences that they pose for one’s pleasure. M can
do whatever M desires provided that doing so does indeed make M’s life go more pleasantly.
Epicurus even goes so far as to endorse the counterfactual of the conditional described in
the previous paragraph: that if the things that normally cause great ruin for humans were to cause
them great tranquility or pleasure, it would be advisable to do them. He writes, for example,
If the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent washed away the mind's
fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they
taught us the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against
them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or
distress (and that is what is bad).
εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τούς τε
περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων, ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν <καὶ τῶν
ἀλγηδόνων> ἐδίδασκεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴχομεν ὅ τι μεμψαίμεθα αὐτοῖς πανταχόθεν
ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐδαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον
ἔχουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν.190
Or, as O’Keefe puts it, “If drinking barrels of beer and eating large quantities of steak dissolved
your fears about the gods and taught you to limit your desires, then the profligate would be filled
with pleasure and admixed with no pain, and that would be all right.”191 It turns out that
consuming massive amounts of alcohol and red meat will not contribute to our tranquility in the
way proposed. Nevertheless, what one ought to do is a function of each action’s tendency to

Ep. Men. 129. τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ
σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος. τούτου γὰρ
πάντα πράττομεν, ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν. ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται, λύεται πᾶς
ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμών, οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῴου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι καὶ ζητεῖν ἕτερον ᾧ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν συμπληρώσεται.
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bring us closer to tranquility; and the more something produces pleasure, the better it is. The
point here is that Epicurus rejects the claim that certain actions are inadvisable in themselves, or
that some things are to be avoided per se. This is true even for actions that are painful. Cutting
off my arm without the aid of any anesthesia would surely cause much pain for me. Regardless,
there are certainly some occasions where it is advisable to do just this. If I have the choice
between doing so or letting an infection spread from that arm to the rest of my body, all things
being equal, it would be better to amputate my arm. As Epicurus writes in Ep. Men.,
And it is just because this is the first innate good that we do not choose every pleasure;
but sometimes we pass up many pleasures when we get a larger amount of what is
uncongenial from them. And we believe many pains to be better than pleasures when a
greater pleasure follows for a long while if we endure the pains.
καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν αἱρούμεθα,
ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβαίνομεν, ὅταν πλεῖον ἡμῖν τὸ δυσχερὲς ἐκ τούτων
ἕπηται· καὶ πολλὰς ἀλγηδόνας ἡδονῶν κρείττους νομίζομεν, ἐπειδὰν μείζων ἡμῖν ἡδονὴ
παρακολουθῇ πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομείνασι τὰς ἀλγηδόνας.192
What one should do thus is function of two factors: (1) the circumstances in which one finds
oneself and (2) given those circumstances, the propensity of the options before us to bring us
closer to tranquility. It follows that no actions in themselves are good or bad in themselves.
If this is the case – if Epicurus indeed believes that no actions are good or bad in
themselves – and if he recommends that we should do everything possible to increase our
tranquility, then the first problem surfaces. O’Keefe describes this problem as follows: “Still,
with their stress on practical effectiveness above all else, it seems the Epicureans would have no
bar in theory in putting forward bad but effective arguments, or in using techniques that are
(from a rational point of view) dubious [in order to produce tranquility].”193 The point is that if
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someone should do whatever makes one’s life the most tranquil, and if there is some argument,
known to be dubious by M, that, when accepted by M can make M’s life more tranquil, then
Epicurus would recommend that M accept that bad or rationally dubious argument.194 So
Epicurus would have to suggest that humans should simply believe whatever makes their life the
most pleasant, regardless of the known truth or falsity of those beliefs.195 Suppose, for example,
that M could enjoy great pleasure if he were to believe that the gods help humans become happy.
Let us call this belief g. We know that Epicurus rejects g and offers arguments against it. He also
suggests that one must reject g in order to live the best life, presumably because we can only live
the best life if it is within our control, and if g is true then living the best life is not within our
control. Nevertheless, it is easy to see why believing g might be pleasant to M; believing that the
gods want M to live a good life and help M to do so would be comforting to M. According to
O’Keefe, if M has these reasons to believe that the practical aspects of life would go better in
virtue of believing g, i.e., if M has evidence that believing g would make M’s life more pleasant,
then M should believe g. The more formal version of the problem O’Keefe raises looks like this.
2.1. Epicurus has no bar in theory in putting forward bad but effective arguments, or in
using techniques that are (from a rational point of view) dubious [in order to produce
tranquility].
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One might claim that M cannot adopt a dubious argument that will promote or constitute tranquility,
since knowing that the argument is dubious will cause worry for M, which thus detracts from M’s
tranquility. I share this worry; it is part of why I argue in the next section of this chapter that Epicurus
does not allow the adoption of arguments that are known to be dubious, even if they increase tranquility
somewhat. Tranquility requires stability. Only beliefs that are justified by evidence are likely to be stable,
so we should only endorse justified beliefs.
195
One might wonder whether it is possible for M to believe some bad or rationally dubious argument a
for claim g if M knows that argument a is bad. There seem to be such cases, one of which I discuss below.
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2.2. The following argument is invalid: “Believing g would produce tranquility for me.
Therefore, g.” Call this argument a.196
2.3. Although invalid, argument a is effective, i.e., accepting a enables me to endorse
beliefs that contribute greatly to my ataraxia.
2.4. Suppose that believing g because of argument a would produce great tranquility for
Menoeceus.
2.5. Epicurus has no bar in theory against Menoeceus believing g because of argument a.
Epicurus has two objections to this argument. First, living tranquilly requires stability and
confidence in one’s future, both of which are unlikely to be features of a life in which someone
knowingly accepts invalid or unsound arguments. Stability requires justified beliefs. Consider,
for example, Epicurus’ argument for why someone should never commit an injustice:
It is impossible for someone who secretly does something which men agreed [not to do]
in order to avoid harming one another or being harmed to be confident that he will escape
detection, even if in current circumstances he escapes detection ten thousand times. For
until his death it will be uncertain whether he will continue to escape detection.
οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάθρα τι ποιοῦντα ὧν συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ
βλάπτεσθαι τιστεύειν ὅτι λήσει, κἄν μυριάκις ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος λαθάνῃ· μέχρι γὰρ
καταστροφῆς ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ λήσει.197
Even if M gets away at t1 with an injustice, possible detection at t2 would have bad
consequences for one’s tranquility, and so M should never commit an injustice, even on the
condition that M might get away with it at first. The deeper point is one about confidence in how
one’s life will go in the future. One should not do something unless one can be reasonably
Ibid. This is the way that O’Keefe puts the inference, against which Epicurus allegedly has no
argument in principle. It is puzzling that O’Keefe puts the inference this way, from “believing p would be
ataraxic” to “therefore p.” I suspect that Epicurus would be more sympathetic to the following inference:
“Believing p would be ataraxic, therefore believe p.” Surely Epicurus does not think that believing in the
pleasant properties of a belief makes the belief true. In any case, I argue that Epicurus rejects both
versions of the inference. Contrary to O’Keefe, Epicurus argues that one should not believe something
simply because doing so would make one’s life more pleasant – and even incomparably more pleasant.
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confident that doing so will not disrupt one’s present or future tranquility. In other words,
tranquility requires stability; one must be confident in one’s future to be tranquil. Apply this
principle to the case where M considers believing g because of argument a. M could never in
good faith to Epicurean ethics believe g in light of argument a because M can only do what he
confidently believes will help him maintain tranquility in the near and distant future.198 Even if
M could convince himself via bad or rationally dubious arguments at t1 that the gods help
mortals live a good life, it is always the case that at t2 or t3 someone could demonstrate to him
the falsity of that belief. Discovering that our beliefs are false causes anxiety. Consequently, no
matter how tranquility-inducing some belief might be, Epicurus does not recommend holding it
unless we have evidence that the belief is true, even if believing it is incredibly pleasant. So
Epicurus has at least one strategy to reject knowingly using bad arguments in order to hold false
but pleasant beliefs. Bad arguments are unlikely to produce reliable pleasure because real
pleasure requires stability, and beliefs produced by bad arguments are unlikely to be stable.199
Furthermore, Epicurus seems to reject in principle knowingly endorsing false but pleasant
beliefs on the grounds that beliefs must result from justified opinions and not what Epicurus calls
some irrational condition. He writes in his Ep. Hdt. that, “…one must also conceive that the
worst disturbance occurs in human souls because…they are not in this state as a result of their

One might wonder why, given Epicurus’ insistence on the connection between belief and tranquility,
one should not just become a skeptic. The short answer is that Epicurus thinks the adoption of certain
beliefs is necessary for our tranquility, such that the total suspension of judgment could not enable one to
live the best life. The best life requires tranquility, and tranquility requires us to have certain beliefs, e.g.,
that the gods will not interfere with mortal affairs and that death is nothing to worry about.
199
To be fair, O’Keefe seems aware of this strategy. He does acknowledge that the inference from
‘believing p would be beneficial’ to ‘therefore p’ cannot “provide a secure foundation for psychic health.”
Epicureanism. 135. My argument, though, is that it is just this that provides a bar in theory against
knowingly accepting defective but pleasure-producing arguments. Epicurus’ theory of action bars doing
something unless one can be confident that it will not upset one’s tranquility, and one cannot be confident
that accepting invalid arguments will not have deleterious effects on one’s pleasure.
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opinions but because of some irrational condition.”200 Take any two souls in a state of
disturbance. Let us suppose that one is in a state of disturbance because of the opinion that
person holds. Let us further suppose that what is causing the disturbance of the other soul is not
some opinion that this person holds but some other irrational factor, say this person’s emotions.
Epicurus’ claim here is that it is worse to be the second soul; it is worse to be in a state of
disturbance owing to some irrational cause than to be in a state of disturbance owing to one’s
opinions. What leads Epicurus to this claim is the premium he places on freedom and selfdetermination. Since I can control my opinions more easily than I can control the irrational parts
of my soul, I can correct a disturbance resulting from my opinions more easily than I can correct
the disturbance resulting from something irrational about me, which is why the second
disturbance is worse than the first. The important point for this part of the chapter is that
Epicurus seems to be suggesting here that our states ought to result from our justified opinions
rather than something over which we have comparably little or even no control whatosever.
Once we get clear on what Epicurus means by ‘opinion’ and ‘irrational condition’, we see
that he has two rejoinders to the claim that his system lacks a theoretical bar against endorsing
unjustified but pleasant beliefs. Some help on this issue comes from Diogenes Laertius:
And they say also that opinion is a supposition, and that it can be true or false. For if it is
testified for or not testified against, it is true. But if it is not testified for or is testified
against, it turns out false. Hence [the Epicureans] introduced the idea of “what awaits
confirmation.” For example, one awaits confirmation of and comes nearer to a tower, to
learn how it appears up close.
τὴν δὲ δόξαν καὶ ὑπόληψιν λέγουσιν, ἀληθῆ τέ φασι καὶ ψευδῆ: ἂν μὲν γὰρ
ἐπιμαρτυρῆται ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρῆται, ἀληθῆ εἶναι: ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρῆται ἢ

Ep. Hdt. 81. τάραχος ὁ κυριώτατος ταῖς ἀνθρωπίναις ψυχαῖς γίνεται… ἐν τῷ μὴ δόξαις ταῦτα πάσχειν
ἀλλ' ἀλόγῳ γέ τινι παραστάσει…
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ἀντιμαρτυρῆται, ψευδῆ τυγχάνειν. ὅθεν <τὸ> προσμένον εἰσήχθη: οἷον τὸ προσμεῖναι καὶ
ἐγγὺς γενέσθαι τῷ πύργῳ καὶ μαθεῖν ὁποῖος ἐγγὺς φαίνεται.201
The passage claims that Epicurus divides opinions into the true, false, and those awaiting
confirmation. Opinions are suppositions about the way that things are in the world – or at least
how they appear in the world. True opinions are those that are testified for or not testified
against. False opinions are those that are not testified for or testified against. There are also
opinions that await confirmation, i.e., there are states of affairs about which we should suspend
judgment because there is inadequate evidence for the purpose of judging our beliefs about them
to be true or false with any level of meaningful confidence. In other words, an opinion is true if
there is clear evidence for it and no direct counterevidence against it. An opinion is false if there
is no evidence to support it or if there is evidence to contradict it.202 An opinion awaits
confirmation when we suspend judgment about something due to a lack of evidence. In Ep. Hdt.,
Epicurus insists that our states must result from our opinions, which in turn must result from a
consideration of the evidence for the opinions that cause our states. Our conditions must be
caused by our opinions, which must be caused by a consideration of the evidence for them.
Thus one problem is that the inference against which O’Keefe claims that Epicurus has
no theoretical bar, namely from ‘Believing p would be pleasant’ to ‘Therefore p’, is not an
inference based on the right kind of evidence. One might have evidence for the first claim: that
believing g would be pleasant. Suppose Menoeceus is convinced that he could not live a good
life on his own, without divine help. Believing g would entail that the gods will help him to do
this. Thus Menoeceus would have evidence that believing g would be pleasant. Nevertheless,
evidence that a belief is pleasant is not evidence that a belief is true. Suppose I have
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incontrovertible evidence that believing g would be very pleasant. This offers no evidence about
whether g is the case. M cannot have any good evidence for the inference from the first claim to
the second because it is fallacious. Ultimately, even though Menoeceus might have evidence for
one claim in the argument, he lacks evidence for the other claim and for what grounds the
inference between the two. Since accepting the second claim and the inference involves having
opinions, and the holder of a true opinion should have evidence in favor these opinions,
Menoeceus cannot accept the argument merely on the basis that doing so would be very
comforting. Epicurus argues that opinions require evidence, and this provides a theoretical bar
against adopting beliefs merely in virtue of their propensity to increase our pleasure.
Second, the line quoted from the Ep. Hdt. requires that one’s state results from a rational
rather than an irrational condition. Unfortunately, Epicurus seldom uses the phrase ‘rational
condition’, so it is difficult to know what being in a rational condition requires. Although it is
difficult to enumerate the necessary conditions for being in a rational condition, there can be
little doubt that Epicurus intended for one of them to be this: M is in a rational condition when M
rejects arguments that are bad, defective, or dubious from a logical point of view. More formally:
3.1. Suppose M could use arguments that are bad, defective, or dubious from a
logical point of view in order to accept beliefs that make M more tranquil.
3.2. M should not be in a state that results from some irrational condition.
3.3. Whenever M knowingly uses arguments that are bad, defective, or dubious from
a logical point of view in order to endorse beliefs that make M more tranquil, M
puts himself an irrational condition.
3.4. M should not use arguments that are bad, defective, or dubious from a logical
point of view in order to endorse beliefs that make M more tranquil.

116
Epicurus’ insistence that one’s state should result from a rational condition must mean at the
very least that one is not being illogical. The problem is that knowingly using invalid or unsound
arguments to develop beliefs underlying one’s way of life is illogical. Thus while we can
conceive of cases in which Menoeceus would profit in terms of his pleasure from using bad or
defective arguments to become more tranquil, the Epicurean requirement that opinions must
result from a rational condition precludes Menoeceus from knowingly doing so.
Epicurus demands that opinions require justification not only in Diog. Laert. 10.34 and
Ep. Hdt. 81. He expresses further commitment to this claim in Ep. Men. 134, where he writes,
And [the wise man] believes that chance is not a god, as the many think, for nothing is
done in a disorderly way by god; nor that it is an uncertain cause. For he does not think
that anything good or bad with respect to living blessedly is given by chance to men,
although it does provide the starting points of great good and bad things. And he thinks it
is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way; for it is better for a
good decision not to turn out right in action than for a bad decision to turn out right
because of chance.
τὴν δὲ τύχην οὔτε θεόν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν, ὑπολαμβάνων, οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτάκτως θεῷ
πράττεται, οὔτε ἀβέβαιον αἰτίαν, οὐκ οἴεται μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἐκ ταύτης πρὸς τὸ
μακαρίως ζῆν ἀνθρώποις δίδοσθαι, ἀρχὰς μέντοι μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν ὑπὸ ταύτης
χορηγεῖσθαι· κρεῖττον εἶναι νομίζει εὐλογίστως ἀτυχεῖν ἢ ἀλογίστως εὐτυχεῖν· βέλτιον
γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ καλῶς κριθὲν <μὴ ὀρθωθῆναι ἢ τὸ μὴ καλῶς κριθὲν> ὀρθωθῆναι
διὰ ταύτην.203
It is fairly easy to see why Epicurus makes the first claim. He rejects the notion that anything is
given or taken from humans by supernatural forces, and insists that whether we live a good life is
up to us. This in part explains why Epicurus argues so strongly for the claim that the gods do not
intervene in human affairs elsewhere. However, it is somewhat unclear why he claims that
chance is the starting point all great and bad things. This is most likely a reference to the
randomness of the universe and our place within it. Since the cosmos consists in atoms randomly
crashing into one another, we should perhaps consider it lucky that we exist and are able to
203

Ep. Men. 134-135.

117
pursue good lives. The randomness of the universe has managed to create a world for us not only
in which good and bad things are possible, but one in which the goodness of our lives is up to us.
What is important for the current argument comes in the last few lines of the passage,
where Epicurus claims that it is better for us to have things turn out badly from a rational
decision than have thing turn out well from a senseless decision. This echoes what Epicurus
claims in Ep. Hdt. 81: that our condition must be rational and thus result from reasons, and this
only happens when we believe to be the case whatever is testified for by the evidence. This
brings to mind the story that Socrates tells in Meno at 97a, about the man who has a correct
opinion about how to get to Larissa, and who can direct others there, but has no knowledge of
how to get to Larissa. It is this story that helps Socrates to distinguish between correct opinion
and knowledge. Epicurus agrees with Socrates, who contends that correct opinion and
knowledge are equally useful, but that the former is unlikely to remain, and so it is better to tie
down opinions with an account of why they are correct.204 It is being able to give such an
account that makes the difference between having a correct opinion and knowing something.
Epicurus also appears to agree with this claim. He seems to acknowledge the importance of
having an account of why one’s opinion is correct, i.e., he sees the importance of justifying our
correct beliefs. Yet it is unclear whether Epicurus could agree with Socrates that correct opinion
is as useful as knowledge, so long as the correct opinion remains. What is clear is that Epicurus
thinks it better to have reasons for one’s opinions and decisions, and this just is what he means
when he says at that it is better to be unlucky in a rational way than lucky in a senseless way.
This seems inconsistent with the claim that Epicurus has no argument against believing
something merely because it is pleasant. Beliefs that we adopt must be more than correct; they
Pl. Meno 98a. …πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ.
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require justification. Opinions are justified when they are supported by evidence. Relying on Ep.
Hdt. 51205, Annas puts it this way:
Epicurus held that opinions of this kind ‘become’ true if there is ‘witnessing’
(epimarturesis) and false if there is ‘no witnessing’ (ouk epimarturesis). On the other
hand, opinions about what is non-apparent206 ‘become’ true if there is no
‘counterwitnessing’ (ouk antimarturesis) and false if there is ‘counterwitnessing’
(antimarturesis). The term ‘become’ indicates that the opinion is initially neither true nor
false; it becomes true or false as a result of a method of testing.207
We should make decisions in a rational way, which is to say that we should decide based on
knowledge. This requires that we test the content of our opinions and only opine about what is
consistent with the evidence. Thus, the belief that g is not knowledge for two reasons: g is not
only false, but Menoeceus lacks justification for believing it in the first place. As such, he should
refrain from believing g, even if doing so would make his life incomparably pleasant or tranquil.
Suppose again that Epicurus were to endorse SRE (2). If Epicurus does this, a second
problem he faces involves the contrapositive. If SRE (2) is true, its contrapositive holds that
something is not good if it fails to be pleasure, promote pleasure, or constitute pleasure. Epicurus
asserts that knowledge itself is not pleasure; pleasure is the sensation that results from the
satisfaction of a desire recognized as such. Thus, if SRE (2) is correct, and if knowledge is good,
it must be because knowledge promotes pleasure or constitutes it. The problem is that there are
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Ep. Hdt. 51. And error would not occur if we did not have some other motion too in ourselves which is
linked <to the application to presentations> but is distinct; falsehood occurs because of this, if it is not
testified for or is testified against; but if it is testified for or is not testified against, truth occurs. τὸ δὲ
διημαρτημένον οὐκ ἂν ὑπῆρχεν εἰ μὴ ἐλαμβάνομεν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συνημμένην
μὲν <τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ,> διάληψιν δὲ ἔχουσαν· κατὰ δὲ ταύτην [τὴν συνημμένην τῇ φανταστικῇ
ἐπιβολῇ, διάληψιν δὲ ἔχουσαν], ἐὰν μὲν μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ ψεῦδος γίνεται· ἐὰν δὲ
ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ ἀληθές.
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cases where knowledge fails to meet either of these criteria, and Epicurus nevertheless argues
that knowledge in such cases is still good for the person who has it. Epicurus cannot agree with
this and accept SRE (2) at the same time. He does agree, which means he must reject SRE (2).

4.4

The Argument against SRE (2)
We know that Epicurus counts knowledge as a good. If knowledge is a good, but

knowledge it not pleasure itself, then knowledge contributes to or constitutes our tranquility.
The contrapositive holds that if knowledge does not contribute to or constitute our pleasure, then
it is not good. The problem with SRE (2) is that Epicurus explicitly rejects this contrapositive.
He seems to think that knowledge can be good sometimes even if it does not contribute to or
constitute our tranquility, and he would be precluded from believing this if he were to endorse
SRE (2). In other words, Epicurus rejects the broad claim that if something is good, then
contributes to or constitutes tranquility because he seems to think that certain goods like
knowledge and philosophy can be good without regard for our pleasure. Suppose Epicurus
endorses SRE (2). The following reductio results, and Epicurus eliminates 4.1 to resolve it.
4. 1.

Only pleasure is good in itself, but if something other than pleasure is good
incidentally, then it contributes to or constitutes our pleasure (SRE (2)).

4. 2.

If something other than pleasure does not contribute to or constitute pleasure, then
it is not good incidentally (contraposition).

4. 3.

Suppose Menoeceus knows calculus, but knowing calculus neither is pleasure, nor
contributes to, nor constitutes pleasure.

4. 4.

Knowing calculus is not good for Menoeceus. (by 4.2 and 4.3)

The reductio above demonstrates the tension between SRE (2) and the intuition that it is
better to have more rather than less knowledge. If SRE (2) were true, the notion that it is better to
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know more would have serious limitations: it would be better to know more if and only if the
additional knowledge contributes to or constitutes my pleasure. However, since there are kinds
of knowledge that do not do either, if Epicurus endorses SRE (2), he must maintain that these
kinds of knowledge are not good. My contention is that Epicurus does not maintain this last
claim, and rightfully so: Epicurus thinks that knowledge is good (at least in some cases) even if it
does not promote or constitute our pleasure, and since he does think this, he cannot hold SRE (2).
For example, Sent. Vat. 74 claims that, “In a joint philosophical investigation, he who is
defeated comes out ahead in so far as he has learned something new.”208 The point seems simple:
anytime I learn something new, I become better off than I was before I came to know that new
thing. So any time my knowledge increases, my life becomes better. If I know n things at t1, and
I come to know n+1 things at t2, I am better off at t2 in virtue of the fact that I have more
knowledge at that later point. Sent. Vat. 74 seems like clear evidence for the claim that, all things
being equal, Epicurus seems to think that knowledge is a good thing, even if it does not
contribute to or constitute our tranquility. Epicurus does not here say that, “In a joint
philosophical investigation he who is defeated comes out ahead in so far as he has learned
something new, provided whatever the defeated person learns promotes or further constitutes his
or her pleasure.” The claim is simply that learning new things make someone better off. What
explains my being better off once I learn something new is the mere fact that I have learned
something new. It is not that what I learn is good because it positively affects my pleasure.
More importantly, there are two kinds of cases in which the goodness of learning new
things cannot be explained by the goodness of pleasure. First, consider cases where learning
something has no practical effect on someone’s pleasure, e.g., the case of Menoeceus learning
208
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calculus. Suppose Menoeceus does not find mathematics pleasing, although he has no aversion
to it. If this is the case, then learning calculus does not promote his pleasure. Nor would learning
calculus somehow constitute the pleasure of his life. Nowhere does Epicurus claim that
mathematical knowledge is an essential ingredient of the pleasant life. Thus, learning calculus
neither promotes nor constitutes Menoeceus’ pleasure, and yet it follows from Sent. Vat. 74 that
his learning calculus is good. These entailments can both be true only if SRE (2) is false, since
SRE (2) precludes there from being anything good that does not promote or constitute our
pleasure. Maintaining that learning is beneficial in all cases requires a rejection of SRE (2).
Second, there are cases in which the tranquil person learns new things. Suppose two
tranquil individuals engage in a philosophical discussion, from which they both learn something
new. Each comes out better off according to Sent. Vat. 74, but coming out better off cannot be
explained in terms of their pleasure. They are already tranquil, and the life of someone who
enjoys tranquility cannot admit of any further pleasure. This is clear from RS II: “The removal of
all feeling of pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures.”209 Since tranquility consists in
ridding oneself of all pain and worry, once one does so, there is no more pleasure to pursue. One
might suggest that perhaps the parties in a philosophical discussion worry because they realize
that there is something that they do not know, a worry they eliminate by learning something new.
This would only cause further problems. If this were the case, the most that I could gain from a
philosophical discussion is the elimination of the worry that philosophizing brought on in the
first place. The claim is that we are better off at t2 after philosophizing than we were at t1
because we learned something new between t1 and t2. The claim is not that getting into a
philosophical conversation makes us worse off (because we realize and worry about what we do
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RS III. ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις.
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not know), but that if we philosophize correctly we can learn what we do not know and thus
restore the freedom from worry we enjoyed before beginning our conversation. Nor will it help
to claim that learning something new is good because it helps us to maintain the tranquility that
we already have. I hinted at why such a solution will not work in Chapter 2, and I explain more
fully it will not work in Chapter 5. To save the instrumentalist reading by claiming that if
something is good then it helps us to maintain our tranquility is to get wrong what is supposed to
be good about tranquility: that it frees us up for other worthwhile pursuits and activities. Thus,
the pleasantness of the life of the tranquil person cannot be promoted or constituted further; it is
maximally pleasant. So if learning something new is always good, which Epicurus claims, this
cannot be because learning always contributes to or constitutes our pleasure, since there are two
kinds of cases in which learn we something new in a way that has nothing to do with our
pleasure. As such, I conclude that Sent. Vat. 74 offers preliminary evidence for my contention
that Epicurus would resolve the tension between SRE (2) and 4.4 by rejecting SRE (2) itself.
We can draw additional evidence for my claim that Epicurus rejects SRE (2) on the
grounds that knowledge can be good even if it does not contribute to or constitute our tranquility
from Ep. Hdt. In the opening lines of that letter, Epicurus writes the following to Herodotus:
For the sake of those, Herodotus, who are unable to work out with precision each and
every detail of what we have written on nature and who lack the ability to work through
the longer books I have composed, I have myself prepared an adequate summary of the
entire system, to facilitate the firm memorization of the most general doctrines210, in
210

One might worry that Epicurus is suggesting here that mere memorization of the basic doctrines is
sufficient for living the best life, while I argued in the previous section that the best life requires
something more robust than memorization: justified belief. However, Epicurus does not mean here that
justified beliefs are unnecessary for achieving tranquility, which is required for living the best life. There
are certain beliefs that we must hold firmly in mind, e.g., that the universe operates through natural laws
and is not controlled by some divine figure. Although this opening section suggests that more advanced
students will know more about the details of such metaphysics than less advanced students, both need
justified beliefs. Moreover, he maintains that it would be better to know the details, although knowing
them is unnecessary for our tranquility. This helps the argument that he must reject SRE (2), since there
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order that at each and every opportunity they may be able to help themselves in the most
important issues, to the degree that they retain their grasp on the study of nature.
Τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις, ὦ Ἡρόδοτε, ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἀναγεγραμμένων ἡμῖν
ἐξακριβοῦν μηδὲ τὰς μείζους τῶν συντεταγμένων βίβλους διαθρεῖν ἐπιτομὴν τῆς ὅλης
πραγματείας εἰς τὸ κατασχεῖν τῶν ὁλοσχερωτάτων γε δοξῶν τὴν μνήμην ἱκανῶς αὐτὸς36
παρεσκεύασα, ἵνα παρ᾽ ἑκάστους τῶν καιρῶν ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις βοηθεῖν αὑτοῖς
δύνωνται, καθ᾽ ὅσον ἂν ἐφάπτωνται τῆς περὶ φύσεως θεωρίας.211
Ep. Hdt. offers only an overview of Epicurus’ metaphysical and epistemological scheme. He
explains in brief his atomistic program, which invites him to give a rough outline of how we can
come to know anything about the external world: through empirical observations and the nonempirical deductions we can make based on them. Nevertheless, Epicurus is explicit about the
fact that the Letter to Herodotus offers only a sketch of his metaphysics and epistemology, while
maintaining that he works out the specifics in greater detail in his larger books, e.g., On Nature.
The important point here is that Epicurus claims that even the overview contained in the letter
will be sufficient for less competent students who want to help themselves achieve tranquility.
More importantly, he claims that there is a reason to offer the larger books on top of the
sketch alone. In the opening lines of Ep. Hdt., Epicurus differentiates between himself and
Herodotus. He acknowledges that people have different philosophical ability. There are
advantages to becoming familiar with Epicurus’ system, but he knows that not everyone would
benefit from reading his larger philosophical works, namely because they would not understand
them. Strikingly, Epicurus even thinks that knowing the details of his larger philosophical works
is unnecessary for a maximally pleasant life. In the closing lines of the Ep. Hdt., Epicurus writes:
But those who are not among the completely accomplished students of nature can, on the
basis of these points and following the method which does not involve verbal expression,

must be some way to explain why it is better to be an advanced student, and this cannot be done via
tranquility, for his point here is that the advanced and elementary students enjoy tranquility equally.
211
Ep. Hdt. 35.
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with the speed of thought achieve an overview of the doctrines most important for
achieving tranquility.
ὅσοι δὲ μὴ παντελῶς τῶν ἀποτελουμένων εἰσίν, ἐκ τούτων καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄνευ φθόγγων
τρόπον τὴν ἅμα νοήματι περίοδον τῶν κυριωτάτων πρὸς γαληνισμὸν ποιοῦνται.212
Knowing the basics contained in the Ep. Hdt. is sufficient for achieving tranquility. If this is the
case, then why would anyone bother with the larger books? If SRE (2) were true, something
would be good either because it is tranquility, contributes to our tranquility, or constitutes our
tranquility. Hence knowing the rough outline from Ep. Hdt. and knowing the minutiae of the
larger books are good because they contribute to our tranquility. However, if both are sufficient
for tranquility, there remains no explanation for why philosophers in Epicurus’ camp would
continue to philosophize once they have learned the basics of the system that are sufficient for
tranquility. Nothing good will result from their philosophizing, since they have already achieved
tranquility, and there is no pleasure to pursue or constitute on top of tranquility. Thus, if SRE (2)
is true, then Epicureans who learn enough to eliminate their pains either must stop
philosophizing or continue and admit that doing so is not good, which is a consequence that
Epicurus flatly rejects in Ep. Men: “He who says either that the time for philosophy has not yet
come or that it has passed is like someone who says that the time for eudaimonia has not yet
come or that it has passed.”213 It is always a good time to do philosophy, even though there will
be times where philosophy does not contribute to or constitute pleasure. Epicurus must therefore
reject SRE (2), since it is inconsistent with both Ep. Men. 122 and Ep. Hdt. 83.
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Ep. Hdt. 83. It is unclear whether this entails that trying to understand the finer points of the
metaphysics is bad for less advanced students. It would only be bad if it took away from their tranquility.
Thus, Epicurus would insist that we should aim to know more in a way that, if we fail, we are not upset.
213
Ep. Men. 122. ὁ δὲ λέγων ἢ μήπω τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν ὥραν ἢ παρεληλυθέναι τὴν ὥραν, ὅμοιός
ἐστιν τῷ λέγοντι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι.
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Suppose that proponents of SRE (2) could come up with a story about how continuing to
philosophize beyond the point of tranquility could contribute to or constitute our pleasure.214
Such a proponent would still have to be committed to the claim that knowing what Herodotus
knows is just as good as knowing what Epicurus knows. In other words, if SRE (2) is true, then
the goodness of something is a function of how much it contributes to or constitutes our pleasure.
If this is so, what Herodotus and Epicurus know, although they know very different things, must
be equally good because their differing knowledge has the same effect on their pleasure. Their
knowledge produces tranquility for them, and tranquility does not admit of degrees. Herodotus’
tranquility is just as pleasant as Epicurus’ tranquility, and the knowledge that caused it is equally
good because it brought about the same pleasure. The problem is that Epicurus and his followers
deny this, which amounts to a denial of SRE (2). Let us consider the following reductio.
5.1.

If something is good, then it is tranquility, promotes tranquility, or constitutes
tranquility, i.e., if something is not, does not promote, or does not constitute
tranquility, then it is not good ((SRE) 2).

5.2.

Knowing the overview of Epicurus’ system from the Letter to Herodotus and
knowing the finer details of Epicurus’ positions from his larger works are
sufficient for promoting or constituting our tranquility, i.e., each contributes to or
constitute our tranquility equally well (Ep. Hdt. 83).

5.3.

Someone who knows the overview from the Letter knows less than someone who
knows the finer details of the larger works.

5.4.

Knowing the overview and knowing the finer details of the larger work are
equally good (by 5.1 and 5.2).

214

I explore some ways in which someone might do this in Chapter 5.
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5.5.

Knowing more is no better than knowing less, provided each has the same effects
on my pleasure (5.3 and 5.4).

My contention is that Epicurus would avoid 5.5 by eliminating 5.1. After all, we know
that he accepts 5.2 and 5.3 since he endorses them in the cited passages from the Ep. Hdt. Now
let us recall Sent. Vat. 74: “In a joint philosophical investigation, he who is defeated comes out
ahead in so far as he has learned something new.” Suppose Herodotus reads the outline of
Epicurus’ system from the Letter, and understands its tenets in a way that helps him to achieve
tranquility. Then Herodotus goes down to the Garden, asks Epicurus about some finer details of
how his atomism works, which Epicurus gladly teaches to him. Now Herodotus knows more
than he knew after reading Ep. Hdt. alone. He has continued his philosophical investigation, and
learned something new; he has gained some new knowledge. It follows from Sent. Vat. 74 that
Herodotus has come out ahead, so long as he understands what he has learned, i.e., so long as he
has justified and true beliefs. He is better off now than he was before going down to the Garden
and learning some more details about atomism from Epicurus. Herodotus could not be better off
if SRE (2) were true. The new knowledge that he obtains from Epicurus does not contribute to or
constitute his tranquility, and it therefore cannot be good. Not only would this be inconsistent
with the texts that I have cited, since Epicurus explicitly claims that learning new things makes
us come out ahead. Even further, the claim that it is not good to know more unless it is pleasant
is so unintuitive that we should aim to read Epicurus in a way that precludes such a commitment.
Consequently, since there are good philosophical reasons for thinking that more knowledge is
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better than less even if it fails to make our lives more pleasant, the very reasons which Epicurus
himself seems to espouse in Sent. Vat. 74, I conclude that Epicurus must reject SRE (2).215

4.5

Conclusions
This chapter has three main parts. In the first, I explored Cooper and Striker’s argument

for attributing to Epicurus the claim that pleasure is the only intrinsic good and pointed to some
of the problems with that argument. I noted that Cooper and Striker mostly argue from Fin. 1.2930. The problem with this is that neither passage commits Epicurus to the claim that pleasure is
the only thing good in itself. I also noted that Epicurus seems to think that eudaimonia and
pleasure are not identical, and that the former is more final and complete as an end to the latter. I
return to this argument in Chapter 5. I concluded that Cooper and Striker’s evidence is
insufficient for attributing to Epicurus the claim that pleasure is the only intrinsic good.
Nevertheless, I demonstrated that an entailment of this claim is that goods other than pleasure, if
there are any, are only good derivatively because of their relation to pleasure. Since Epicurus
takes knowledge to be a good, it follows that knowledge must be good in some non-intrinsic
way. There are two such ways: knowledge can only be good either as an instrument for the
promotion of pleasure or as an essential constituent of pleasure. I called this claim SRE (2).
In the second major part of this chapter, I explored two problems that would result if
Epicurus were to endorse SRE (2). The first is that if pleasure is the only good, and we should do
everything possible for the sake of pleasure, then one might worry that Epicurus approves of
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Admittedly, Epicurus could maintain SRE (2) consistently in the face of the passages from the Letters
I have cited and Sent. Vat. 74 by developing some position that allows Herodotus to come out ahead or be
better off in virtue of acquiring some new knowledge, but only if Epicurus were to have an account of
goodness by which coming out ahead or being better off does not mean that one’s life has more good in it.
This indeed seems strange, although it remains an option. I see no good evidence in the extant texts that
suggests Epicurus developed an account of goodness or value like this, so he must reject SRE (2).
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knowingly adopting unjustified or even false beliefs that are very pleasant. I gave reasons to
believe that Epicurus argues against the permissibility of adopting beliefs merely because they
are pleasant. The most notable was that Epicurus insists that our beliefs should result from our
opinions. Our opinions are suppositions about the world that require justification. Thus, that
holding a belief would be pleasant is an inadequate reason to hold it. One should only believe
what is testified to or not testified against by evidence of what is the case. The second problem is
that if Epicurus agrees that knowledge is only good if it promotes or constitutes pleasure, then
the contrapositive must be true: knowledge is not good if it does not promote or constitute
pleasure. This a problem because Epicurus argues that there are cases where knowing something
is good, and that pursuing knowledge is good via philosophizing, even if doing so does not
contribute to our constitute pleasure. This brought me to the third major task of the chapter: to
argue that Epicurus rejects SRE (2). I argued that Epicurus does so by reductio. If SRE (2) is
true, then knowledge and philosophizing for the sake of it are not good unless they promote or
constitute our pleasure. Epicurus clearly denies this, though. He has in mind cases where
knowledge and philosophizing for the sake of it are good even if they do not promote or
contribute to the pleasantness of our lives. Thus, the goodness of knowledge and philosophy
cannot be explained in all cases by the primary goodness of pleasure, which SRE (2) requires.
I end this chapter by offering some clarifications. I have not argued that knowledge and
philosophizing for the sake of it are not good because they never promote or constitute our
pleasure. There will be many cases, perhaps the majority of them, where knowledge and
philosophizing for the sake of it are good because they promote or constitute our pleasure, or
because they help us to achieve tranquility. Epicurus writes, for example, “If our suspicions
about heavenly phenomena and about death did not trouble us at all and were never anything to
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us, and, moreover, if not knowing the limits of pains and desires did not trouble us, then we
would have no need of natural science.”216 If there were not things that we need to know in order
to live the most pleasant life possible, then it would be unnecessary to study the natural sciences.
Part of the reason, Epicurus argues, that we study the natural sciences is because they help us
overcome our worries and learn which desires we should pursue, both of which bring us closer to
tranquility. In this sense, knowledge will often be instrumentally or constitutively good for us.
There are certain things we should aim to know because it promotes or constitutes the
pleasantness of our lives. I do not deny this. What I deny is that the goodness of knowledge has a
similar explanation in all possible cases. As I argued here, there are at least some circumstances
in which Epicurus argues that knowledge and philosophizing for the sake of it are good,
circumstances in which the pleasantness of our lives is not maintained, promoted further by any
instruments, or constituted further by any ingredients. Thus, the instrumentalist and constitutivist
explanations of goodness fail to explain the goodness of knowledge and philosophy in all cases.
This is precisely why this dissertation argues for reading Epicurus as an objective good
perfectionist. To say that Epicurus is an objective goods perfectionist is to say that there is a
plurality of goods worth pursuing, and that when we pursue them in the right proportion, we
achieve eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is realizing and pursuing the best things in life. Some of these
goods are sometimes worth pursuing for the sake of pleasure, although some of them are at many
times not worth pursuing for the sake of pleasure, contrary to what SRE alleges. Some of these
goods are worth choosing at least sometimes for the very sake of themselves, because to do so
just is to live the best life, to be eudaimon. Knowledge and philosophy are two such goods. This

RS XI. εἰ μηθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν καὶ αἱ περὶ θανάτου, μήποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ᾖ τι,
ἔτι τε τὸ μὴ κατανοεῖν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ τῶν επιθυμιῶν, οὐκ ἄν προσεδεόμεθα
φυσιολογίας.
216
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is precisely what it means for them to be objective goods: they are goods worth choosing, at least
sometimes, in and of themselves, because to pursue them in the right way is to live the best
possible life.
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CHAPTER 5: TRANQUILITY, EUDAIMONIA, AND THE BEST POSSIBLE
LIFE

5.1

Introduction
Epicurus is usually taken to argue that tranquility is the final telos, so that all actions

ought to aim at bringing about a total absence of bodily pain and mental turmoil that we
acknowledge as such. As Brown puts it, “…no activity is to be done unless it brings about an
absence of pain and disturbance.”217 If this is correct, then tranquility must be complete as an
end. Epicurus adopts this criterion from Aristotle, which I discuss in Section 5.2 of this chapter.
If tranquility is complete as an end, two things follow. First, there is no single action we ought to
perform that is not ultimately for the sake of tranquility. Second, our lives do not improve once
we achieve tranquility. I argue that Epicurus rejects both of these claims. There are actions we
should perform that are not for the sake of tranquility, and there are goods that we should
cultivate that are not for the sake of eliminating pain or anxiety. Insofar as we perform these
actions and cultivate these goods, our lives improve beyond tranquility218, provided that we have
already achieved a stable freedom from pain and worry. Tranquility thus cannot be the final telos
because there can be an end more complete than freedom from bodily pain and mental turmoil.
In this chapter, I first explain why various scholars attribute to Epicurus the view that
tranquility is the final end. Second, I explain the shortcomings of these attributions, i.e., I
demonstrate that the reasons offered are insufficient for attributing to Epicurus the claim that
Eric Brown, “Contemplative Withdrawal in the Hellenistic Age,” Philosophical Studies 137, no. 1
(2008): 84.
218
To say that humans can improve their lives beyond tranquility is to say that there is a life that is better
than the life of tranquility: that in which a human achieves stable freedom from pain and worry but
continues to cultivate the goods of life that in no way promote or constitute tranquility or its maintenance.
217
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tranquility is the final telos. Third, I develop a positive account of what Epicurus describes as the
final end. I argue that this is eudaimonia: the activity of pursuing and cultivating the best things
in life. Eudaimonia and tranquility are not identical. We achieve tranquility by developing a
stable freedom from pain and worry recognized as such. Achieving tranquility will be a
necessary condition for achieving eudaimonia since tranquility itself is one of the best things in
life. Nevertheless, achieving tranquility does not entail the realization of all the best things in
life, which means that there is an end more complete than tranquility. Consequently, living the
best life requires something more than tranquility; we live the best life by pursuing eudaimonia.

5.2

Blessedness, Tranquiliity, and Eudaimonia
Scholars have paid little attention to the distinctions among blessedness, tranquility, and

eudaimonia in Epicurus’ work. Many take it to be obvious that blessedness produces tranquility,
and that tranquility and eudaimonia are identical. This explains why some scholars, e.g., G.
Lesses and J. Annas, think that tranquility is the final telos. On this view, Epicurus argues that
eudaimonia is that for the sake of which we should do everything else. Since tranquility just is
eudaimonia on this reading, tranquility is that for the sake of which we should do everything
else. I argue that this is mistaken. In order to get clear on the nature of blessedness, tranquility,
and eudaimonia, let us consider the texts in which Epicurus distinguishes among them and
explains each.
Blessedness appears to be a property of a life that goes well in a number of passages.
(Ep. Hdt. 78-80; Ep. Pyth. 84; RS XXVII; Sent. Vat. 52; Fin. 1.65). Ep. Hdt. 78 says that, “…one
must believe that it is the job of physics to work our precisely the cause of the most important
things, and that blessedness lies in this part of meteorological knowledge and in knowing what

133
the natures are which are observed in these meteorological phenomena…”219 The claim here is
that blessedness requires some knowledge of meteorology. This seems strange until a few lines
later, where Epicurus tells us that, “…if we think that [something] might also occur in some
particular way and recognize the very fact that it [might] happen in many different ways, we
shall be as free from disturbance as if we knew that it occurred in some particular way.”220 In the
context of Ep. Hdt., what Epicurus means is that we cannot achieve ataraxia if we think that
meteorological phenomena are caused by the gods. On the contrary, we must understand that
they happen because of natural laws, and it is the job of physics to work these out. Thus, the
claim is that we are blessed by having this knowledge because it brings us closer to tranquility.
In Ep. Pyth. 84, Epicurus says something similar: that the pursuit of some knowledge is good
because it makes us blessed: “Cleon delivered to me your letter, in which you continued to
display good will to us worthy of our concern for your friend and you tried, not unconvincingly,
to recall the lines of reasoning that contribute to a blessed life.”221 RS XXVII makes a similar
point, which is that, “Of the things which wisdom provides for the blessedness of one’s whole
life, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship.”222 This claim is different from the others.
It is not that knowledge contributes directly to blessedness, but that the possession of friendship
makes our life the most blessed and wisdom provides this insight. Cicero must have known about
Sent. Vat. 52, because he says in Fin. 1.65 that, “Epicurus indeed says this on the topic: that of
Καὶ μὴν καὶ <τὸ> τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων αἰτίαν ἐξακριβῶσαι φυσιολογίας ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν,
καὶ τὸ μακάριον ἐν τῇ περὶ μετεώρων γνώσει ἐνταῦθα πεπτωκέναι καὶ ἐν τῷ τίνες φύσεις αἱ θεωρούμεναι
κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα ταυτί…
220
Ep. Hdt. 80, ἂν οὖν οἰώμεθα καὶ ὡδί πως ἐνδεχόμενον αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι [καὶ ἐν ποίοις ὁμοίως
ἀταρακτῆσαι], αὐτὸ τὸ ὅτι πλεοναχῶς γίνεται γνωρίζοντες, ὥσπερ κἂν ὅτι ὡδί πως γίνεται εἴδωμεν,
ἀταρακτήσομεν.
221
Ἤνεγκέ μοι Κλέων ἐπιστολὴν παρά σου, ἐν ᾗ φιλοφρονούμενός τε περὶ ἡμᾶς διετέλεις ἀξίως τῆς
ἡμετέρας περὶ σεαυτὸν σπουδῆς καὶ οὐκ ἀπιθάνως ἐπειρῶ μνημονεύειν τῶν εἰς μακάριον βίον
συντεινόντων διαλογισμῶν
222
ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας
κτῆσις.
219
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all the things which wisdom has contrived which contribute to a blessed life none is more
important, more fruitful, or more pleasing than friendship.”223 Sent. Vat. 52 makes a similar
claim about the connection between friendship and blessedness: that friendship leads to the
blessedness of our lives: “Friendship dances around the world announcing to all of us that we
must make up to its blessedness.”224 All of these passages describe how various goods, e.g.,
friendship and knowledge, contribute to the blessedness of our lives. Ep. Men. 128 describes the
relation between blessedness and tranquility. “The steady evaluation of [desires] enables one to
refer every choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the freedom of the soul from
disturbance, since this is the goal of living blessedly.”225 The claim here is that a lack of
disturbance is the telos of a blessed life. We live blessedly in order to achieve ataraxia, and we
live blessedly by cultivating the goods that free us from disturbances in our bodies and minds.
These passages demonstrate that there is a causal connection between blessedness and
tranquility for humans. A handful of other passages clarify that the same is true for the gods. We
know from Ep. Men. 123 that the gods are blessed.226 We also know from RS I that to be blessed
is to have no troubles.227 To have no troubles and recognize this is to be tranquil, so the gods
enjoy absolute tranquility in virtue of their blessedness, which is a part of their very nature. This
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de qua Epicurus quidem ita dicit, omnium rerum, quas ad beate vivendum sapientia comparaverit, nihil
esse maius amicitia, nihil uberius, nihil iucundius.
224
ἡ φιλία περιχορεύει τὴν οἰκουμένην κηρύττουσα δὴ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν ἐγείρεσθαι ἐπὶ τὸν μακαρισμόν.
225
τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν
καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος.
226
First, believe that god is an indestructible and blessed animal, in accordance with the general
conception of god commonly held, and do not ascribe to god anything foreign to his indestructibility or
repugnant to his blessedness. πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων, ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ
θεοῦ νόησις ὑπεγράφη, μηθὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ
πρόσαπτε·
227
What is blessed and indestructible has no troubles itself, nor does it give trouble to anyone else, so that
it is not affected by feelings of anger or gratitude. For all such things are a sign of weakness. τὸ μακάριον
καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει· ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται· ἐν
ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.
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explains the connection between blessedness and tranquility in the case of humans. Gods cannot
fail to be tranquil because blessedness produces tranquility and the gods necessarily enjoy full
blessedness. Human must work to become tranquil, and they do so by cultivating the things that
produce blessedness for them. This is why Epicurus says in Ep. Men. 128 that freedom from
disturbance is the telos of a blessed life. Living blessedly aims for eliminating pains and worries,
i.e., ridding oneself of disturbance in body and mind. Accomplishing this is achieving tranquility.
Let us now consider the passages that discuss eudaimonia. One of the most important is
Ep. Men. 122, which says, “Therefore, one must practice the things which produce eudaimonia,
since if that is present we have everything and if it is absent we do everything in order to have
it.”228 Here Epicurus says that eudaimonia is the final end; if we have eudaimonia, then we have
everything worthwhile. If we do not have eudaimonia, then we do everything in order to have it.
Another passage that mentions eudaimonia is Ep. Men. 127, where Epicurus says that, “One
must reckon that of desires some are natural, some groundless; and of the natural desires some
are necessary and some are merely natural; and of the necessary, some are necessary for
eudaimonia, and some for freeing the body from disturbance, and some for life itself.”229 Here
Epicurus distinguishes between freedom from disturbance in body and eudaimonia, so we know
that he cannot take aponia and eudaimonia to be identical with one another. This leaves it
possible that eudaimonia is identical with the conjunction of aponia and ataraxia perceived as
such, which is what Annas and Lesses argue. I argue against this in Section 5.4. There will be
cases where the pursuit of eudaimonia and the pursuit of ataraxia come apart, and if this is the
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case, they cannot be identical. I reconstruct the texts to show that, according to Epicurus, there
are things we should do for the sake of eudaimonia that we cannot do for the sake of ataraxia. If
we do these things, provided we have already achieved a stable freedom from pain and worry,
then our lives improve. Thus, tranquility cannot be the most final and complete end. Rather, this
is eudaimonia. Achieving tranquility is a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving
eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is the structured pursuit of the best things in life, and since this
outstrips the achievement of tranquility, eudaimonia rather than ataraxia must be the final telos.

5.3

The Argument for SRE (3)
Long and Sedley claim that, “Although freedom from bodily pain and freedom from

mental disturbance jointly constitute the Epicurean good, the superiority of mental
pleasure…makes freedom from mental disturbance, or tranquility, the supreme hallmark of
Epicurean happiness.”230 Here Long and Sedley insist that tranquility is the good according to
Epicurus. It remains unclear what Long and Sedley mean when they say that freedom from pain
and mental disturbance “jointly constitute” the Epicurean good, and thus the Epicurean telos.
They seem to mean that the telos is nothing but the full absence of pain and worry. Whatever
they mean, since tranquility is constituted by freedom from pain and worry, it follows that our
end consists in nothing but eliminating all of our pains and anxieties. Because this is another way
of saying that tranquility is the final end, Long and Sedley take Epicurus to claim that achieving
both aponia and ataraxia is that for the sake of which we should do everything else. As evidence
of this, Long and Sedley point to a number of passages231, one of which is Ep. Men. 127:
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We must reckon that some desires are natural and others empty, and of the natural some
are necessary, others natural only; and of the necessary some are necessary for
eudaimonia, others for the body’s freedom from stress, and others for life itself. For the
steady observation of these things makes it possible to refer every choice and avoidance
to the health of the body and the soul’s freedom from disturbance, since this is the end of
a blessed life. For we do everything on account of this – to be free from pain and anxiety.
ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ κεναί, καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ
μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον· τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν
ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν. τούτων γὰρ
ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν
καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος. τούτου γὰρ πάντα
πράττομεν, ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν.232
Since Ep. Men. 127 says that the health of the body and the soul’s freedom from disturbance are
that for which we do everything, Long and Sedley have prima facie evidence that Epicurus takes
tranquility to be that at which all of our actions should aim. If we are pursuing blessedness,
which just is freedom from pain and worry recognized as such, then tranquility is the telos
I shall argue in 5.4 that tranquility alone cannot be final as an end, for there are goods that
we should pursue in ways that are not for the sake of our freedom from pain and worry. In
fairness to Long and Sedley, Epicurus indeed claims here that we do everything for the sake of
freedom from pain and worry, which is a way of saying that tranquility is an end for us.
Nevertheless, the passage Long and Sedley refer to makes no claims about tranquility being the
only end. Nor does it say that tranquility is the final end. As such, it remains possible that there
are ends other than tranquility, one of which might include it and thus be more complete than it.
Epicurus describes something other than tranquility as that for which all of our actions
aim earlier in the Letter to Menoeceus. After stressing the importance of philosophy for people of
all ages, Epicurus concludes, “Therefore, one must practice the things which produce

argue against this at the end of 5.3 I will thus delay until then a demonstration of how Ep. Men. 131 does
not support such an attribution, when I consider and reject the views of Rosenbaum, Purinton, and Annas.
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eudaimonia, since if that is present we have everything and if it is absent we do everything in
order to have it.”233 Here Epicurus tells us that eudaimonia is self-sufficient and complete as an
end; if we have it, we have everything we need, and if we do not have it, we do everything in
order to obtain it. Hence Ep. Men. 127 and 122 offer prima facie support for mutually exclusive
claims: (1) tranquility is the final telos and (2) eudaimonia is the final telos.234 In 5.4 of this
chapter I suggest that tranquility cannot be complete as an end, and thus not final, because there
are actions we should perform that are not for the sake of tranquility. If this is true, nondisturbance recognized as such cannot be that for the sake of which we should do everything. My
suggestion is that this is why Epicurus presents eudaimonia as the final end in the beginning of
the Ep. Men. Eudaimonia is the structured pursuit of the best things in life, which includes
tranquility. If Epicurus takes tranquility to be the final end, as Long and Sedley suggest, then
tranquility must be either (a) the only end or (b) the most complete of several ends. The passages
on which Long and Sedley depend, however, do not commit clearly Epicurus either to (a) or (b).
Glen Lesses accepts that Epicurus takes the human good to be eudaimonia; nevertheless,
he argues that Epicurus takes eudaimonia to be pleasure. Thus eudaimonia turns out to be
tranquility for Epicurus. Annas argues similarly. She claims that when Epicurus says eudaimonia
is the end, he means that tranquility and eudaimonia are one and the same, i.e., that pleasure is
our “specification of happiness.”235 To support his argument, Lesses claims that Epicurus accepts
the criteria that Aristotle gives for being the final end: it must be self-sufficient and complete. So,
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be the same thing. If that were so, then there would not be multiple goods, and Epicurus would just be
describing freedom from pain and worry in a different way when he calls eudaimonia our final end.
Lesses and Annas seem to take this view. I show why this reading cannot work below.
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the final end must be (a) something at which we aim for its own sake rather than for the sake of
something else and (b) something that results in a life to which nothing can be added to improve
it. To substantiate his claims that Epicurus not only (1) calls the final good eudaimonia and (2)
accepts the Aristotelian conditions for what a final end must be, but also (3) takes eudaimonia to
be pleasure, Lesses cites a passage from Fin.:
We are investigating the final and ultimate good, which as all philosophers agree must be
of such a kind that it is the end to which everything is the means, but it is not itself the
means to anything. Epicurus situates this in pleasure, which he wants to be the greatest
good with pain as the greatest bad.
quaerimus igitur, quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum
sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. hoc
Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult, summumque malum
dolorem…236
Lesses goes on to argue that when Cicero claims that Epicurus takes pleasure to be the ultimate
good, what Cicero means is that Epicurus takes one of the particular forms of pleasure to be the
ultimate good: tranquility.237 As evidence of this, Lesses points us to the same passage that Long
and Sedley use to attribute the claim that tranquility is the final end to Epicurus: Ep. Men. 127.238
When taken together, Lesses concludes that Fin. 1.29 and Ep. Men. 127 commit Epicurus to the
claim that tranquility is the ultimate telos. For Lesses, these passages give good evidence that
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Epicurus takes eudaimonia to be pleasure, which is final and complete, but that eudaimonia is a
specific kind of pleasure: tranquility. It is for the sake of this that we should do everything else.
Yet there are problems with Lesses’ argument and the passages that he uses to support it.
The first is that Cicero is sometimes hostile towards Epicurus and mischaracterizes his positions,
so I recommend caution in taking Cicero to be indicative of what Epicurus actually argues. The
passage that Lesses cites proves this very point. Cicero says that Epicurus takes the final end to
be pleasure, which can be misleading. Anyone who reads Epicurus learns that he distinguishes
among three kinds of pleasure and esteems one form of pleasure above the others: tranquility.
Cicero does not mention this distinction in a way that clarifies Epicurus’ position in the passage
cited, which means Cicero is either deliberately mischaracterizing Epicurus or giving an
inaccurate rehearsal of his claims. So, if there are other texts from Epicurus himself saying
whether or not he takes tranquility to be the final end, we should prefer them as better indicators
of Epicurus’ positions. Fortunately this is true of the second passage that Lesses cites, Ep. Men.
127, which claims that we do everything for the sake of being neither in pain nor in terror. This
seems like prima facie evidence for attributing to Epicurus the claim that tranquility is the final
end.239 Let us consider, however, what Epicurus writes in the following lines:
As soon as we achieve this state [of tranquility], every storm in the soul is dispelled, since
the animal is not in a position to go after some need nor to seek something else to
complete the good of the body and the soul. For we are in need of pleasure only when we
are in pain because of the absence of pleasure, and when we are not in pain, then we no
longer lack pleasure.
ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμών, οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ
ζῴου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι καὶ ζητεῖν ἕτερον ᾧ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος

However, as I pointed out in my discussion of Long and Sedley’s argument, Ep. Men. 127 does not
commit Epicurus to either of the following two claims, which cannot be the case if he thinks tranquility is
the final end: (a) tranquility is the only end or (b) tranquility is the most final of several ends.
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ἀγαθὸν συμπληρώσεται. τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρείαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν
ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν· <ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν> οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα.240
Epicurus’ claim here is that tranquility is sufficient for our well-being. What he seems to mean is
that achieving tranquility completes the good of our bodies and souls, so that once we have it, we
no longer lack anything required for tranquility. However, this does not preclude us from
pursuing things that might continue to make our lives better once we are already tranquil. The
claims that (1) tranquility completes the good of our bodies and souls and (2) once we have
tranquility we need nothing else for it do not entail that (3) there are no reasons to cultivate other
goods or undertake other pursuits once we achieve tranquility. On the contrary, there are reasons
to pursue other goods once we achieve tranquility because our life will get better if we do so
successfully. This is what I argue in 5.4: that tranquility is necessary but not sufficient for our
eudaimonia. Lesses’ view gets this wrong. He and Annas take tranquility and eudaimonia to be
identical, although the two concepts come apart. I argue in 5.4 that there are cases in which the
pursuit of tranquility and eudaimonia are not coextensive. Living the best life requires
tranquility, but life can improve beyond tranquility. Thus achieving non-disturbance cannot be
the final end since when we accomplish this feat, there are reasons that we should cultivate
certain goods and undertake other pursuits, as Epicurus actually recommends. Hence there must
be something more complete for the sake of which we should do these things after achieving
tranquility.
Setting Lesses’ argument aside, other scholars of Epicurus take him to claim that
tranquility is the final end because they allege that this is entailed by two of his other
commitments: (1) pleasure is a telos and (2) tranquility is the highest kind of pleasure.
Rosenbaum, for example, argues that, “…one may take it that the end of the Epicurean good life
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is katastematic mental and physical pleasure.”241 Rosenbaum takes Epicurus to claim that
pleasure is the good, and the highest form of pleasure just is tranquility, i.e., katastematic mental
and physical pleasure. Consequently, Rosenbaum writes, “…it is important to realize that
Epicurus regarded the highest good as ataraxia/aponia, these constituting katastematic
pleasure.”242 As evidence, Rosenbaum cites Ep. Men. 131, in which Epicurus writes,
So when we say that pleasure is a goal we do not mean the pleasures of the profligate or
the pleasures of consumption, as some believe, either from ignorance and disagreement
or from deliberate misinterpretation, but rather the lack of pain in the body and
disturbance in the soul. For it is not drinking bouts and continuous partying and enjoying
boys and women, or consuming fish and other dainties of an extravagant table, which
produce the pleasant life, but sober calculation which searches out the reasons for every
choice and avoidance and drives out the opinions which are the source of the greatest
turmoil for men’s souls.
ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν, οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν
ἀπολαύσει κειμένας λέγομεν, ὥς τινες ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦντες ἤ κακῶς
ἐκδεχόμενοι νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μήτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν.
οὐ γὰρ πότοι καὶ κῶμοι συνείροντες οὐδ’ ἀπολαύσεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ’ ἰχθύων
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα φέρει πολυτελὴς τράπεζα, τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾷ βίον, ἀλλὰ νήφων
λογισμὸς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξερευνῶν πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ τὰς δόξας ἐξελαύνων,
ἐξ ὧν πλεῖστος τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει θόρυβος.243
Rosenbaum takes Epicurus to claim here that pleasure is the goal. Moreover, the rest of the
passage goes onto tell us more specifically what kind of pleasure we ought to aim for: the lack of
pain in the body and disturbance in the soul. Since this just is tranquility, the passage appears to
commit Epicurus to the claims that the goal is pleasure, but a specific version of it: tranquility.
Purinton gives reasons similar to Rosenbaum in supporting the claim that pleasure is the
telos. Also citing Ep. Men. 131, Purinton claims that, “…when Epicurus says that pleasure is the
telos, what he means is that the telos is specifically what he calls katastematic pleasure,
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painlessness (the katastematic pleasure of the body) and undisturbedness (the katastematic
pleasure of the soul).”244 Rosenbaum and Purinton disagree about why Epicurus takes tranquility
to be a worthy end. Whereas Rosenbaum takes tranquility to be a worthy telos because the
absence of pain and worry is complete and self-sufficient itself, Purinton stresses that part of
what makes tranquility desirable as an end is that pursuing it entails the satisfaction of many
kinetic desires, which are also good in themselves. Thus, according to Purinton, tranquility is the
telos not only because freedom from pain and worry is the highest good, but because achieving it
leads us to experience many other intrinsic goods of a lesser form: kinetic pleasures. Despite
their disagreement on this point, both take Epicurus to hold that tranquility is the final end
because Ep. Men. 131 says that pleasure is a goal and clarifies that when we say this, what we
mean is that a goal is tranquility, i.e., the absence of pain and worry recognized as such. Annas,
too, argues similarly. She writes in her Morality of Happiness that, “Clearly, the kind of pleasure
which forms our final end is ataraxia (sometimes absence of bodily pain is explicitly added,
sometimes assumed to be included) and this is pleasure of a static rather than a kinetic kind.”245
As evidence, she points to the same passage as Rosenbaum and Purinton: Ep. Men. 131.
Yet the evidence that Rosenbaum, Purinton, and Annas provide, I argue, is insufficient
for attributing to Epicurus the claim that tranquility is the final end. It is true, as they point out,
that Epicurus claims pleasure is a goal. It is also true that what Epicurus means when he says this
is that the highest form of pleasure is a goal, i.e., tranquility is a telos. Finally, Epicurus does
claim in Ep. Men. 131 that it is not the accumulation of kinetic pleasures that produces the
pleasant life, but rather the sober reasoning that helps us to eliminate the beliefs that cause
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anxiety for us. However, these claims do not entail the conclusion that tranquility is final and
complete as an end. In order to attribute this claim to Epicurus, one needs a passage where he
claims that (1) there is nothing we should do that is not for the sake of tranquility and (2) our
lives cannot improve once we achieve tranquility. Ep. Men 131 does not commit Epicurus to
either (1) or (2). It says that pleasure is a telos, not the only telos or the final telos. There is no
indication in Ep. Men. 131 that pleasure is the only end or the most final end, but only that it is
an end. The same is true for all of the evidence that Long, Sedley, Lesses, Rosenbaum, Purinton,
and Annas offer: they commit Epicurus to neither (1) nor (2), whether taken individually
together. Thus none of their evidence is sufficient for attributing the claim that tranquility is the
final telos to Epicurus. There is no sufficient evidence for this because, I argue, Epicurus rejects
it. Achieving clarity about what tranquility is reveals that it is neither final nor complete; for not
only are there goods that we should pursue over and above tranquility; our lives will improve
beyond tranquility to the extent that we do so. Thus Epicurus must posit some end that is more
final and complete than tranquility. This is eudaimonia, which is not identical to tranquility.

5.4

The Argument against SRE (3)
Insofar as Epicurus describes eudaimonia as a telos, we know that tranquility is not his

only candidate for an end. Thus emerges the question of which of these is more final and
complete. I argue that the answer is eudaimonia. In order to see why this is correct, we must
consider carefully what tranquility is. It is a condition in which someone experiences no bodily
discomfort or mental turmoil, no pain or worry, and realizes that this is the case. I am tranquil
when I know that I am totally free from any disturbance in my body and soul. In this respect,
tranquility is defined negatively; it is characterized by the absence of various factors that, if any
were present, would mean that tranquility would not be present. We need to look no further than
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Ep. Men. 128 and 131 to understand tranquility as such. The former passage says that a condition
of bodily health and freedom from disturbance in the soul is the goal of living blessedly, which is
why we do everything for the sake of ridding ourselves of pain and terror. The second says that
pleasure is a goal, which turns out to mean that the lack of pain in body and disturbance in soul is
an end. Both passages describe tranquility as a state of non-disturbance; each portrays tranquility
as a condition devoid of certain factors: pain and worry. However, there is one positive aspect of
tranquility. To be tranquil, we must not only be free from disturbance, but we must also realize
that this is so. Tranquility consists in both (1) the absence of pain and worry and (2) the
perception of our condition as such. We learn that tranquility has this positive aspect from
Torquatus: “The pleasure we pursue is not that alone which sets in motion our physical being
itself in some agreeable way and is perceived by the senses with a certain delight, but rather we
hold that the greatest pleasure is that which is perceived when all pain has been taken away.”246
So suppose tranquility is indeed the final end. If this is correct, then two entailments
follow. First, tranquility must be final, which means that we cannot justifiably act in ways that
are not for the sake of tranquility. From this it follows that there cannot be goods worth pursuing
that are not for the sake of tranquility itself, so achieving tranquility means that we secure all
worthwhile goods. Second, tranquility must be complete, which means that we do not need
anything other than tranquility to live the best life. One individual could be closer to tranquility
than another, but one cannot have a greater share of tranquility itself than anyone else, for there
is no sense in which someone can have a greater amount of an absence of something. The
tranquility of one individual could be more stable than that of another, but this does not mean
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that the former enjoys a greater share of tranquility than another. Two individuals enjoy
tranquility equally insofar as they are free from disturbance and know it. In light of these two
entailments, if tranquility is final and complete as a telos, the following argument holds.
1.1. Tranquility is the final telos.
1.2. Tranquility is final, i.e., there are no more actions we should perform that are not for
the sake of tranquility (entailment 1 of what it means to be the final telos).
1.3. Tranquility is complete, i.e., there is nothing we can do to improve our lives once we
achieve tranquility (entailment 2 of what it means to be the final telos).
1.4. Tranquility is the freedom from bodily pain and mental turmoil perceived as such (by
definition of tranquility at Ep. Men. 28, 31 & Fin. 1.37).
1.5. There are no actions we should perform that are not for the sake of freedom from all
bodily pain and mental turmoil perceived as such (by 1.2 and 1.4).
1.6. There is nothing we can do to improve our lives once we achieve freedom from all
bodily pain and mental turmoil perceived as such (by 1.3 and 1.4).
The problem with taking Epicurus to argue that tranquility is the final telos is that he
rejects both 1.5 and 1.6. First, Epicurus not only argues that there are actions we should perform
that are not for the sake of freeing ourselves from bodily pain or mental turmoil. There will be
cases, for example, where we should act to cultivate goods in a way that is not simply for the
sake of our freedom from pain and worry. Second, Epicurus argues that we should improve our
lives beyond freedom from pain and worry, and we do so by acting to cultivate these very goods.
In order to argue that Epicurus does not take tranquility to be the final telos insofar as he
rejects 1.5 and 1.6, I do three things. First, I show that Epicurus thinks there are pursuits we
should undertake that are not simply for the sake of our freedom from pain and worry. Second, I
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show that if we undertake these pursuits in the right way, our lives improve beyond tranquility. I
argue that one pursuit satisfying both of these criteria is philosophy. I contend that Epicurus
argues that there are cases in which (1) we should engage in philosophy even though doing so is
not always for the sake of our tranquility, and (2) that our lives improve insofar as we do so.
Third and finally, I provide a separate line of argument to demonstrate Epicurus’ rejection of 1.5
and 1.6. We know that Epicurus claims that the gods are beings who necessarily experience no
pain or worry. Nevertheless, the gods seem to engage in something like the good of friendship. I
argue that the manner in which the gods partake in this good cannot be for the sake of freedom
from pain and worry, since they necessarily enjoy this in virtue of what they are. More to the
point, Epicurus thinks that the condition of the gods improves when they partake in the good of
friendship. Epicurus exhorts us to become godlike in this very sense, so it follows that the same
must be true for us. Not only can we (1) partake in goods over and above tranquility, but also (2)
improve our lives beyond tranquility insofar as we do just that. All of this entails that tranquility
cannot be that for the sake of which we should do everything, i.e., it cannot be the one, final end
Epicurus takes the life of tranquility to be worth living once we achieve it, so there must
be actions worth doing or pursuits worth undertaking even after we free ourselves completely
from pain and worry. We know, for instance, that Epicurus condemns suicide in most cases. He
claims, for example, that, “He is utterly small-minded for whom there are many plausible
reasons for committing suicide.”247 There might be cases where ending one’s life is the best
option, e.g., M has good reasons to believe that her life would be utterly miserable if M
continues to live. Nevertheless, Epicurus seems to think that ceteris paribus one should continue
living. It was this commitment, alongside his alleged endorsement of the claim that tranquility is
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Sent. Vat. 38. μικρὸς παντάπασιν ᾧ πολλαὶ αἰτίαι εὔλογοι εἰς ἐξαγωγὴν βίου.
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the final end, that led the Cyrenaics to raise the following objection against Epicurus: if there is
nothing beyond our end in freedom from pain and worry at which our actions should aim, why
not sleep as much as possible or even kill ourselves, since sleeping persons and corpses are both
free from bodily pain and mental turmoil? They claim, for example, that, “...the removal of the
feeling of pain is not pleasure…since the absence of pain is like the condition of somebody who
is asleep.”248 For similar reasons, “These Cyrenaics reject Epicurus’ definition of pleasure, i.e.,
the removal of what causes pain, stigmatizing it as the condition of a corpse.”249 The objections
are similar. If freedom from pain and worry is that for the sake of which we do everything else,
once we achieve this, we might as well sleep a lot or kill ourselves, for there is nothing left to
accomplish awake or alive. In fact, it might be better to do this since things can only get worse.
The only way that our condition could change would be negatively, by coming to experience
either some bodily pain or mental turmoil, which means tranquility would slip from our grasp.
How Epicurus responds to the Cyrenaics’ objections makes sense of why he rejects the
claim that freedom from pain and worry is the final end. Cooper forcefully shows that the
Cyrenaics’ objections rest on “a gross and merely polemical misrepresentation of [Epicurus’]
doctrine,” since they fail to account for the fact that, “…the pleasure Epicurus is proposing as the
correct goal for a whole life is therefore a certain state of consciousness or perception.” 250 In
other words, the Cyrenaics misunderstand Epicurus’ notion of pleasure because they do not see

Diog. Laert. 2.89. ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις, ὡς εἴρηται παρ᾽ Ἐπικούρῳ, δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶναι
ἡδονή: οὐδὲ ἡ ἀηδονία ἀλγηδών. ἐν κινήσει γὰρ εἶναι ἀμφότερα, μὴ οὔσης τῆς ἀπονίας ἢ τῆς ἀηδονίας
κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπονία οἱονεὶ καθεύδοντός ἐστι κατάστασις.
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Clem. Al., Strom. 2.21, 130.8-9. τὴν ἐκ τῆς πράξεως περιγινομένην ἡδονήν. οὗτοι οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ τὸν
ὅρον τῆς ἡδονῆς Ἐπικούρου, τουτέστι τὴν τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσιν, ἀθετοῦσιν, νεκροῦ κατάστασιν
ἀποκαλοῦντες· χαίρειν γὰρ ἡμᾶς μὴ μόνον ἐπὶ ἡδοναῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ ὁμιλίαις καὶ ἐπὶ φιλοτιμίαις. ὁ δὲ
Ἐπίκουρος πᾶσαν χαρὰν τῆς ψυχῆς οἴεται ἐπὶ πρωτοπαθούσῃ τῇ σαρκὶ γενέσθαι.
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that pleasure and tranquility require consciousness and perception. Thus their objections amount
to very little, since sleeping persons and corpses lack active consciousness and perception. As
evidence for Epicurus’ view that pleasure and tranquility require consciousness and perception,
Cooper points to passages where Epicurus claims that for pleasure to be pleasure, it must be
perceived as such. For example, the Epicurean interlocutor, Torquatus, describes the formal
doctrine in Cicero’s De Finibus by claiming that, “The pleasure we pursue is not that alone
which sets in motion our physical being itself in some agreeable way and is perceived by the
senses with a certain delight, but rather we hold that the greatest pleasure is that which is
perceived when all pain has been taken away.”251 Insofar as tranquility requires consciousness
and perception, which we only have while awake and alive, the tranquil person should keep on
living. The problem is that the tranquil person will continue to engage in worthwhile pursuits and
activities, although there is no clear explanation on SRE (3) for what makes these activities and
pursuits worthwhile. If tranquility is that for the sake of which we should do everything else,
once we achieve tranquility, there are some things that we cannot do for the sake of it anymore.
It is easy to see how if tranquility is merely the absence of pain and worry perceived as
such, one might reasonably suspect that tranquility is incomplete as an end. If this is tranquility,
the claim would be that our telos is something defined mostly by its negative components, i.e.,
our end consists in the elimination of maladies. It is true that tranquility has a positive
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Cic. Fin., 1.37. Non enim hanc solam sequimur, quae suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet et cum
iucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus, sed maximam voluptatem illam habemus, quae percipitur omni
dolore detracto…While I argue that there is reason to be suspicious of Cicero elsewhere, this passage is a
reliable indicator of Epicurus’ views for two reasons. First, I argued elsewhere that we should be
suspicious of Cicero’s own reconstructions of Epicurean arguments, and he seems to be quoting
Torquatus here. Second, what I trust about this passage is very limited: that Epicurus argues pleasure must
be perceived as such in order to be pleasure. Otherwise, our tranquility would not be up to us, which it is.
If tranquility requires absence of pain and worry, and we do not know when we are in pain and worry,
then we are not able to eliminate these disturbances in order to become tranquil in the first place.
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component, i.e., the recognition of our freedom from disturbance. The problem is that this fails to
give our ideal life enough positive content. Adam Barkman seems aware of this when he argues
that Epicurean happiness appears incomplete because it is a negative happiness, i.e., it is a
happiness defined by the absence of bad rather than the presence of good.252 However, some
interpreters take Epicurus to argue that tranquility consists in more than the absence of pain and
worry acknowledged as such. For example, Cooper argues that, “…what Epicurus is pointing to
[when he describes tranquility] is the enjoyably active experience at once of the pain-free,
healthy capacities of one’s body and the undisturbed, unstressed, unconstructed, free play of
one’s mental faculties.”253 Annas has something similar in mind when she claims that, “Static
pleasure is taken to be ataraxia, the state of being untroubled, unhindered in one’s activities: the
condition of normal activity that is not to be bothered by any interference.”254 Both Cooper and
Annas take tranquility to be uninterrupted, good activity. This seems misguided to me. Epicurus
nowhere says that tranquility is unimpeded, worthwhile activity. He says that it is the absence of
pain and worry perceived as such. It is true that the tranquil person will continue to undertake
various pursuits and engage in worthwhile activities. This is my very argument in this chapter.
The problem with Cooper and Annas’ notion of tranquility, however, is that they take
these pursuits and activities to be an essential part of tranquility, which they are not. It is difficult
to see how Epicurus could maintain such a position. SRE (3) alleges that tranquility is final,
which means it must be complete in and of itself. Cooper and Annas’ notion of tranquility as a
state of unimpeded, worthwhile activity seems to miss this. It presupposes that the absence of
pain and worry is good because it enables us to undertake worthwhile pursuits without
Adam Barkman, “Negative Happiness,” Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy 3, no. 1 (June
2009).
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impediment. It claims that the absence of pain and worry perceived as such is not good in itself,
but because it enables us to enjoy our physical and mental faculties without hindrance. Thus it
makes the exercise of these faculties the final telos, while the absence of pain and worry is only
good because it enables us to do so. This notion of tranquility gives the absence of pain and
worry instrumental or constitutive goodness, which Epicurus considers intrinsically good. The
texts show that Epicurus takes the absence of pain and worry perceived as such to be good in
itself.
I suspect that what motivates Cooper and Annas to claim that tranquility is unimpeded,
worthwhile activity is their desire to read Epicurus in a way that gives positive content to our
final end. I am sympathetic to this aim, and it is largely what motivates me to reject SRE (3) in
this chapter. My suggestion is that there is ultimately a better way to do this, one that does not
accept the contradiction that Cooper and Annas’ notions of tranquility do. Engaging in
worthwhile pursuits and activities once we achieve tranquility is good, but not because it is part
of tranquility. Doing so is good because it is what it means to be eudaimon, which is something
more final and complete than tranquility. I have noted that one thing we should continue to do
after freeing ourselves from pain and worry is philosophize. Yet Epicurus thinks that there are
cases where our philosophizing is not for the sake of tranquility, and that our lives improve from
doing philosophy even if we are already in a stable condition devoid of disturbance. He argues,
for example, that there is no time at which it is not good to do philosophy. He starts Ep. Men. by
claiming that, “He who says either that the time for philosophy has not yet come or that it has
passed is like someone who says that the time for eudaimonia has not yet come or that it has
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passed.”255 There are two claims here. First, it is never too early or late to do philosophy. Second,
one never gets to a point where doing philosophy is not worthwhile. Consequently, even the
person who is already devoid of pain and worry with stability should continue to do philosophy.
Tranquility consists in an absence of pain and worry recognized as such, but the tranquil
person has no further pains or worries to eliminate via philosophy, so her philosophizing cannot
be for the sake of tranquility itself. Someone might respond that the tranquil person
philosophizes for the sake of tranquility in the sense that she does philosophy in order to
maintain her tranquility. There are two reasons, however, that this response will not work. First,
Epicurus’ claim in the opening lines of Ep. Men. is that the time is always right for philosophy,
not that we should philosophize whenever we lack tranquility or want to maintain it. All that we
need to do in order to see the shortcomings of the response that tranquility is final and complete
because we do everything in order to maintain it is realize that tranquility is unlikely to require
maintenance. If we take the proper steps in order to achieve tranquility, i.e., we make ourselves
resilient to bodily pain and eliminate all possible sources of anxiety, our tranquility will be very
stable and not require maintenance. Tranquility requires the elimination of sources of turmoil,
not turmoil itself. What produces the pleasant life is “….sober calculation which searches out the
reasons for every choice and avoidance and drives out the opinions which are the source of the
greatest turmoil for men’s souls.” 256 Individuals who have eliminated the sources of their
disturbance achieve tranquility that does not require maintenance, for disturbances are unlikely
to occur for them. If tranquility consists in eliminating sources of disturbance rather than
Ep. Men. 122. ὁ δὲ λέγων ἢ μήπω τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν ὥραν ἢ παρεληλυθέναι τὴν ὥραν, ὅμοιός
ἐστιν τῷ λέγοντι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι.
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Ep. Men. 132. οὐ γὰρ πότοι καὶ κῶμοι συνείροντες οὐδ’ ἀπολαύσεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ’ ἰχθύων
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα φέρει πολυτελὴς τράπεζα, τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾷ βίον, ἀλλὰ νήφων λογισμὸς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας
ἐξερευνῶν πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ τὰς δόξας ἐξελαύνων, ἐξ ὧν πλεῖστος τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει
θόρυβος.
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disturbances themselves, once we achieve tranquility, disturbances are unlikely, which means
that tranquility will require little maintenance. Second, it remains difficult to see how doing
philosophy would help us maintain our tranquility in the first place. We might, for example, keep
our jobs and continue to work after eliminating all our pains and worries because maintaining
our tranquility requires us to have a source of income; we cannot support ourselves without
resources. However, there are no such obstacles for our tranquility in the moment we do
philosophy while tranquil, so philosophy cannot do any work for the sake of it. Perhaps it could
help us learn how to deal with anxieties that might come up in the future, although this seems
self-defeating. As Cooper and Annas rightly suggest, tranquility frees us up for other worthwhile
pursuits and activities. To suggest that tranquility requires maintenance misses this. Claiming
that we continue to do philosophy because it helps us to maintain our tranquility seems to require
that we spend our time coming up with problems that might confront us in the future and prepare
ourselves to deal with them when they come. This seems inconsistent with the nature of
tranquility. Tranquility is a freedom from worry, not a preoccupation with readying ourselves to
deal with the potential problems of tomorrow. Tranquility frees us up for other things, and we
cannot be freed up for other things if spend our time maintaining tranquility itself. For these
reasons, we cannot save the claim that tranquility is final and complete by insisting that we
should engage in activities once we achieve tranquility because they help us to maintain it.
The problem is not only that tranquility fails to be final as an end because we should
sometimes do philosophy in a way that is not for the sake of tranquility itself or maintaining it.
The problem is also that doing philosophy in such cases improves our lives beyond freedom
from pain and worry because we always benefit from philosophizing. Epicurus writes, for
example, that, “In a joint philosophical investigation he who is defeated comes out ahead insofar
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as he has learned something new.”257 The claim here is that doing philosophy is beneficial
because we learn new things by doing it; every instance in which M philosophizes benefits M
because M learns new things from doing so. Philosophy cannot fail to be beneficial for those
who learn from it. There would be no way of explaining these benefits for M, however, if
tranquility were the final telos. We would need to explain any such benefits in terms of
tranquility, which we could not do. Tranquility cannot increase for someone who has it, since it
is merely the freedom from pain and worry recognized as such. The tranquil person has no
further pains or worries to eliminate by doing philosophy. For the same reasons described above,
nor can we explain these benefits in terms of maintaining tranquility. Doing philosophy at t1
cannot help us maintain tranquility at t2 because there is no indication of what problems might
arise at t2. Even if there were, philosophizing at t1 to prepare ourselves to deal with potential
problems at t2 seems to be at odds with the kind of thing that tranquility is. Tranquility frees us
from worries; it does not require us to busy ourselves with preempting whatever troubles might
arise tomorrow. As such, the sense in which Epicurus considers philosophy beneficial remains
inexplicable if tranquility is the final telos. Doing philosophy always benefits us, which means
that philosophizing always improves our lives. If tranquility were the final telos, however, our
lives could never improve beyond freedom from pain and worry perceived as such, which is
precisely why Epicurus must think there is some other and more complete end.258

Sent. Vat. 74. ἐν φιλολόγῳ συζητήσει πλεῖον ἤνυσεν ὁ ἡττηθεὶς καθʼ ὃ προσέμαθεν.
One might respond that tranquility as a form of pleasure is the telos, and that philosophy is beneficial
because it is pleasurable. This solution would not work, though. Epicurus clearly insists that once we
reach tranquility, there is no more pleasure for us to pursue. This is why Epicurus insists in RS XIX that,
“Unlimited time and limited time contain equal [amounts of pleasure], if one measures its limits by
reasoning.” ὁ ἄπειρος χρόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος, ἐάν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα
καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ. We reach the limit of pleasure when we eliminate our pains and worries,
which means that more time adds nothing to the pleasure of our life, for there simply are no additional
pleasures to pursue within that time.
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Since there is at least one pursuit we should undertake that is not for the sake of
tranquility, then we need an account of what Epicurus actually takes the final telos to be.
Epicurus recommends philosophy even if it has no effect on tranquility because it produces
eudaimonia. This is precisely what he goes on to say after claiming that the time is always right
for philosophy.
He who says either that the time for philosophy has not yet come or that it has passed is
like someone who says that the time for eidaimonia has not yet come or that it has
passed. Therefore, both young and old must philosophize, the latter so that although old
he may stay young in good things owing to gratitude for what has occurred, the former so
that although young he too may be like an old man owing to his lack of fear of what is to
come. Therefore, one must practice the things which produce eudaimonia, since if that is
present we have everything and if it is absent we do everything in order to have it.
μήτε νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν, μήτε γέρων ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν. οὔτε
γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδείς ἐστιν οὔτε πάρωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον. ὁ δὲ λέγων ἢ μήπω
τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν ὥραν ἢ παρεληλυθέναι τὴν ὥραν, ὅμοιός ἐστιν τῷ λέγοντι πρὸς
εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι. ὥστε φιλοσοφητέον καὶ νέῳ καὶ
γέροντι, τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων, τῷ δὲ
ὅπως νέος ἅμα καὶ παλαιὸς ᾖ διὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν τῶν μελλόντων· μελετᾶν οὖν χρὴ τὰ
ποιοῦντα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εἴπερ παρούσης μὲν αὐτῆς πάντα ἔχομεν, ἀπούσης δέ πάντα
πράττομεν εἰς τὸ ταύτην ἔχειν.259
Epicurus here claims outright that: (1) it is never not the time to do philosophy and (2) it is never
not the time for eudaimonia. Together (1) and (2) suggest that we do philosophy because it
makes us eudaimon. Admittedly, there will be other reasons that people do philosophy. Some of
us will do philosophy because it helps us come closer to tranquility, e.g., it pays the bills or
removes fears about what is to come. Philosophy has instrumental value for some in this sense.
Epicurus famously argues, for example, that we can undo our worries about death simply by
doing philosophy. All we have to do is understand that death is nothing to worry about since (1)
death cannot affect us while we are alive and (2) nothing can affect us once we die, including
death, because we cease to exist. Nevertheless, there will be cases where we should do
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philosophy in a way that is not for the sake of freedom from pain and worry, and doing so
improves our lives. This explains why Epicurus claims there is never a bad time to do
philosophy. We will philosophize even after achieving tranquility, so we must do it for the sake
of something else. Epicurus takes this something to be eudaimonia. This is why Epicurus claims
only a few lines later that if eudaimonia is absent, we do everything in order to have it. He
acknowledges the inadequacies of tranquility as a candidate for the final end and posits
something more final than freedom from pain and worry at which our actions aim: eudaimonia.
Suppose I am mistaken to argue that Epicurus rejects the claim (1) freedom from pain
and worry is that for the sake of which we do everything else because it is inconsistent with the
claim (2) we should continue to devote ourselves to and benefit from certain pursuits, e.g.,
philosophy, even after achieving stable tranquility. Another argument can get us to the same
conclusion. According to Epicurus, the gods live in absolute tranquility. By virtue of being gods,
they experience neither bodily pain nor mental turmoil as mortals do, since they have no
troubles. In Ep. Men., Epicurus writes, “First, believe that god is an indestructible and blessed
animal, in accordance with the general conception of god commonly held, and do not ascribe to
god anything foreign to indestructibility or repugnant to blessedness.”260 In RS, Epicurus tells us,
“What is blessed and indestructible has no troubles itself, nor does it give trouble to anyone else,
so that it is not affected by feelings of anger or gratitude. For all such things are a sign of
weakness.”261 Together these passages tell us that the gods are blessed.262 Since blessedness is a

Ep. Men. 123. πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων, ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ
νόησις ὑπεγράφη, μηθὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ
πρόσαπτε·
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RS I. τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει· ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε
χάρισι συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.
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It is unclear why Epicurus refers to god in the singular here. In the following lines, he refers to the
gods in the plural and says that they are not like many humans believe them to be. The suggestion is that
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matter of having no weakness, and anything free of weakness neither has troubles nor gives
trouble to anything else, the gods have no troubles. Insofar as the gods have no troubles
themselves, they have neither bodily pain nor mental turmoil, and therefore must be in a
condition of complete tranquility. Nonetheless, Epicurus seems to think that the condition of the
gods can improve beyond mere freedom from pain and worry. He claims, for example, “…the
gods always welcome men who are like themselves, being congenial to their own virtues and
considering that whatever is not such is uncongenial.”263 Similarly, he “…[mentions] elsewhere
the congeniality which god feels for some and the alienation [for others].”264 I argue later that
what Epicurus means by this is that the gods can experience some sort of friendship with
humans, one that consists in feeling congeniality towards another on the basis of shared virtues.
Since friendship is a good, this means that gods experience a good that is not related to their
tranquility. The gods cannot fail to be tranquil, and yet they can experience a good that is not for
the sake of tranquility: friendship with mortals based on shared virtue.265 This means that
tranquility alone is not what makes divine life good. There is at least one good outside of
tranquility that gods experience, which they do when mortals emulate them in being virtuous.
Admittedly, demonstrating that Epicurus takes the gods to enjoy a good over and above
complete tranquility does not guarantee that mortals should also do so. To argue for that further

many humans fail to attribute to them the properties described in the line above: blessedness and
indestructibility. As such, we can take Ep. Men. 123 to make claims about all of the gods, who share a
common nature, which is what I do here.
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Ep. Men. 124. ταῖς γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειούμενοι διὰ παντὸς ἀρεταῖς τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀποδέχονται, πᾶν τὸ μὴ
τοιοῦτον ὡς ἀλλότριον νομίζοντες.
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From books 12 and 13 of On Nature (Arrighetti 27 and 28, 84, 87, 88 U = Philodemus On Piety), as
translated in Gerson and Inwood’s The Epicurus Reader, p. 75.
265
Notice that this has implications for anyone who might try to claim, as I noted, that when Epicurus
calls tranquility the telos, what he might mean is that maintaining tranquility is that for which all of our
actions should aim. Epicurus could not mean this in light of what he says about the gods. The gods cannot
fail to be tranquil, which means their tranquility requires no maintenance, and yet they act for the sake of
something else as I point out here, e.g., a feeling of congeniality towards those similarly virtuous to them.
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point, I must show that mortals can and should also enjoy this good in a way that is not for the
sake of their tranquility. There is support for this claim in the extant writings. Epicurus
consistently encourages mortals to become as godlike as possible. He writes in Ep. Men., for
example, “Practice these and the related precepts day and night, by yourself and with someone
like you, and you will never be disturbed either when awake or in sleep, and you will live as a
god among men. For a man who lives among immortal goods is in no respect like a mere mortal
animal.”266 The point here is that if we adhere to the tenets of Epicureanism, we can live a life
free from disturbance and become godlike. The suggestion is not only that the gods live a life of
non-disturbance, but that mortals should become godlike in the same sense by living among
immortal goods. To insist that we live among immortal goods urges us to imitate the behavior of
the gods. Insofar as doing so requires that we are friends with those who share in our virtues,
Epicurus claims that mortals can experience some of the goods over and above tranquility that
the gods do. Furthermore, the Roman Epicurean, Lucretius, must have noticed Epicurus’ call to
become godlike because he describes the archetype of Epicurean behavior for having
accomplished this very task. De Rerum Natura attributes to Memmius the compliment, “deus ille
fuit, deus” – “that man was a god.”267 Thus we know Epicurus urges us to make ourselves
godlike and we know that we can do so by cultivating immortal goods, i.e., the goods that the
gods enjoy not only because of their tranquility, but those over and above it. I should note that
there is disagreement in the literature about whether Epicurus takes the gods to be real, mindindependent entities or mere noetic projections of ethical ideals. Although I take the realist
Diog. Laert.10.134. ταῦτα οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ μελέτα πρὸς σεαυτὸν ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς <καὶ>
πρὸς τὸν ὅμοιον σεαυτῷ, καὶ οὐδέποτε οὔθ’ ὕπαρ οὔτ’ ὄναρ διαταραχθήσῃ, ζήσῃ δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν
ἀνθρώποις. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔοικε θνητῷ ζῴῳ ζῶν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς. This suggests that living
like a god among men means being free from disturbance, i.e., achieving tranquility. I take this to mean
that tranquility is part of what makes the life of the divine good, not that tranquility is the only or most
final good, or that the life of the gods is good only because they are necessarily tranquil.
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reading to be correct, my argument here works on either interpretation.268 My claim is that
Epicurus encourages us to become godlike by imitating divine behavior. Whether gods turn out
to be real and mind-independent entities or purely psychological projections of ethical ideals,
Epicurus insists that we should aim to imitate the gods.269 One way to do so involves cultivating
immortal goods in a way that is not simply for the sake of tranquility, and our our lives improve
beyond tranquility when we do this.
Let us consider Epicurus’ claim that a man who lives among immortal goods is in no
respect like a mere mortal animal. What makes this claim work is the presupposition that there
are immortal goods, and that a mortal becomes godlike by coming to possess them. I argued in
Chapter 1 that immortal goods are goods typically associated with the gods, the ones that make
their lives good. What immortal goods are remains an open question. Regardless, to make the
argument of this chapter, we need not know exactly what immortal goods are. Rather it is enough
to note that Epicurus commits himself to at least one thing counting as an immortal good:
friendship. “The noble man is most involved with wisdom and friendship, of which one is a
mortal good, the other immortal.”270 Provided my interpretation of immortal goods is correct, to
say friendship is an immortal good is to say that friendship is a good in which the gods partake.
This is consistent with the passage I mentioned earlier, where Epicurus describes the gods as
welcoming and being congenial towards those who are similar in virtue to them. My argument is
that what Epicurus means when he says that the gods are congenial towards those who share in
See David Konstan’s A Life Worthy of the Gods: The Materialist Psychology of Epicurus on these
points. Konstan convincingly argues not only that the Epicurean gods are real beings, but outlines the
various ways in which Epicurus thought that mortal humans can and should become like them.
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For an excellent overview of the anti-realist reading, see Sedley’s “Theological Innatism,” and for an
excellent overview of the realist reading, see Konstan’s “Epicurus on the Gods.” (Both appear in Fish and
Sander’s Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, [Cambridge: 2011]).
270
Sent. Vat. 78. ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ
ἀθάνατον.
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their virtues is that they are (in some sense) friends towards them. Notice here how Aristotelian
this concept of friendship is: friendship involves two beings acknowledging one another’s virtues
and feeling congeniality towards one another because of the virtues they have in common.271 The
more important point is that Epicurus’ counting friendship as an immortal good gives us the link
that we need to bridge the gap between the following claims: (1) the gods partake in goods over
and above tranquility and (2) mortals should do the same thing. It appears that the very reason
that gods are in such a state is because they partake in certain goods, namely friendship, and so if
humans partake in such a good, provided that they are already in the tranquil state when they do
so, humans can improve their lives beyond tranquility. To put the argument more formally:
2.1. A friendship is a relation between two beings who, among other things, feel congeniality
for one another because they are similarly virtuous.
2.2. Friendship is an immortal good (Sent. Vat. 78).
2.3. The gods partake in friendships, i.e., they feel congeniality towards those who are
similarly virtuous (Sent. Vat. 78 and Ep. Men. 124).
2.4. Congeniality towards a similarly virtuous being is a good one can enjoy over and above
tranquility (from 2.3 and the fact that the gods are necessarily tranquil).
2.5. The noble human is involved with the immortal good of friendship (Sent. Vat. 78).
2.6. The noble human is congenial towards those who are similarly virtuous (2.4 and 2.5).
2.7. The noble human can enjoy a good over and above tranquility (2.4, 2.5, and 2.6).

Arist. IX.9.30. If happiness lies in living and being active, and the good man’s activity is virtuous and
pleasant in itself, as we have said at the outset, and if a thing’s being one’s own is one of those attributes
that make it pleasant, and if we can contemplate our neighbors better than ourselves and their actions
better than our own, and if the actions of virtuous men who are their friends are pleasant to good men – if
this be so, the blessed man will need friends of this sort, since he chooses to contemplate worthy actions
and actions that are his own, and the actions of a good man is who his friend have both these qualities.
271
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Since Epicurus accepts 2.7, he must reject the claim that tranquility is the final end. If
tranquility were the final end, it would have to be that for the sake of which we should do
everything else. Insofar as we can aim for and enjoy goods over and above tranquility, it cannot
be the final end. Two of these goods are philosophy and friendship. Since philosophy is always
good for us, but we cannot benefit in any additional way once we achieve tranquility, there must
be some end over and above freedom from bodily pain and mental turmoil for the sake of which
we do philosophy. Similarly, since friendship adds to the sense in which the gods enjoy
themselves even though they already experience tranquility, tranquility cannot be the gods’ final
end. Thus to the extent that mortals should partake in friendship in the same sense, tranquility
does not exhaust the limit of the goods we can enjoy, so there must be something outside of
freedom from pain and worry at which our actions should aim once we achieve tranquility.
I argued here is that this is eudaimonia for two reasons. First, a number of claims that
Epicurus endorses preclude him from taking tranquility to be the final telos, which means we
need something else to take on this role. Second, Epicurus calls this eudaimonia at Ep. Men. 122.
If my argument is correct, then it remains true that tranquility is an end that many of our actions
should aim for, and to the extent that we are successful in doing so, our lives will go well.
However, it cannot be the only end, nor can it be the most final and complete of several ends.
Only eudaimonia qualifies as an end that is final and complete by Epicurus’ definition; it gives
structure to the pursuit of all worthwhile goods that make our lives go well, tranquility included.
This is precisely why this dissertation argues that Epicurus is an objective goods
perfectionist. This means that eudaimonia is the realization and pursuit of the best things in life.
Some of these are sometimes worth pursuing for the sake of pleasure, although some of them are
at many times not worth pursuing for the sake of pleasure, contrary to what SRE alleges.
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Epicurus is not a monist about the good. He rejects the notion that pleasure is the only good, and
that all other goods are only good because of their relation to pleasure, because they either
promote or constitute pleasure. Rather there is a plurality of goods worth pursuing, e.g., virtue,
friendship, knowledge, etc., worth pursuing sometimes for their own sake, sometimes for the
sake of tranquility, and sometimes for the sake of other goods. Pleasure plays an important role
in our eudaimonia. Achieving tranquility is a necessary condition for living the best life, and
many goods are worth pursuing because they promote or constitute our tranquility. Nevertheless,
tranquility is not the most final and complete end that Epicurus posits. This is eudaimonia, which
we achieve by pursuing a plurality of goods in the right way. Some of these are objectively good,
i.e., worth choosing in themselves, because to pursue them in the right way is to live the best life.

5.5

Further Concerns and Conclusions
I end this chapter by noting that my argument has implications for how we understand

some of Epicurus’ other views. One of his most distinctive arguments claims that death is
nothing to us, so we should not worry about our mortality. This seems to presuppose that
tranquility is the final telos. Since all that one must do in order to secure the final end is not feel
pain and not worry (and realize that this is so), one does not need a whole lot of life to achieve
this task, which downplays the sense in which death could be troubling to us. We consider death
bad because it deprives us of something, but if we achieve tranquility, we have already secured
the final end, and so we can be deprived of nothing. Once we take Epicurus to claim there are
goods beyond tranquility we should pursue and from which we can benefit, however, we renew
the sense in which death might be troubling to us, for we recognize that the tranquil person could
always use more time to pursue the best things in life. So there seems to be tension between the
arguments that I develop in this chapter and how we understand Epicurus’ views on death.
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Although this seems a difficulty for our understanding of Epicurus, refusing to attribute
to him the claim that tranquility is the final telos does not create any real inconsistency between
Epicurus’ views. His claims about whether death should be troubling to us are largely
misunderstood. A handful of scholars are already working to demonstrate that the standard
interpretation of Epicurus on death and the irrelevance of the duration of one’s life is mistaken.
Kirk Sanders, for example, recently argued that death could prove troubling to an Epicurean in
certain circumstances, e.g., suppose someone dies before achieving tranquility.272 What I argue
in this chapter offers new reasons to take the alternative reading that Sanders develops. If it is
correct, even the Epicurean Sage who has already achieved tranquility might prefer a longer life
to a shorter one because it gives her more time to spend philosophizing and enjoying her
friendships, i.e., a longer life gives her more time to realize and then pursue the best things in
life. She has more time to partake in philosophy and friendships, to live the best life possible.
The argument of this chapter also affects how we should understand Epicurus in relation
to Aristotle, particularly with respect to the notion of final ends, the nature of friendship, what
makes the lives of humans and gods good, and the respect in which mortals should become
godlike. Both Epicurus and Aristotle seem to think (1) that there must be something for the sake
of which we should do everything else, (2) that some friendships involve beings feeling
congenial towards one another because of their shared virtues, (3) that there is a difference
between what makes the life of humans good and what makes the lives of gods good, and (4) that
human lives can improve insofar as humans make themselves godlike. Interestingly, however,
Epicurus calls wisdom a mortal good and friendship an immortal one, which means that humans
Kirk R. Sanders, “Philodemus and the Fear of Premature Death,” in Fish and Sanders’ Epicurus and
the Epicurean Tradition, (Cambridge University Press: 2011), 234. “But attainment of this more
restricted form of distinctly human happiness is also perfectly compatible with the recognition that, at
least under certain circumstances, death could prove something to us after all.”
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act in a godlike manner by feeling congenial towards those who are similarly virtuous. On the
other hand, Aristotle thinks that humans act in a godlike manner by contemplating. So while both
agree that mortals can imitate the life of the gods, they seem to have different accounts of how
mortals should go about doing so: friendship is divine and wisdom is mortal for Epicurus, and
vice versa for Aristotle.273 It would be beyond the scope of this chapter to say much more about
this, but my argument has implications for how we understand Epicurus as both a compliment
and contrast to Aristotle. Since historians of philosophy often do not rank Epicurus among the
ancient philosophers with the most gravitas, demonstrating that Epicurus adopts various aspects
of the Aristotelian framework while modifying it in interesting ways is a worthwhile task.

273

This is not to say that Epicurean gods are not wise, but only that Epicurus seems to associate wisdom
with mortals more than the gods, whereas Aristotle thinks contemplative activity is essentially divine.
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